Political Crossfire Forums

[Fido]

Skiazo wrote: To find truth, one need only to look around. The laws of nature are truth and the only truth that mankind needs.

How do you know, and by the way, how do you do?

[The Impeacher]

Nathyn wrote: Regarding the essay I wrote a while ago about theories of truth, someone did convince me that nothing substantial can be said about the truth. Well, I was just thinking about symbolic representations of the truth. Tarski's objection to truth-theory apparently seems to be the same as mine, but still, the semantic theory of truth is equally objectionable.

[...]

In mathematics, Tarski's indefinability theorem states, "Arithmetical truth cannot be defined in arithmetic." Well, with that same reasoning, "Truth cannot be defined in statements of the truth."

And so, I'd argue that truth is indefinable. We can say nothing substantial about it, but only understand it based upon our intuitions about it. Rather than having discovered a more rational definition of truth, Tarski discovered the only rational way of modeling the truth.

Informally, the semantic theory of truth seems most right: If we consider "truth," to be that which is understood through rational observation, then what the majority of scientists claim to be true is most likely to be correct. They are the most intelligent and have reviewed the most evidence, and so, in my opinion, scientists have tended to be the most truthful, historically. And science as an institution is self-correcting, lending credibility to the suggestion that "truth," is nominal, always moving towards an apparently absolute truth.

Formally, the semantic theory of truth is the only one which is valid, mathematically. But still, the semantic theory of truth, like all truth-theories, is self-asserting, so it's questionable. And the semantic theory of truth doesn't really seem to define "truth," at all, but it's merely a model containing persons who believe they've conceived of the truth. With regard to the semantic theory of truth, if truth is defined in terms of specific languages which define the truth, then how does one determine which language's definition of the truth is, in fact, representative of the truth?

Just curious, do you mean to imply that truth cannot exist in abstraction?

Because I would say that is a false claim... ;)

[Skiazo]

Fido wrote: Skiazo wrote: To find truth, one need only to look around. The laws of nature are truth and the only truth that mankind needs.

How do you know, and by the way, how do you do?

I am well, happy Thanksgiving to all. :)

Knowledge is a means to an end. Due to this, no matter what we believe, or what theory mankind may come up with, it's measure of truth will ultimately be judged by our objective reality when the theory is attempted to be applied to it. Physical, social, and political experiments are essentially a way of asking reality "Is this true?".

Albeit, as Fido has said...
Quote: ...most people who deal in truth at all seem happy with a near approximation. There are degress of resolution, or accuracy, to what the "whole" truth is. However, since knowing "truth" is only necessary when it is to be applied for some ends, these approximations need only hold up to the level of accuracy of truth that apply to it's ends.

[anselfir]

one can of course create conditions in which the whole truth is needed, quite arbitrarily, such as engaging in a discussion on truth. ;)

[Fido]

anselfir wrote: one can of course create conditions in which the whole truth is needed, quite arbitrarily, such as engaging in a discussion on truth. ;)

I don't mean to dog you. Certainly in the political and scientific spheres, truth equating with power rather than wisdom creates a greater need for a certain whole truth. On the one hand, whether looking at an individual life, or the life of humanity, there is no limit to the amount of truth that is needed with one exception. If the truth reveals as fact what I believe it suggests, that there is no escape from the behavior of humanity nor the reality that we shall one and all someday perish without hope with the death of this planet, then the fatality of our existence might depress us into an early extinction much as the sense of fatality in individuals often brings out their worst behavior rather than their best behavior. If the truth is that we are doomed then the joy of the moment, and of the wonder of life may yet give us purpose. If the truth is that there is no purpose, then it may well be too much to handle. But then, who looks for truth without the nerve to face it?

[anselfir]

Well, where to start. I suppose we could always define a useful definition for truth that will bring hope and happiness to those who define it, and doing so would be a good thing, for those who are happy in doing this. However, is it necessary to live in the truth to be totally happy, or is it ok to live in ignorance also. of course this depends on which truth, in what area. There are practical arguments for knowing the truth, since the world works according to the truth, and not to any particular individual's beliefs (sadly the latter is all we can hope to gather, given our existence in the world has a beginning, a beginning in whcih "everything" is undefined to us, or, a beginning in which we are asked to define everything), and not knowing the truth may one day lead to deviations between expectation and reality. Then there are the more elegant outlooks, such as somehow tying truth to a more complete form of being, or even the simple statement that those who pursue the truth do so because they love the truth, or something like that. Why one loves the truth, because it is necessary in order to find one's place in teh world, to place your true self in a world of trues, after all, we are all too fragile and stupid to be God.

[Nathyn]

The Impeacher wrote: Nathyn wrote: Regarding the essay I wrote a while ago about theories of truth, someone did convince me that nothing substantial can be said about the truth. Well, I was just thinking about symbolic representations of the truth. Tarski's objection to truth-theory apparently seems to be the same as mine, but still, the semantic theory of truth is equally objectionable.

[...]

In mathematics, Tarski's indefinability theorem states, "Arithmetical truth cannot be defined in arithmetic." Well, with that same reasoning, "Truth cannot be defined in statements of the truth."

And so, I'd argue that truth is indefinable. We can say nothing substantial about it, but only understand it based upon our intuitions about it. Rather than having discovered a more rational definition of truth, Tarski discovered the only rational way of modeling the truth.

Informally, the semantic theory of truth seems most right: If we consider "truth," to be that which is understood through rational observation, then what the majority of scientists claim to be true is most likely to be correct. They are the most intelligent and have reviewed the most evidence, and so, in my opinion, scientists have tended to be the most truthful, historically. And science as an institution is self-correcting, lending credibility to the suggestion that "truth," is nominal, always moving towards an apparently absolute truth.

Formally, the semantic theory of truth is the only one which is valid, mathematically. But still, the semantic theory of truth, like all truth-theories, is self-asserting, so it's questionable. And the semantic theory of truth doesn't really seem to define "truth," at all, but it's merely a model containing persons who believe they've conceived of the truth. With regard to the semantic theory of truth, if truth is defined in terms of specific languages which define the truth, then how does one determine which language's definition of the truth is, in fact, representative of the truth?

Just curious, do you mean to imply that truth cannot exist in abstraction?

Because I would say that is a false claim... ;)
Not perfectly accurately, no. See my recent thread about an inflationary theory of truth.

Language limits the extent to which we can comprehend and express truth. It limits truth to the set of facts which are expressable.

For example, language limits us in expressing non-existence. One cannot argue, "The world does not exist," or "I do not exist," because one of the axioms of language is that the asserter exists.

The world may not, in fact, exist and I may not, in fact, exist. But I can't express that in language. Words also don't bear meaning in of themselves, but bear different, albeit similar meanings for different people. When I say, "Jesus Christ," we may mostly be talking about the same person, but our actual conception of the idea of Jesus Christ can be vastly different. Every concept has an entire world of experience-derived facts attached to it and that's lost when projected, symbolically. So, language is useful, but very inaccurate.

Taking into account the incompleteness theorems, formal systems (such as truth, logic, and experience) cannot be defined in terms of themselves. And so, it is impossible to truly conceive of the actual, real truth. Continuing scientific study seems to lead us closer to the truth, but it's doubtful we'll ever reach it.

See Plato's allegory of the cave.

[Skiazo]

anselfir wrote: one can of course create conditions in which the whole truth is needed, quite arbitrarily, such as engaging in a discussion on truth. Wink
If the end is simply a discussion, the accuracy of the truth can be way off without reality butting in and necessarily proving it false. If you were to apply what you discuss in some way to reality, reality will then step in with some degree of asserting or disproving the idea. See any politicians advertisements vs. how they perform ;)

Nathyn wrote:
Not perfectly accurately, no. See my recent thread about an inflationary theory of truth.

Language limits the extent to which we can comprehend and express truth. It limits truth to the set of facts which are expressable.

For example, language limits us in expressing non-existence. One cannot argue, "The world does not exist," or "I do not exist," because one of the axioms of language is that the asserter exists.

The world may not, in fact, exist and I may not, in fact, exist. But I can't express that in language. Words also don't bear meaning in of themselves, but bear different, albeit similar meanings for different people. When I say, "Jesus Christ," we may mostly be talking about the same person, but our actual conception of the idea of Jesus Christ can be vastly different. Every concept has an entire world of experience-derived facts attached to it and that's lost when projected, symbolically. So, language is useful, but very inaccurate.

Taking into account the incompleteness theorems, formal systems (such as truth, logic, and experience) cannot be defined in terms of themselves. And so, it is impossible to truly conceive of the actual, real truth. Continuing scientific study seems to lead us closer to the truth, but it's doubtful we'll ever reach it.

See Plato's allegory of the cave.

I wholeheartedly agree with you that to express truth in an abstract form does have some limitations, however, it does not follow that our words are meaningless. Your example of not being able to use language to express that you or the world may not exist....is proof that language does not have as large a limitation as you might think. The reason you can't argue that you don't exist is because you do exist.

In your example of Jesus, you are speaking of ones perception of Him which will have varying degress of accuracy to the truth, depending on that person's perception. You rightly say we may have vastly different concepts of the man, but our concepts have no bearing on the truths about that man, just how we perceive Him. Just from 2 simple words, we can all know whom you speak of, albeit, not every detail of him. This may be accurate enough for what you need to convey, (e.g. if you needed only identify a man and nothing more), however, if it were not accurate enough, you could always add more information (read words) to convey the truth more accurately. In other words, you could add more depth to the concept by supplying as much information as was necessary to form that concept instead of simply providing two pieces of information.

[anselfir]

The end is a discussion on truth. The point being, one can separate the practical utility of truth from truth by recognizing the relativistic nature of utility. That it is flexible enough to not bound anything.