Political Crossfire Forums

[Selfish_Meme]

Please explain truthfully how you would justify walking past 10 scared, tearful children to pick up a canister and walk away with it.

FYI: At the current implantation success rate 4/18 the embryos would be able to create many more than 10 children.

PS. We all know you are witty, please refrain from dismissive one liners, or prove what we all suspect, that you really are just a waste of time.

[Varyag]

You actually have to make your arguments up to justify a pro-death position, as a I suppose all pro-death people do, just like you dont want people to see those pictures of aborted babies and so forth, thats why I'm anti abortion, I like to deal with "what is" rather than "what if" (and impossible ones at that).

[Selfish_Meme]

I believe, and I think everybody else pretty much does as well, if being perfectly honest, that there is a deep and fundamental difference between children that are and have been aware compared to those that havn't.

Is it invalid, no. This is exactly the tactic used every day on this forum by pro-life supporters, just look at all the baby killer threads.

I also have no objection to pictures, unless they are labelled incorrectly.

[Selfish_Meme]

Well I can see the pro-lifers are avoiding this one like the plague, hit a bit close to home eh?

[The Grandmaster]

Selfish_Meme wrote: Well I can see the pro-lifers are avoiding this one like the plague, hit a bit close to home eh?

An almost identical poll was done some months ago on here. Back then, it was hundreds of frozen embryos v.s. a single two year old kid. The consensus was completely overwhelming, something to the effect of 30-1 or something like that, demonstrating that on the most fundamental level, everyone, even the anti-choice crowd does not believe a lump of undeveloped cells is a complete human being on the same standing as a child, and furthering my belief that their wish to ban abortion is ultimately to serve as a punishment for those who would dare “sin” by having sex.

[Obilisk18]

Selfish_Meme wrote: Please explain truthfully how you would justify walking past 10 scared, tearful children to pick up a canister and walk away with it.

FYI: At the current implantation success rate 4/18 the embryos would be able to create many more than 10 children.

PS. We all know you are witty, please refrain from dismissive one liners, or prove what we all suspect, that you really are just a waste of time.

It depends on the plausible futures of the embryos versus the children. If for instance, you were to stipulate that all of these 10 children were dying of a disease that would end their lives within the week, while the embryos were all to be implanted in women (as opposed to disposed, the usual practice for the vast majority of embryos), I would choose the embryos. A question of plausible future is relevant when, and perhaps only when, weighing lives in a situation where one has no choice but to save one group and neglect another.

If on the other hand, we were simply in standard state, involving healthy young children, and embryos likely to be disposed of, I'd save the children.

In short, your hypothetical is irrelevant and contains far too many dis-analogies to have any weight in assessing the value one places on pre-born life, versus born life. At best, assuming a standard condition, you've shown that individuals are able to make use of utilitarian type reasoning when confronted with difficult ethical dilemmas. Hardly, something which combats the pro-life position in any respect.

Furthermore, even assuming all things to be equal (10 healthy children versus enough embryo's to produce 10 babies upon implementation), you've introduced an element into the situation which invalidates the entire analogy. Your ability to see the children directly in front of you, and identify with their pain is determined by both proximity and similarity. You can, on some level, relate to them and their struggles because of the common bonds you share. But, ultimately, this connection in no way suggests that you inherently place a higher value on the life of born. In fact, it's a bit like suggesting that because we are more likely to aid unfortunate individuals close to home (those who we can more closely relate to), we place a greater value, and thus a greater intrinsic worth, is accorded to these individuals. A failed philosophy by any measure.

[Selfish_Meme]

Its hardly a strong counter argument when you agree with an arguments conclusion, and then call it irrelevant. The hypothetical shows a big difference, all your slip sliding around the amount of children and what condition they are in notwithstanding, between what we instinctualy know and what we logically think. It said that the embryo's would create many more than 10 children, so by not picking up the canister you are in effect killing more potential lives.

There is no argument about absence, because canister and children are in front of you, your dis-analogy is that the embryos are somehow not relevant because they are unseen. Well howdeedoodee, isn't that an argument the pro-choice people use? A cell to small to see?

Not a very good try.

[Selfish_Meme]

Also we could easily fix your objection by saying the children are in a room next to the canister, you know they are there but you can't see or hear them. It makes no difference to the outcome of the hypothetical situation.

[Obilisk18]

Selfish_Meme wrote: Its hardly a strong counter argument when you agree with an arguments conclusion, and then call it irrelevant. The hypothetical shows a big difference, all your slip sliding around the amount of children and what condition they are in notwithstanding, between what we instinctualy know and what we logically think. It said that the embryo's would create many more than 10 children, so by not picking up the canister you are in effect killing more potential lives.

There is no argument about absence, because canister and children are in front of you, your dis-analogy is that the embryos are somehow not relevant because they are unseen. Well howdeedoodee, isn't that an argument the pro-choice people use? A cell to small to see?

Not a very good try.

That isn't my argument at all. My argument is that the inherent qualities of the embryos versus the children confuse the situation in an illegitimate way. Firstly, as I said, embryos are unseen. I do think this does indeed make a substantive difference. Not morally of course, but in terms of your relation to the life involved. You can here children's cries for help. Imagine a choice between saving 10 children directly in front of you, whose cries of terror are audible and whose shivering bodies are visible, and saving 10 children in South America, children you have no knowledge of and no way to relate to. The vast majority of people would choose the 10 children directly in front of them (though, they wouldn't admit to this). In fact, they do so constantly in our world. Charity is far and away more prevalent locally then internationally.

They make these choices for a variety of reasons. It is easier to abdicate responsibility for a choice when its negative effects are unseen. There's also an element of selfishness involved; when you are able to closely connect to the situation of others, your bond deepens. In turn, failing to save them increases your guilt. The essential invisibilty of the embryos function in this same way. They are, in essence if not in truth, absent.

Another way in which your analogy fails involves the question of interpersonal bonds. I like my mother. She is a fine human being. I value her life highly. I like a man I've met for the first time less then I like my mother. If asked to choose between my mother's life and this anonymous man's, I will choose my mothers. Does this in anyway show that this man's life is inherently less valuable? At best, it shows that it's less valuable to me. Therefore, I'd perhaps not be unreasonable in saving my mother, and leaving the man to his fate. But your argument hinges on a central premise; because we feel that embryos have less value, they must necessarily inherently have less value. This is clearly not the case.

Our individual beliefs of value are entwined with a wide variety of particularistic associations and interpersonal connections; things which though relevant on a personal level, can have no bearing on the law or the fundamental moral worth of individuals. These particularistic associations are formed through experiences, history, and physical relation. I like my mother because I have experienced many pleasant days in her company. We also have a history together which deepens our bond. Finally, I have a physical connection to her; she is the blood of my blood.

In seeing these children directly in front of me, I already possess the first association. Their screams and the significant situation we are undergoing together tie us through experience. It can also be said that we have a history together, albeit a short one. I have no chance to form such associations with these embryos, through no fault of their own. Thus, to the extent that I value them less highly (and this is not necessarily the case), I do so in light of factors which can have no general moral or legal weight.

Finally, we tend to make value judgments on the basis of noticible similarity. This is seen in the interaction between races, ethnicities, and religions. White people have white friends. Black people have black friends. Jewish people have Jewish friends. These connections are all generally disproportionate to the populations involved. Our interactions are thus coded by morally irrelevant factors.

150 years ago I would have been a slave. I would have been placed in such bondage on the basis of one thing; my color. The people's of America's inability to relate to me, on the basis of physical similarities, created the lowered value assigned to the black race. Yet, there would certainly be something peculiar in suggesting that because European Americans looked on blacks as less then persons, they were ipso facto less then persons morally. Our inability to relate to the embyros certainly, to some extent, triggers to their dehumanization. But this does not in anyway serve as an argument for why this dehumanization is valid. At best, it shows that we are flawed creatures, capable of making decisions on the basis of factors of limited moral relevance.

[Selfish_Meme]

Obilisk18 wrote: That isn't my argument at all. My argument is that the inherent qualities of the embryos versus the children confuse the situation in an illegitimate way.
You don't think pro-lifers try just the same tactic, confusing the issue in an illegitimate way? Is a life, a life, or living or a person? They surely do confuse the issue, muddy it up so no one can have a clear opinion on something without being called a baby killer or death monger.

Obilisk18 wrote: Firstly, as I said, embryos are unseen. I do think this does indeed make a substantive difference. Not morally of course, but in terms of your relation to the life involved. You can here children's cries for help. Imagine a choice between saving 10 children directly in front of you, whose cries of terror are audible and whose shivering bodies are visible, and saving 10 children in South America, children you have no knowledge of and no way to relate to. The vast majority of people would choose the 10 children directly in front of them (though, they wouldn't admit to this). In fact, they do so constantly in our world. Charity is far and away more prevalent locally then internationally.

They make these choices for a variety of reasons. It is easier to abdicate responsibility for a choice when its negative effects are unseen. There's also an element of selfishness involved; when you are able to closely connect to the situation of others, your bond deepens. In turn, failing to save them increases your guilt. The essential invisibilty of the embryos function in this same way. They are, in essence if not in truth, absent.

Another way in which your analogy fails involves the question of interpersonal bonds. I like my mother. She is a fine human being. I value her life highly. I like a man I've met for the first time less then I like my mother. If asked to choose between my mother's life and this anonymous man's, I will choose my mothers. Does this in anyway show that this man's life is inherently less valuable? At best, it shows that it's less valuable to me. Therefore, I'd perhaps not be unreasonable in saving my mother, and leaving the man to his fate. But your argument hinges on a central premise; because we feel that embryos have less value, they must necessarily inherently have less value. This is clearly not the case.

Our individual beliefs of value are entwined with a wide variety of particularistic associations and interpersonal connections; things which though relevant on a personal level, can have no bearing on the law or the fundamental moral worth of individuals. These particularistic associations are formed through experiences, history, and physical relation. I like my mother because I have experienced many pleasant days in her company. We also have a history together which deepens our bond. Finally, I have a physical connection to her; she is the blood of my blood.

In seeing these children directly in front of me, I already possess the first association. Their screams and the significant situation we are undergoing together tie us through experience. It can also be said that we have a history together, albeit a short one. I have no chance to form such associations with these embryos, through no fault of their own. Thus, to the extent that I value them less highly (and this is not necessarily the case), I do so in light of factors which can have no general moral or legal weight.
This whole section fails when you can't see or hear the children, as in my 'fix' so this part of your argument is irrelevant. You have no prior relationship with either the children or embryos, yet that wouldnot change your decision on who to save.

Obilisk18 wrote: Finally, we tend to make value judgments on the basis of noticible similarity. This is seen in the interaction between races, ethnicities, and religions. White people have white friends. Black people have black friends. Jewish people have Jewish friends. These connections are all generally disproportionate to the populations involved. Our interactions are thus coded by morally irrelevant factors.

150 years ago I would have been a slave. I would have been placed in such bondage on the basis of one thing; my color. The people's of America's inability to relate to me, on the basis of physical similarities, created the lowered value assigned to the black race. Yet, there would certainly be something peculiar in suggesting that because European Americans looked on blacks as less then persons, they were ipso facto less then persons morally. Our inability to relate to the embyros certainly, to some extent, triggers to their dehumanization. But this does not in anyway serve as an argument for why this dehumanization is valid. At best, it shows that we are flawed creatures, capable of making decisions on the basis of factors of limited moral relevance.
Again with no prior relationship you do not know the children, you just know they are there. So again this argument is irrelevant, why don't you just admit the children would be saved first regardless because they are inherently more valuable.

[Obilisk18]

Selfish_Meme wrote: Obilisk18 wrote: Firstly, as I said, embryos are unseen. I do think this does indeed make a substantive difference. Not morally of course, but in terms of your relation to the life involved. You can here children's cries for help. Imagine a choice between saving 10 children directly in front of you, whose cries of terror are audible and whose shivering bodies are visible, and saving 10 children in South America, children you have no knowledge of and no way to relate to. The vast majority of people would choose the 10 children directly in front of them (though, they wouldn't admit to this). In fact, they do so constantly in our world. Charity is far and away more prevalent locally then internationally.

They make these choices for a variety of reasons. It is easier to abdicate responsibility for a choice when its negative effects are unseen. There's also an element of selfishness involved; when you are able to closely connect to the situation of others, your bond deepens. In turn, failing to save them increases your guilt. The essential invisibilty of the embryos function in this same way. They are, in essence if not in truth, absent.

Another way in which your analogy fails involves the question of interpersonal bonds. I like my mother. She is a fine human being. I value her life highly. I like a man I've met for the first time less then I like my mother. If asked to choose between my mother's life and this anonymous man's, I will choose my mothers. Does this in anyway show that this man's life is inherently less valuable? At best, it shows that it's less valuable to me. Therefore, I'd perhaps not be unreasonable in saving my mother, and leaving the man to his fate. But your argument hinges on a central premise; because we feel that embryos have less value, they must necessarily inherently have less value. This is clearly not the case.

Our individual beliefs of value are entwined with a wide variety of particularistic associations and interpersonal connections; things which though relevant on a personal level, can have no bearing on the law or the fundamental moral worth of individuals. These particularistic associations are formed through experiences, history, and physical relation. I like my mother because I have experienced many pleasant days in her company. We also have a history together which deepens our bond. Finally, I have a physical connection to her; she is the blood of my blood.

In seeing these children directly in front of me, I already possess the first association. Their screams and the significant situation we are undergoing together tie us through experience. It can also be said that we have a history together, albeit a short one. I have no chance to form such associations with these embryos, through no fault of their own. Thus, to the extent that I value them less highly (and this is not necessarily the case), I do so in light of factors which can have no general moral or legal weight.
This whole section fails when you can't see or hear the children, as in my 'fix' so this part of your argument is irrelevant. You have no prior relationship with either the children or embryos, yet that wouldnot change your decision on who to save.

Not at all. If these children are in some unknowable and inexperienceable region, and you're merely aware of their existence, this will indeed affect the likelihood that you're likely to save them. This is borne out consistently in our world. The vast majority of charity (donations) occurs on the local level (state and national versus supranational and international). This effect increases dramatically when one considers the general "neediness" of the rest of the world, compared to our local communities. To compound this even further, the needed resources to improve life situation is much less substantial in foreign countries as well due to cheaper goods, lower costs of living, and a lower initial baseline of existence. In truth, every day we choose to save 10 Americans for 1000 (if not more) foreigners. I'd argue of course that's there's a subtle, yet relevant difference between this type of situation, and one by which you're compelled to a choice of the nature presented in this thought experiment. But the simple fact that we consistently choose to "aid" on the basis of proximity proves my point.

Furthermore, I do have a prior relationship with children I've just seen. Not an extensive one to be sure, but an existent one. This will influence my choice, whether or not you believe it should. In the human consciousness, responsibility defuses over distance. Again, I point to the scenario of saving children, in the conventional sense of the word, where the only knowable difference between them is that one is directly in front of you, and the other is an unknown location; or to simplify it, in a sealed off room 20 feet away. In this scenario, you will choose to save the child directly in front of you, because of all these reasons I've already expressed; proximity, attachment (brief though it is), and the question of immediate responsibility.

Your argument fails because it hinges on the notion that we value individuals- regardless of mediating factors such as proximity, relationship, and similarity- equally. This is simply not the case. I don't even believe such a scenario would be ideal. But even assuming that it were, we're not dealing in a fantasy world of hoped for behavior.

Selfish_Meme wrote: Obilisk18 wrote: Finally, we tend to make value judgments on the basis of noticible similarity. This is seen in the interaction between races, ethnicities, and religions. White people have white friends. Black people have black friends. Jewish people have Jewish friends. These connections are all generally disproportionate to the populations involved. Our interactions are thus coded by morally irrelevant factors.

150 years ago I would have been a slave. I would have been placed in such bondage on the basis of one thing; my color. The people's of America's inability to relate to me, on the basis of physical similarities, created the lowered value assigned to the black race. Yet, there would certainly be something peculiar in suggesting that because European Americans looked on blacks as less then persons, they were ipso facto less then persons morally. Our inability to relate to the embyros certainly, to some extent, triggers to their dehumanization. But this does not in anyway serve as an argument for why this dehumanization is valid. At best, it shows that we are flawed creatures, capable of making decisions on the basis of factors of limited moral relevance.
Again with no prior relationship you do not know the children, you just know they are there. So again this argument is irrelevant, why don't you just admit the children would be saved first regardless because they are inherently more valuable.

Because I don't believe this is the case. I believe there are plenty of scenarios where I'd save the embryos (if they were my wifes embryos for instance, all of which we intended to implant). But even assuming I was willing to save the children, in all possible situations, it does not in anyway follow that the children are more inherently valuable then the embryos. Anymore then it would follow that my friends and family are more inherently valuable, because I've made a decision to save them, then children in Malaysia who I left to their fate (placing these two categories in the original thought experiment). It simply means that all sorts of morally and logically irrelevant factors are becoming entangled in the question.

[Selfish_Meme]

Your trying to squirm around the point by saying there is some kind of implicit relationship other than that there is a difference in value according to age and development. However if the hypothetical was that the building is going to collapse and that there was a canister of frozen embryos in one room and a bunch of born 4 YO children you have never met in another room, who would you save? I still don't think your answer would change, yet there could be no prior relationship.

[Obilisk18]

Selfish_Meme wrote: Your trying to squirm around the point by saying there is some kind of implicit relationship other than that there is a difference in value according to age and development. However if the hypothetical was that the building is going to collapse and that there was a canister of frozen embryos in one room and a bunch of born 4 YO children you have never met in another room, who would you save? I still don't think your answer would change, yet there could be no prior relationship.

I am not trying to squirm around anything. Let me be clear then. If I were assured that these embryos would be implanted, and develop into an equal number of fully functioning children, and I had no way to see or relate to either the children or the embryos, my choice would be a toss-up. But this does not pertain to my main point. I was considering how we, as individuals, assign value to human life in thought experiments such as these. And how this in no way relates to how we, as individuals again, assign rights. This thought experiment captures nothing. At best, even if one accepts your terms and chooses to save the children, you've only proven that one places a greater value on the born, not that a greater rights should be accorded to them. Virtually everyone on the planet is likely to place a greater value on a 8 year old girl with a loving family then a 77 year old malnutrished homeless man. Virtually everyone on the planet is likely to place a greater value on their family, then strangers they have never encountered. Your argument seems to be that these are special circumstances, where our intuitions about what or who is valuable do not coincide with our intuitions about rights. But if this thought experiment cannot succeed as a basis for assigning rights in some situations, then it cannot succeed at all. Either our valuing someone makes them more worthy of rights, or it does not. You cannot pick and choose to suit your whims.

We assign value unevenly and arbitrarily. We do not, or should not assign higher order rights such as the right to life, in the same manner.

[Lumina]

I wholeheartedly agree, Obilisk.

[aus blog]

World wide there are over 3,500 terminations carried out every day. Thats well over 1.3 million every year. In the US fifty percent of all cases, claimed birth control was used, forty-eight percent used no precaution, and two percent had medical reasons.
That's a stagering ninety-eight percent that could have been prevented had an effective birth control been used. That's sad.
Don't get me wrong, I suspect the figures in Australia would be much the same. Just a whole lot of unnessesary killing.
ausblog

[aus blog]

I am a pro-lifer who has no religious convictions at all . I didn't need the fear of god or anything else to come to my decision, just a good sense of what is right and wrong.
You see we were all once a fetus. Is it beyond the realm of possibilities that when your mother first learned she was carrying you, she may have considered her options? What if she had decided to terminate? Would that have been OK?
You would not exist, if you have children they would not exist, and your (husband or wife) would be married to someone else. You would have been deprived of all your experiences and memories. In this day and age with terminations being so readily available and so many being carried out, if you make it to full term
you can consider yourself lucky. Lucky you had a mother that made the choice of life for you.Don't you think they all deserve the same basic human right, LIFE?
I'm all for contraception, prevention is certainly better than termination.
Did you know you can get an implant that lasts for three years? Just think girls not even a show for three years, wouldn't that be great? I think too many people rely too heavily on the last option (abortion), I think if abortions weren't so readily available people would manage their reproductive system far better resulting in a fraction of the number of unwanted pregnancies.
World wide there are over 3,500 terminations carried out every day,that's over 1.3million every year,in the US 50% of all cases CLAIMED that birth control was used,48% admitted they took no precaution, and 2% had a medical reason. That's a stagering 98% could have been prevented had an effective birth control been used. Don't get me wrong, I suspect the figures in Australia would be much the same.
Just a lot of unnessessary killing.
I am convinced that in the not to distant future,people will look back at many of the practices of today with disbelief and horror.



ausblog

[aus blog]

DID YOU KNOW THAT YOU CAN GET AN IMPLANT THAT IS - SAFE, EFFECTIVE AND LASTS FOR THREE YEARS?

[Selfish_Meme]

Obilisk18 wrote:
I am not trying to squirm around anything. Let me be clear then. If I were assured that these embryos would be implanted, and develop into an equal number of fully functioning children, and I had no way to see or relate to either the children or the embryos, my choice would be a toss-up. Please make a choice, you are being disenguous again.

Obilisk18 wrote: But this does not pertain to my main point. I was considering how we, as individuals, assign value to human life in thought experiments such as these. And how this in no way relates to how we, as individuals again, assign rights.
I'm sorry the poll above proves you wrong, apart from someone who would rather lie than admit the truth. With a full majority there are no grounds for quibbling. Every single person would make the same decision, they would place the value of the children first. As they should, embryos are just potential which does not have the same value as actual.

Obilisk18 wrote: This thought experiment captures nothing. At best, even if one accepts your terms and chooses to save the children, you've only proven that one places a greater value on the born, not that a greater rights should be accorded to them.
I'm sorry but is not that how rights are determined, is anyone prosecuted for torturing ants or fish? Why not, they can feel pain like any other animal. What you propose is inconsistent with the way all rights are accorded.

Obilisk18 wrote: Virtually everyone on the planet is likely to place a greater value on a 8 year old girl with a loving family then a 77 year old malnutrished homeless man. Virtually everyone on the planet is likely to place a greater value on their family, then strangers they have never encountered. Your argument seems to be that these are special circumstances, where our intuitions about what or who is valuable do not coincide with our intuitions about rights. But if this thought experiment cannot succeed as a basis for assigning rights in some situations, then it cannot succeed at all. Either our valuing someone makes them more worthy of rights, or it does not. You cannot pick and choose to suit your whims.
Not that I said anything about rights, it was simply about value, however.
In most rescue situations, women and children go first, usually followed by the old and infirm, the old and infirm often have their rights circumscribed, just like children. So we have a basis for comparison that shows values, intellectual capability, and how their rights are accorded. In some cases, very old and infirm people have rights not much better than children.

Obilisk18 wrote: We assign value unevenly and arbitrarily. We do not, or should not assign higher order rights such as the right to life, in the same manner.
I think you would wish to interperet the world in a way it is not. We are predjudicial as a species, we caterogise things, people, animals, just about everything, constantly. If we didn't we would be virtually statues considering possible ramifications and values for any action. If you concede that it is we who assign the right to life, then we do it according to our natures.

We assign values to things, and we do it by their worth to us, first by our instinctual protective natures and then by their intellectual capabilities.

[gemma]

aus blog wrote: You see we were all once a fetus. Is it beyond the realm of possibilities that when your mother first learned she was carrying you, she may have considered her options? What if she had decided to terminate? Would that have been OK?

How am I, the aborted fetus, in the position of having any thoughts on the matter whatsoever in this scenario? I'd think if I had never been born, I most probably would not care... So, yes, it would have been OK. For one with no religious convictions, you should not believe I'd be a sad little fetus looking down from heaven at the life I might have had, right?

[aus blog]

Gemma, but you were born, and you have a life, aren't you glad of that.
And all fetuses have the same value as your own.....as for heaven,do you beleive in santa too?