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[Nathyn]

The following is excerpted from something I'm writing.

It's particularly long, but worth reading, in my opinion, anyway. It lays out my general criticism of existing theories of truth and I put forth my own theory of truth: the individualist or egoist theory of truth.

I still need to flesh it out a bit, but I'd like others' opinions.

Quote: Theories of Truth

The Existence of Truth and the Necessity for a Theory of Truth

Every philosophical belief must be supported by a rational theory of truth for it to hold any weight. Because if one’s definition of truth is false, then one cannot make any assertions about what is true because one’s measure of truth-value is itself flawed. If one cannot define a particular realm, then one cannot accurately and convincingly cite examples of such a realm. And so, in this sense, theories of truth are like the foundation for building a house. If one’s theory of truth is false, uncertainty abounds and not a single brick of that house can stand. In similar fashion, the entire philosophy that follows rests upon a particular definition of truth. And so, for my argument, indeed any argument, I must define truth. In this section, I shall define and critique the general concepts of the correspondence theory, the identity theory, the coherence theory, the pragmatic theory, and the recent deflationary theory of truth.

The existence of truth is self-evident, not just in our experiences, but logically as well. From the standpoint of the empiricist, truth exists because we perceive it to exist. From the standpoint of the rationalist, claiming truth does not exist violates the law of non-contradiction, as “Truth does not exist,” is itself a statement of truth. But if contradictions can exist, then anything can be true (“the principle of explosion”). However, if any assertion can be true, then one cannot deny that, “Truth exists,” is a true statement.

I admit that the following section is rather boring and so if parrot-like philosophical conjecture bores you, it would probably be best to skip ahead to and read the "Individualist Theory of Truth,” then leave this section.

The Correspondence Theory of Truth

The correspondence theory of truth, in my opinion, is perhaps one of the oldest and most common theories of truth, yet it is greatly flawed.

The basic definition of the correspondence theory of truth is the idea that an assertion is true because it corresponds to the way things are.

To begin, it must be noted that all theories of truth are inherently normative. That is, in defining truth, they don’t simply define what constitutes an object of truth, but also define methods of gaining truth. And so, the coherence theory of truth implies we should seek out claims which cohere to facts, the consensus theory encourages debate, the pragmatic theory of truth upholds science, and the theory of relative truth implies we should merely decide truth arbitrarily. This is because objects of truth are inseparable from the method. An object of truth is only an object of truth because it was gained through a method of truth. A method of truth is also a prerequisite for any theory of truth itself to be valid or certain.

Now, the problem with the correspondence theory of truth is that it defines objects of truth, but its method of truth is uncertain. Indeed, a true proposition should correspond to the actual circumstances the proposition described and yet, how does one describe these circumstances?

Some assert that there is no need to define methods of truth, yet as asserted above, if methods of truth are not defined, one cannot argue for a theory of truth.

Others assert that a method of truth is defined by truth itself. That is, “truth,” does not even need to have a subject-predicate structure; if a tree falls in a forest, it makes a sound even if there is no one to assert that. The problem with this is that no one can claim that something exists when it is beyond the realm of anyone’s perception. Such claims are noumena, which may exist, but we have no way of knowing. This is ultimately the problem with correspondence theory of truth: its basis for truth is noumena, a hypothetical reality of truth which exists independently of the mind. But since our knowledge consists solely of phenomena, of our perceptions, the correspondence theory cannot be upheld. We can only make claims regarding what we are capable of perceiving.

Furthermore, the correspondence theory of truth’s method of truth is not replicable or verifiable, so it’s hardly even a “method of truth.” For instance, let us assume I was to claim that a tree falling in a forest does make a sound and that this claim is true. The claim itself is true and therefore, the method of truth by which I reached it was truth. However, there essentially was no method. I merely made an assertion. No one can take my same actions and repeat them to again find truth, nor can they analyze the structure of my actions to determine if they should bear truth.

The Identity Theory of Truth

The identity theory of truth asserts that a statement is true when it is identical to reality. The identity theory of truth is similar in many respects to the correspondence theory of truth, which is why I consider it bizarre that the two are “opposed.” Take the correspondence theory, replace “corresponds to,” with “identifies,” and you have the identity theory of truth.

“Corresponds to,” and “identifies,” are almost synonymous. To clarify: What distinguishes identity theorists is basically their claim that true statements do not simply correspond with truth, but rather they are truth, provided that they identify with reality This distinction, however, does not solve the same problem of the correspondence theory: methods of truth in the identity theory of truth again cannot be verified or replicated. As a result, with no clear method of truth, they cannot even argue that their own arguments for truth are sound.

The Coherence Theory of Truth

The coherence theory of truth asserts that a statement holds true if it coheres to some certain set of propositions. As a result, it poses the opposite problem as correspondence theory and identity theory: it accurately defines methods of truth, but its definition of truth is ambiguous.

But which set of propositions should we adhere to?

Some assert that we should adhere to those most widely-held, but this is quite clearly an appeal to popularity. Then there are others which make the absurd assertion that such propositions should cohere to those which would be held by an omniscient being, which yields the same results as the correspondence theory of truth.

Simply put, one cannot define the set of propositions necessary for truth without first defining truth itself, because these propositions consist of truth themselves. They distinguish between objects which should be regarded as self-evident propositions and those which must be proven. In effect, they put forth a lower standard of proof for some claims, in order to build actual truth upon them. But if such a low standard of proof is insufficient for claims of truth, in general, it should be equally insufficient for any proposition, as there is no division in the truth. Their separation of truth into axioms and assertions is entirely artificial, that is, their view of axioms is apparently that axioms are beyond the truth.

The Pragmatic Theory of Truth

The pragmatic theory of truth is largely similar to the coherence theory of truth. That is, truth is regarded by

Pragmatists assert that truth coheres to those principles which are most widely held when people have engaged in rational inquiry.

In addition, they have made one great leap in theories of truth: they recognize truth is nominal. Other theories of truth generally try to establish absolute truth or at least universal certainty. Pragmatists, on the other hand, concede that at best we can establish only temporary certainty. This view is grounded in science, by the observation that scientists and philosophers have historically apparently been most correct about the truth and, when they have been wrong, they have been self-correcting.

And yet, just as with the coherence theory, still this is appeal to popularity, but merely within a narrower framework. Furthermore, even regarding such rational inquiry, how does one define rational inquiry before defining truth?

It also offers no specific direction for how nominal truth should be led. “Science,” is not one conscious unit which makes judgments. There are various theories and disagreements. In defining truth according to rational inquiry, it offers no distinction for what is proper rational inquiry and what is not proper rational inquiry. This is precisely because the definition of rational inquiry relies upon the definition of truth. Without any such definition, it inevitably relies upon coherence theory, to fill in the gaps.

The Deflationary Theory of Truth

Despite being so widely regarded and its founder being so renowned, the deflationary truth is perhaps the silliest theory of truth of them all. The deflationary theory of truth follows as such: Asserting statements of truth is just simply that. For instance, “The sky is blue is true,” is the same as simply saying that the sky is blue. In this respect, statements of truth are regarded as an aspect of communication rather than any property, object, or method.

The problem with deflationism can be best summarized: “The deflationary theory is true,” is the same as simply saying that the deflationary theory is true. In other words, if one applies deflationist reasoning to deflationism itself, then one leads to the conclusion that, being that we cannot understand properties of truth, we cannot understand truth itself either.

In many ways, the deflationary theory of truth is simply the correspondence theory with quotation marks added.

The Individualist Theory of Truth

The problem with all theories of truth, as I see it, is that they both attempt to define truth by attempting to define its objects of truth first, in order to define methods of truth or by defining methods of truth first, in order to define objects of truth. And yet, either method leads to either an incoherent definition of the first or an erroneous definition of the second. Any adequate theory should define both in synchrony.

Many theories of truth also don’t apply their definitions of truth to themselves. That is, they begin with a theory of truth which applies to everything except the theory of truth itself.

However, the greatest point to be made about theories of truth is that what ultimately underlies all theories of truth is individual infallibility. Whether one advocates the coherence theory or the pragmatic theory, each philosopher is certain of their individual belief about truth. Having individual certainty equates with infallibility, because if the proper method of truth is individual certainty, then the only things which can be objects of truth are those we support. This fact of individual certainty and individual infallibility is universal. For this reason, individual infallibility is supported to the same extent as the law of non-contradiction. A person may disagree with the individualist theory of truth just as a person may disagree with the law of non-contradiction. Yet both are proven by merely logically demonstrating that each person unanimously agrees with both principles, whether they recognize it or not.

Quote: Where I is the function of my determinations of truth
And U is the function of other determinations of truth

I (∀Q) → Q
U (∀Q) → Q ⇔ U (Q) = I (Q)

Say that you, the reader, have a particular belief. You cannot believe that your belief is both false and true. And, ultimately, every belief comes down to one or the other. Even in terms of certainty, one leans towards certainty or uncertainty. So, you cannot deny that at any given point in time, from your standpoint, you regard every single one of your beliefs as true.

Other than the circumstance of ignorance, it is impossible to have a perfect equilibrium between certainty and uncertainty, to reach a neutral truth-value. In a state of ignorance, a statement’s truth-value could be said to be zero. Each piece of supporting evidence would increase the numerical value of the truth-value, while each piece of diminishing evidence would decrease the numerical value. It is impossible for any person to be “perfectly certain.” And so, all statements except ones involving ignorance come down to comparable determinations of certainty. While one can be more or less certain, it is impossible to draw a line halfway between both points because the upper-bound, “infallible certainty,” does not exist.

However, if no such halfway point exists, how can we draw the line between truth and falsehood? Such a line is drawn immediately above zero. If merely one piece of evidence supports a claim, from the individual perspective, it can be said to be infallible, or more appropriately, “true.” Each additional piece of evidence may increase or decrease certainty, but infallibility remains the same provided that one’s certainty remains above zero, that is, above ignorance.

The individualist theory of truth also solves the problem of having to favor defining objects of truth or methods of truth. Being that truth is defined by me, both are defined at precisely the same time.

An accurate summation of the individualist theory of truth would be simply, “I am always right because I cannot disagree with myself. Even when I have been wrong, I have recognized myself as wrong, and therefore am right.”
This is the philosophical basis for why I believe I should rule the world.

[Gus]

"Which theory of truth is true?" seems very circular, IMO. Sort of begging the question.

[Katsumoto]

Nathyn wrote:
Quote:
An accurate summation of the individualist theory of truth would be simply, “I am always right because I cannot disagree with myself. Even when I have been wrong, I have recognized myself as wrong, and therefore am right.”
This is the philosophical basis for why I believe I should rule the world.

In that case we should all rule the world, and since we cannot all rule the world simultaneously, we should all rule only ourselves and that part of the world we currently occupy and own. In other words your theory of truth demands Anarchy.

[Atlas Bergeron]

Quote:
The correspondence theory of truth, in my opinion, is perhaps one of the oldest and most common theories of truth, yet it is greatly flawed.

The basic definition of the correspondence theory of truth is the idea that an assertion is true because it corresponds to the way things are.

To begin, it must be noted that all theories of truth are inherently normative. That is, in defining truth, they don’t simply define what constitutes an object of truth, but also define methods of gaining truth. And so, the coherence theory of truth implies we should seek out claims which cohere to facts, the consensus theory encourages debate, the pragmatic theory of truth upholds science, and the theory of relative truth implies we should merely decide truth arbitrarily. This is because objects of truth are inseparable from the method. An object of truth is only an object of truth because it was gained through a method of truth. A method of truth is also a prerequisite for any theory of truth itself to be valid or certain.

Now, the problem with the correspondence theory of truth is that it defines objects of truth, but its method of truth is uncertain. Indeed, a true proposition should correspond to the actual circumstances the proposition described and yet, how does one describe these circumstances?

Some assert that there is no need to define methods of truth, yet as asserted above, if methods of truth are not defined, one cannot argue for a theory of truth.

Others assert that a method of truth is defined by truth itself. That is, “truth,” does not even need to have a subject-predicate structure; if a tree falls in a forest, it makes a sound even if there is no one to assert that. The problem with this is that no one can claim that something exists when it is beyond the realm of anyone’s perception. Such claims are noumena, which may exist, but we have no way of knowing. This is ultimately the problem with correspondence theory of truth: its basis for truth is noumena, a hypothetical reality of truth which exists independently of the mind. But since our knowledge consists solely of phenomena, of our perceptions, the correspondence theory cannot be upheld. We can only make claims regarding what we are capable of perceiving.

Furthermore, the correspondence theory of truth’s method of truth is not replicable or verifiable, so it’s hardly even a “method of truth.” For instance, let us assume I was to claim that a tree falling in a forest does make a sound and that this claim is true. The claim itself is true and therefore, the method of truth by which I reached it was truth. However, there essentially was no method. I merely made an assertion. No one can take my same actions and repeat them to again find truth, nor can they analyze the structure of my actions to determine if they should bear truth.


You have done nothing against the correspondence theory of truth. It defines truth as the relationship between a concept and its object--It does not matter that it defines no way to clearly arrive at such knowledge.


Quote: Whether one advocates the coherence theory or the pragmatic theory, each philosopher is certain of their individual belief about truth. Having individual certainty equates with infallibility, because if the proper method of truth is individual certainty, then the only things which can be objects of truth are those we support.
you seem to be mixing the definitions of omniscience and infalibility here. What if a philosopher hold that real universals exist, but he has yet to find thier true form? They can be adamant that they know that truth exists, and be adamant that they do not yet know of the best way to arrive at that truth. That would be having 'individual certainty' without 'infallibility'

Quote: While one can be more or less certain, it is impossible to draw a line halfway between both points because the upper-bound, “infallible certainty,” does not exist.
in science, we seem to be able to measure the speed of an object as it drops to earth. Originally, this was 9.8 m/s^2, now it is much more exact. Thus, as our understanding and ability to measure reality becomes more complex, we seem to be able to reach the limit of one--or perfect absolute truth. We may never reach it, but we can be infinitely close.

Quote:
However, if no such halfway point exists, how can we draw the line between truth and falsehood? Such a line is drawn immediately above zero. If merely one piece of evidence supports a claim, from the individual perspective, it can be said to be infallible, or more appropriately, “true.” Each additional piece of evidence may increase or decrease certainty, but infallibility remains the same provided that one’s certainty remains above zero, that is, above ignorance.
but assumedly there is some point at which it will be infallible


Quote: The individualist theory of truth also solves the problem of having to favor defining objects of truth or methods of truth. Being that truth is defined by me, both are defined at precisely the same time.

An accurate summation of the individualist theory of truth would be simply, “I am always right because I cannot disagree with myself. Even when I have been wrong, I have recognized myself as wrong, and therefore am right.”
if this is an attack on Rand's theory of truth, you should have targeted it on more relevant items. It seems that you are well read in philosophy--you could have done better than making up strawmen.
If this is actually a theory of truth, then it is not even worth debating against.

[Nathyn]

Gus wrote: "Which theory of truth is true?" seems very circular, IMO. Sort of begging the question.
The individualist theory of truth. Read again: I laid out the problems with the other theories.

Katsumoto wrote: Nathyn wrote:
Quote:
An accurate summation of the individualist theory of truth would be simply, “I am always right because I cannot disagree with myself. Even when I have been wrong, I have recognized myself as wrong, and therefore am right.”
This is the philosophical basis for why I believe I should rule the world.

In that case we should all rule the world, and since we cannot all rule the world simultaneously, we should all rule only ourselves and that part of the world we currently occupy and own. In other words your theory of truth demands Anarchy.
No, it demands my rule, not yours.

Perhaps, from your perspective, if you were to take the same theory and apply it to yourself, yes, it would imply that you should rule. And if every person applied the concept to themselves, it would imply Anarchy.

But that's not the way things are. The truth is defined from my perspective, not yours. Therefore, what I conceive as the truth is the truth and I should rule.

It is the only rational theory for truth, regardless of how ridiculous its conclusions may seem. And in case you or anyone else decides to mention Kant's categorical imperative: It doesn't apply because truth itself precedes moral philosophy. Regardless of whether anyone thinks it's better to impose equality on the world, the truth is defined by me. And it's in the best interest of every individual, so there's no actual even basis for the categorical imperative to apply.

Atlas Bergeron wrote: Quote: The correspondence theory of truth, in my opinion, is perhaps one of the oldest and most common theories of truth, yet it is greatly flawed.

The basic definition of the correspondence theory of truth is the idea that an assertion is true because it corresponds to the way things are.

To begin, it must be noted that all theories of truth are inherently normative. That is, in defining truth, they don’t simply define what constitutes an object of truth, but also define methods of gaining truth. And so, the coherence theory of truth implies we should seek out claims which cohere to facts, the consensus theory encourages debate, the pragmatic theory of truth upholds science, and the theory of relative truth implies we should merely decide truth arbitrarily. This is because objects of truth are inseparable from the method. An object of truth is only an object of truth because it was gained through a method of truth. A method of truth is also a prerequisite for any theory of truth itself to be valid or certain.

Now, the problem with the correspondence theory of truth is that it defines objects of truth, but its method of truth is uncertain. Indeed, a true proposition should correspond to the actual circumstances the proposition described and yet, how does one describe these circumstances? I mean, without defining methods of the truth, the question is: through what method was the theory of truth itself developed? And you can't classify an object as an object of truth without asserting that it was reached by some method of truth.

Some assert that there is no need to define methods of truth, yet as asserted above, if methods of truth are not defined, one cannot argue for a theory of truth.

Others assert that a method of truth is defined by truth itself. That is, “truth,” does not even need to have a subject-predicate structure; if a tree falls in a forest, it makes a sound even if there is no one to assert that. The problem with this is that no one can claim that something exists when it is beyond the realm of anyone’s perception. Such claims are noumena, which may exist, but we have no way of knowing. This is ultimately the problem with correspondence theory of truth: its basis for truth is noumena, a hypothetical reality of truth which exists independently of the mind. But since our knowledge consists solely of phenomena, of our perceptions, the correspondence theory cannot be upheld. We can only make claims regarding what we are capable of perceiving.

Furthermore, the correspondence theory of truth’s method of truth is not replicable or verifiable, so it’s hardly even a “method of truth.” For instance, let us assume I was to claim that a tree falling in a forest does make a sound and that this claim is true. The claim itself is true and therefore, the method of truth by which I reached it was truth. However, there essentially was no method. I merely made an assertion. No one can take my same actions and repeat them to again find truth, nor can they analyze the structure of my actions to determine if they should bear truth.


You have done nothing against the correspondence theory of truth. It defines truth as the relationship between a concept and its object--It does not matter that it defines no way to clearly arrive at such knowledge.
Yes, it does, for the reason pointed out:

Some assert that there is no need to define methods of truth, yet as asserted above, if methods of truth are not defined, one cannot argue for a theory of truth.

If you don't define methods of truth, then you cannot define a particular theory of truth as an object of truth itself. If there is no certainty regarding methods of truth, then how on Earth can you be certain about the correspondence theory itself? The correspondence theory doesn't define methods of truth, so it doesn't apply its own theory to itself, hence it's baseless. I mean, without defining methods of the truth, the question is: through what method was the theory of truth itself developed? And you can't classify an object as an object of truth without asserting that it was reached by some method of truth.

Atlas Bergeron wrote: Quote: Whether one advocates the coherence theory or the pragmatic theory, each philosopher is certain of their individual belief about truth. Having individual certainty equates with infallibility, because if the proper method of truth is individual certainty, then the only things which can be objects of truth are those we support.
you seem to be mixing the definitions of omniscience and infalibility here. What if a philosopher hold that real universals exist, but he has yet to find thier true form? They can be adamant that they know that truth exists, and be adamant that they do not yet know of the best way to arrive at that truth. That would be having 'individual certainty' without 'infallibility'
Infallibility implies flawless judgement, not omniscience. Of course I don't have access to all knowledge everywhere, but with the knowledge I have, I can judge with perfect precision. That's infallibility.

Atlas Bergeron wrote: Quote: While one can be more or less certain, it is impossible to draw a line halfway between both points because the upper-bound, “infallible certainty,” does not exist.
in science, we seem to be able to measure the speed of an object as it drops to earth. Originally, this was 9.8 m/s^2, now it is much more exact. Thus, as our understanding and ability to measure reality becomes more complex, we seem to be able to reach the limit of one--or perfect absolute truth. We may never reach it, but we can be infinitely close.
I agree, which is compatible with what I said. Each additional piece of evidence adds credibility to a claim and there is no limit to how much evidence can add credibility to any particular claim.

Atlas Bergeron wrote: Quote: However, if no such halfway point exists, how can we draw the line between truth and falsehood? Such a line is drawn immediately above zero. If merely one piece of evidence supports a claim, from the individual perspective, it can be said to be infallible, or more appropriately, “true.” Each additional piece of evidence may increase or decrease certainty, but infallibility remains the same provided that one’s certainty remains above zero, that is, above ignorance.
but assumedly there is some point at which it will be infallible
No, it's always infallible. You see, you're assuming that there's actually some kind of "infallibility," beyond perfect judgement, that is.. You assume that a person with perfect judgement can be wrong. Well, later evidence can force them to revise their claims so that past judgements were incorrect. But they weren't "wrong," because they made their conclusions based upon the previous evidence.

Atlas Bergeron wrote: Quote: The individualist theory of truth also solves the problem of having to favor defining objects of truth or methods of truth. Being that truth is defined by me, both are defined at precisely the same time.

An accurate summation of the individualist theory of truth would be simply, “I am always right because I cannot disagree with myself. Even when I have been wrong, I have recognized myself as wrong, and therefore am right.”
if this is an attack on Rand's theory of truth, you should have targeted it on more relevant items. It seems that you are well read in philosophy--you could have done better than making up strawmen.

If this is actually a theory of truth, then it is not even worth debating against.
It isn't an attack on Rand's theory of truth at all. Also, in what I'm writing, I plan to mention Objectivism and distinguish myself from it.

"I am not an Objectivist. I am the Objectivist."

I will say that I think Ayn Rand, too, seemed to advocate the individualist theory of truth, but she never told anyone that. However, even so, she was wrong. The individualist theory of truth is derived from me, not her.

But I strongly encourage you to debate against it, though I'm relatively certain it will be futile.

EDIT:

Please pardon the typos in the original post. I'll get around to fixing them, eventually. I can clarify, however, if I was unclear.

[Gus]

Nathyn wrote: Gus wrote: "Which theory of truth is true?" seems very circular, IMO. Sort of begging the question.
The individualist theory of truth. Read again: I laid out the problems with the other theories.
What? I wasn't asking which one was true, I was pointing out that even asking that (or attempting to answer it) presupposes a "theory" of truth already. You're saying that the individualist theory of truth is true, but according to what? The individualist theory of truth? Begging the question.

IMO, there is nothing substantial to say about truth. It's basically just logic applied to sensory percepts, but there is nothing to say philosophically about logic or truth or any of that--it just is. Truth is an intuition of sorts, a feeling that something is the case. You're trying to define "is" by saying "is is x," which obviously begs the question. The only thing to say about "is" or truth or material equivalence or whatever you want to call it, is...it is.

[Nathyn]

Gus wrote: Nathyn wrote: Gus wrote: "Which theory of truth is true?" seems very circular, IMO. Sort of begging the question.
The individualist theory of truth. Read again: I laid out the problems with the other theories.
What? I wasn't asking which one was true, I was pointing out that even asking that (or attempting to answer it) presupposes a "theory" of truth already. You're saying that the individualist theory of truth is true, but according to what? The individualist theory of truth? Begging the question.

IMO, there is nothing substantial to say about truth. It's basically just logic applied to sensory percepts, but there is nothing to say philosophically about logic or truth or any of that--it just is. Truth is an intuition of sorts, a feeling that something is the case. You're trying to define "is" by saying "is is x," which obviously begs the question. The only thing to say about "is" or truth or material equivalence or whatever you want to call it, is...it is.
You bring up an interesting point: that arguments for theories of truth seem to be self-asserting.

However, is it really begging the question to apply logic to sensory percepts about logic to sensory percepts?

I mean the term "begging the question," is a term in logic. Should standards of logic apply to theories of truth which define logic?

If we call truth simply an "intuition," then that diminishes it, seeming to imply that truth doesn't even exist at all. It's just whatever we think it is. That doesn't seem sufficient or rational. There have been so many historical cases of improper intuition and there is no basis upon which to determine, "good," intuition, that I reject intuitionism in any form.

Furthermore, our intuition is that we are always right.

[Gus]

Nathyn wrote: Gus wrote: Nathyn wrote: Gus wrote: "Which theory of truth is true?" seems very circular, IMO. Sort of begging the question.
The individualist theory of truth. Read again: I laid out the problems with the other theories.
What? I wasn't asking which one was true, I was pointing out that even asking that (or attempting to answer it) presupposes a "theory" of truth already. You're saying that the individualist theory of truth is true, but according to what? The individualist theory of truth? Begging the question.

IMO, there is nothing substantial to say about truth. It's basically just logic applied to sensory percepts, but there is nothing to say philosophically about logic or truth or any of that--it just is. Truth is an intuition of sorts, a feeling that something is the case. You're trying to define "is" by saying "is is x," which obviously begs the question. The only thing to say about "is" or truth or material equivalence or whatever you want to call it, is...it is.
You bring up an interesting point: that arguments for theories of truth seem to be self-asserting.

However, is it really begging the question to apply logic to sensory percepts about logic to sensory percepts?

I mean the term "begging the question," is a term in logic. Should standards of logic apply to theories of truth which define logic?

If we call truth simply an "intuition," then that diminishes it, seeming to imply that truth doesn't even exist at all. It's just whatever we think it is. That doesn't seem sufficient or rational. There have been so many historical cases of improper intuition and there is no basis upon which to determine, "good," intuition, that I reject intuitionism in any form.

Furthermore, our intuition is that we are always right.
You're going to need to use commas or something in the "is it really" paragraph because I have no idea what the grouping of those phrases is.

But no, logic can't apply to an objective definition of itself...that is begging the question. If you want to try and define logic without using logic...well...as I hope you can see, it's not imaginable and basically it's absurd to think aboot.

Nathyn wrote: If we call truth simply an "intuition," then that diminishes it, seeming to imply that truth doesn't even exist at all. It's just whatever we think it is. That doesn't seem sufficient or rational. There have been so many historical cases of improper intuition and there is no basis upon which to determine, "good," intuition, that I reject intuitionism in any form.

Furthermore, our intuition is that we are always right.
It is sufficient insofar as rationality is concerned. There's nothing to say about truth other than it is. I can't explain what is is (or what is is) without using it (or equivocating it), which is what you are trying to do. It doesn't matter if that's discomforting or insufficient to you. If you don't want to accept that, then prepare to beat your head against a wall for eternity. That a thing is what it is what it is what it is (ad infinitum) is an intuition...it is not up for discussion whether x is really x, that is just something you must accept as part of the human experience. So long as you place nouns and verbs in your sentences, you are bound by that axiom.

As for your latter claim, if you've ever changed your mind on something then you have disproven that claim. If you're talking about the ego, then that is just an extension of the axiom I was just talking about--I instinctively know that certain things are the case, so I construct complex theories based on those axioms and my percepts. If the theory does not exceed its limits based upon the axioms, then it is valid (i.e. it conforms to the rules of logic) and we call that "truth." The constituencies of truth are axioms (i.e. intuitions).

[Atlas Bergeron]

Gus wrote: Nathyn wrote: Gus wrote: Nathyn wrote: Gus wrote: "Which theory of truth is true?" seems very circular, IMO. Sort of begging the question.
The individualist theory of truth. Read again: I laid out the problems with the other theories.
What? I wasn't asking which one was true, I was pointing out that even asking that (or attempting to answer it) presupposes a "theory" of truth already. You're saying that the individualist theory of truth is true, but according to what? The individualist theory of truth? Begging the question.

IMO, there is nothing substantial to say about truth. It's basically just logic applied to sensory percepts, but there is nothing to say philosophically about logic or truth or any of that--it just is. Truth is an intuition of sorts, a feeling that something is the case. You're trying to define "is" by saying "is is x," which obviously begs the question. The only thing to say about "is" or truth or material equivalence or whatever you want to call it, is...it is.
You bring up an interesting point: that arguments for theories of truth seem to be self-asserting.

However, is it really begging the question to apply logic to sensory percepts about logic to sensory percepts?

I mean the term "begging the question," is a term in logic. Should standards of logic apply to theories of truth which define logic?

If we call truth simply an "intuition," then that diminishes it, seeming to imply that truth doesn't even exist at all. It's just whatever we think it is. That doesn't seem sufficient or rational. There have been so many historical cases of improper intuition and there is no basis upon which to determine, "good," intuition, that I reject intuitionism in any form.

Furthermore, our intuition is that we are always right.
You're going to need to use commas or something in the "is it really" paragraph because I have no idea what the grouping of those phrases is.

But no, logic can't apply to an objective definition of itself...that is begging the question. If you want to try and define logic without using logic...well...as I hope you can see, it's not imaginable and basically it's absurd to think aboot.
try defining existence without using concepts which stem from existence and you will see the absurdity of it indeed. Logic defines itself becuase it [seems to] correspond perfectly existence, i.e. to a world with universal truths.
Asking someone to try and define logic without logic would be like asking someone to explain why two plus two equals four without using any math.

[Nathyn]

Gus wrote: Nathyn wrote: Gus wrote: Nathyn wrote: Gus wrote: "Which theory of truth is true?" seems very circular, IMO. Sort of begging the question.
The individualist theory of truth. Read again: I laid out the problems with the other theories.
What? I wasn't asking which one was true, I was pointing out that even asking that (or attempting to answer it) presupposes a "theory" of truth already. You're saying that the individualist theory of truth is true, but according to what? The individualist theory of truth? Begging the question.

IMO, there is nothing substantial to say about truth. It's basically just logic applied to sensory percepts, but there is nothing to say philosophically about logic or truth or any of that--it just is. Truth is an intuition of sorts, a feeling that something is the case. You're trying to define "is" by saying "is is x," which obviously begs the question. The only thing to say about "is" or truth or material equivalence or whatever you want to call it, is...it is.
You bring up an interesting point: that arguments for theories of truth seem to be self-asserting.

However, is it really begging the question to apply logic to sensory percepts about logic to sensory percepts?

I mean the term "begging the question," is a term in logic. Should standards of logic apply to theories of truth which define logic?

If we call truth simply an "intuition," then that diminishes it, seeming to imply that truth doesn't even exist at all. It's just whatever we think it is. That doesn't seem sufficient or rational. There have been so many historical cases of improper intuition and there is no basis upon which to determine, "good," intuition, that I reject intuitionism in any form.

Furthermore, our intuition is that we are always right.
You're going to need to use commas or something in the "is it really" paragraph because I have no idea what the grouping of those phrases is.
Any additional commas would be grammatically incorrect, I think. But I'll clarify: You said that truth is essentially just logic applied to sensory precepts. Is it begging the question to apply that same process to itself?

Gus wrote: But no, logic can't apply to an objective definition of itself...that is begging the question. If you want to try and define logic without using logic...well...as I hope you can see, it's not imaginable and basically it's absurd to think aboot.
Makes sense, except defining truth is unavoidable. It occurred to me that you, in the previous post, defined truth: truth is our intuition about logic and sensory precepts. That is a substantial statement about truth. Nobody can avoid defining truth because in order to assert that truth exists or that a particular thing is "true," they have to define what truth is.

Gus wrote: Nathyn wrote: If we call truth simply an "intuition," then that diminishes it, seeming to imply that truth doesn't even exist at all. It's just whatever we think it is. That doesn't seem sufficient or rational. There have been so many historical cases of improper intuition and there is no basis upon which to determine, "good," intuition, that I reject intuitionism in any form.

Furthermore, our intuition is that we are always right.
It is sufficient insofar as rationality is concerned. There's nothing to say about truth other than it is. I can't explain what is is (or what is is) without using it (or equivocating it), which is what you are trying to do. It doesn't matter if that's discomforting or insufficient to you. If you don't want to accept that, then prepare to beat your head against a wall for eternity. That a thing is what it is what it is what it is (ad infinitum) is an intuition...it is not up for discussion whether x is really x, that is just something you must accept as part of the human experience. So long as you place nouns and verbs in your sentences, you are bound by that axiom.

As for your latter claim, if you've ever changed your mind on something then you have disproven that claim. If you're talking about the ego, then that is just an extension of the axiom I was just talking about--I instinctively know that certain things are the case, so I construct complex theories based on those axioms and my percepts. If the theory does not exceed its limits based upon the axioms, then it is valid (i.e. it conforms to the rules of logic) and we call that "truth." The constituencies of truth are axioms (i.e. intuitions).
But because I changed my mind doesn't mean that the actual original judgement was ever wrong, because upon the evidence perceived at the time.

Right now: Can you argue that anything you believe is false? No. So, how then, from your standpoint, can argue that truth is not entirely defined by you? Even though you have the potential for your claims to be revised, with further evidence perceived, that doesn't change the fact that every person views their own judgement as infallible. No one can ever be wrong and neither can I.

Atlas Bergeron wrote: Gus wrote: Nathyn wrote: Gus wrote: Nathyn wrote: Gus wrote: "Which theory of truth is true?" seems very circular, IMO. Sort of begging the question.
The individualist theory of truth. Read again: I laid out the problems with the other theories.
What? I wasn't asking which one was true, I was pointing out that even asking that (or attempting to answer it) presupposes a "theory" of truth already. You're saying that the individualist theory of truth is true, but according to what? The individualist theory of truth? Begging the question.

IMO, there is nothing substantial to say about truth. It's basically just logic applied to sensory percepts, but there is nothing to say philosophically about logic or truth or any of that--it just is. Truth is an intuition of sorts, a feeling that something is the case. You're trying to define "is" by saying "is is x," which obviously begs the question. The only thing to say about "is" or truth or material equivalence or whatever you want to call it, is...it is.
You bring up an interesting point: that arguments for theories of truth seem to be self-asserting.

However, is it really begging the question to apply logic to sensory percepts about logic to sensory percepts?

I mean the term "begging the question," is a term in logic. Should standards of logic apply to theories of truth which define logic?

If we call truth simply an "intuition," then that diminishes it, seeming to imply that truth doesn't even exist at all. It's just whatever we think it is. That doesn't seem sufficient or rational. There have been so many historical cases of improper intuition and there is no basis upon which to determine, "good," intuition, that I reject intuitionism in any form.

Furthermore, our intuition is that we are always right.
You're going to need to use commas or something in the "is it really" paragraph because I have no idea what the grouping of those phrases is.

But no, logic can't apply to an objective definition of itself...that is begging the question. If you want to try and define logic without using logic...well...as I hope you can see, it's not imaginable and basically it's absurd to think aboot.
try defining existence without using concepts which stem from existence and you will see the absurdity of it indeed. Logic defines itself becuase it [seems to] correspond perfectly existence, i.e. to a world with universal truths.
Asking someone to try and define logic without logic would be like asking someone to explain why two plus two equals four without using any math.
But by what method does a person determine what corresponds to reality if our perception is limited?

[Fido]

Katsumoto wrote: Nathyn wrote:
Quote:
An accurate summation of the individualist theory of truth would be simply, “I am always right because I cannot disagree with myself. Even when I have been wrong, I have recognized myself as wrong, and therefore am right.”
This is the philosophical basis for why I believe I should rule the world.

In that case we should all rule the world, and since we cannot all rule the world simultaneously, we should all rule only ourselves and that part of the world we currently occupy and own. In other words your theory of truth demands Anarchy.

I cannot disagree with this theory demanding anarchy. In fact, since truth is experienced primarily on an individual level, so that only individuals know all truth in regard to their reality, experiences and emotions, only they are qualified to rule themselves, and this is, in a sense, anarchy. We don't belong to society and social organizations to be ruled, but rather to defend self rule, and as in all other relationships it is not all take, and not all give; but give and take. The greatest objection plutocrats and aristocrats and oligarchs have to democracy is its resemblance to anarchy, and this objection is valid since self government is like no government. When it appears as it should there is no seam between society and the individual, and no denial of individual rights, and government is only a reflection of so many self wills. I think what is being argued above is the validity of self government, of government over ones own world.

[The Impeacher]

Well as always Nathyn, its a good read, so thanks for sharing your mentations...

I guess me first real question is why does a philosophical system need a theory of rational truth?

It just seems to me that would likely not really be philosophy, but perhaps a Karl Popperism or a social science. Like economics for example.

Philosophy is about things that may or may not be true, why limit philosophy to truth, and just what is meant by a philosophical truth? Or is this a systems argument?

I dunno, but a"philosphical truth" almost seems oxymoronic to me?

[Fido]

The Impeacher wrote: Well as always Nathyn, its a good read, so thanks for sharing your mentations...

I guess me first real question is why does a philosophical system need a theory of rational truth?

It just seems to me that would likely not really be philosophy, but perhaps a Karl Popperism or a social science. Like economics for example.

Philosophy is about things that may or may not be true, why limit philosophy to truth, and just what is meant by a philosophical truth? Or is this a systems argument?

I dunno, but a"philosphical truth" almost seems oxymoronic to me?


I know your reply was not aimed at me, but if you don't mind some comments. Philosophical truth is the same as any other. We all know reality, but reality presents us with problems, and the purpose of philosophy, I think, is to gain some leverage over reality through understanding. In this sense, philosophers sell methods like Idealism, or Existentialism, or Platonism that all try to blow away the chaff of reality to find the essential kernel. Religion after a fashion does the same thing with the same object, which I would say is change, and barring change, acceptance.

[The Impeacher]

The key term was "rational". Your post, though well intendended, is off base because of that.

A rational truth would essentially be a fact, by defintion, afaik....

[Fido]

The Impeacher wrote: The key term was "rational". Your post, though well intendended, is off base because of that.

A rational truth would essentially be a fact, by defintion, afaik....

Philosophy seeks rational truth because that is the only part of truth that can be communicated. There are emotional truths that show up in visual art or music, and people say oh ya, I get it, Love, or anger, or angst; but these are only approximations of the emotions that gave the art shape. The rational is a ladder that carries the mind each way, so one can go back to a beginning or follow it to its end in infinity. This does not mean that a deeper insight might not some day displace a rational truth, but that, while it lasts, it can be examined, or communicated, and not just expressed.
Now, what does that mean to the individual. All truth is apprehended emotionally. We think of ourselves as true, and think of all our memories as true, and ourselves as the true measure of all truth. It is so very difficult to change a mind because what we know, even if it is only an unfounded belief, is a part of ourselves and our self perception. Changing a person's notion of truth, and therefore changing their self perception is a long and slow process involving an emotional readjustment at the same time. People honestly come to terms with the fact that they are wrong almost every time they place a bet or balance their check book. Those same people will react with hostility if told they are thinking wrongly or that they hold wrong knowledge. It is because we value the truth that we react so strongly to the news we may be in error.

And I see the point of your question on systems, I think as a question of method. I look at someone like Hegel, who I have not read more than bits and pieces of, trying and failing to apply dialectics to every imaginable vision of truth. Perhaps such a systematic approach is valuable. Reality is, but rational truth serves to predict what reality will be, and when it cannot, but can only tell what reality should be if it behaved according to the model, then it has failed to explain reality at all.

[The Impeacher]

Fido wrote:

Philosophy seeks rational truth because that is the only part of truth that can be communicated.

That statment is false.

What is "rational" based on the OP and how does philosophy seek it?

Is all truth rational?

or

Is all truth logical?

Why is this necessary for being true and not allowing a sufficent truth qualification?

[Nathyn]

The Impeacher wrote: Well as always Nathyn, its a good read, so thanks for sharing your mentations...

I guess me first real question is why does a philosophical system need a theory of rational truth?

It just seems to me that would likely not really be philosophy, but perhaps a Karl Popperism or a social science. Like economics for example.

Philosophy is about things that may or may not be true, why limit philosophy to truth, and just what is meant by a philosophical truth? Or is this a systems argument?

I dunno, but a"philosphical truth" almost seems oxymoronic to me?
It needs a theory of truth, because in order to assert that something is true, you need to define what truth is.

The Impeacher wrote: Fido wrote:

Philosophy seeks rational truth because that is the only part of truth that can be communicated.

That statment is false.

What is "rational" based on the OP and how does philosophy seek it?

Is all truth rational?

or

Is all truth logical?

Why is this necessary for being true and not allowing a sufficent truth qualification?
The majority of philosophers seek rational truth, but not all.

Nietzsche was an irrationalist and an existentialist. He thought we could and should just "make up" whatever truth we want. Nihilists, too, also reject that truth exists at all.

[Fido]

Nathyn wrote: The Impeacher wrote: Well as always Nathyn, its a good read, so thanks for sharing your mentations...

I guess me first real question is why does a philosophical system need a theory of rational truth?

It just seems to me that would likely not really be philosophy, but perhaps a Karl Popperism or a social science. Like economics for example.

Philosophy is about things that may or may not be true, why limit philosophy to truth, and just what is meant by a philosophical truth? Or is this a systems argument?

I dunno, but a"philosphical truth" almost seems oxymoronic to me?
It needs a theory of truth, because in order to assert that something is true, you need to define what truth is.

The Impeacher wrote: Fido wrote:

Philosophy seeks rational truth because that is the only part of truth that can be communicated.

That statment is false.

What is "rational" based on the OP and how does philosophy seek it?

Is all truth rational?

or

Is all truth logical?

Why is this necessary for being true and not allowing a sufficent truth qualification?
The majority of philosophers seek rational truth, but not all.

Nietzsche was an irrationalist and an existentialist. He thought we could and should just "make up" whatever truth we want. Nihilists, too, also reject that truth exists at all.

I disagree with Nietzsche on many statements of fact; but I have to believe from notice given his voice of authority that the "thought" issued above was with tongue in cheek. I don't believe Nietzsche was a real philosopher, and I doubt if it were possible that he would accept me as such. Clearly he was more obsessed than many, and incomplete in the most obvious fashion. Some think that he is right and many think he is wrong; but the wonder is that any human being could be so right and wrong in one short lifetime. It is also possible that he was only talking to those who would understand him to begin with: adolescents, and mental adolescents like himself who like peter pan could never grow up. A purely rational argument would never appeal much to people so over burdened with angst. Yet, if he did not phrase his opinions as the result of education and reason they would have been rejected out of hand.

[Fido]

Quote: The Impeacher wrote: Fido wrote:

Philosophy seeks rational truth because that is the only part of truth that can be communicated.

That statment is false.

What is "rational" based on the OP and how does philosophy seek it?

Is all truth rational?

or

Is all truth logical?

-------Only that part of truth we can know: Finite knowledge is rational, though we may assume a rationality not yet revealed in other truth. If you give me a philosopher, I could give you a method of seeking truth. Method is all the differentiates philosophers. Use of method is what unites most philosophers as well excluding Nietzsche who deliberately seems to have rejected method. Most seem to believe without objective proof that there is an underlying logic to all that occurs as reality. Regardless of this fact, reason is needed to express ideas, just as other methods must be found to express emotion. Ideas change people, but without reference to ratio that is clear in every detail no change takes place. People can change, but over a lot of emotional resistance because after change all people are like new people. Change therefore takes emotion or a great weight of rational argument to effect any change of moment.-----
Fido

Quote: Why is this necessary for being true and not allowing a sufficent truth qualification?

Can you rephrase this?

[greeneye]

Nathyn wrote: No one can ever be wrong and neither can I.
If you were the only dot in the universe, perhaps. But, last I checked... you're not.

Nathyn wrote: But by what method does a person determine what corresponds to reality if our perception is limited?

By the given perception of where we are here and now ....but we should perceive this with humility knowing that as we grow and evolve, life will constantly uncover truth (philosophical and even scientific as more discoveries are made) that have always been absolutes but we were simply not ready or willing to understand them as such.

Absolute truth is constant. What changes is man's ability (mind and awareness) to recognize it. This does not make truth relative. Truth existed far before man.