Political Crossfire Forums

[Richard Owl Mirror]

Jimmy Madison wrote: Quote: Medius, I'm afraid all Jimmy Madison can offer to this debate is a hypothetical straw-man argument rather than a clear reading of the Constitution.
:lol: :lol: :lol: :lol:

This is the joke of the month. You couldn't render a clear reading of the U.S. Constitution if all of the Framers were present to help you. Which explains why you cannot adequately answer the question.

So let's review shall we because you are having some difficulty following the progression of the dialogue.

You said:

Quote: The President has only TWO options, sign the bill into law or veto it. PERIOD.
That is what the Constitution says.

To which I accepted as a valid reading of the U.S. Constitution as it relates to the President signing a bill into law. I have italicized this language because the part of the U.S. Constitution you keep relying upon is in regards to the SIGNING OF A BILL INTO LAW and not my next question.

I asked, "Do you dispute the authority of the president to refuse to enforce and follow ANY law he believes is unconstitutional in some context?

To which you replied in the following manner. Quote: Is He willing to show just cause ?
Many seem to be of the opinion that if the President exclaims that something is unconstitutional, it therefore must be.
Is it too much to ask for the President to show the preciseness of unconstitutionality?


Somehow you think you have answered the question by asking questions. Furthermore, your questions make no sense at all because no such burden exists on the President at all other than this is nothing more than a preference you possess.

Then you follow up with the following remark. Quote: Besides, the President is charged with either signing into Law the legislation in question or
he must Veto it in total and send the bill and his constitutional concerns back to Congress.


No, this still does not answer my question of, "Do you dispute the authority of the president to refuse to enforce and follow ANY law he believes is unconstitutional in some context?

So to this point you have failed to answer my question. Instead you have presented a host of questions and relied upon a paraphrase of the text of the U.S. Constitution which has absolutely NOTHING to do with my question but the procedure for signing a bill into law or vetoing it.

After I made this point unequivocally clear you proceed with the same flawed modus operandi as before under the delusion you are answering the question with the following retort.

Quote: Dear Jimmy, how often must it be repeated before you will understand what the Constitution says?

Section 7 - Revenue Bills, Legislative Process, Presidential Veto

All bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.

Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States;
If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.
If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.

Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill. :lol: :lol:

Not one word, combination of words to form a phrase, combination of words to make a sentence, or run-on sentences in this part of the U.S. Constitution ANSWERS my question of, drum roll please, Do you dispute the authority of the president to refuse to enforce and follow ANY law he believes is unconstitutional in some context?

NOTHING IN SECTION 7, NO LANGUAGE IN SECTION 7, addresses, answers, implies an answer, infers an answer, or explicitly gives an answer to my question of, "Do you dispute the authority of the president to refuse to enforce and follow ANY law he believes is unconstitutional in some context?

In fact it is deplorably laughable you even suggest the contrary. Then you have the audacity to make these remarks.

Quote: Medius, I'm afraid all Jimmy Madison can offer to this debate is a hypothetical straw-man argument rather than a clear reading of the Constitution.


This remark coming from a guy who has just repeatedly relied on a part of the U.S. Constitution which contains NO LANGUAGE, PHRASE, SENTENCE, or REASONING to answer my question. Which demonstrates to me YOU, not me, not Medius, not Galt, not GTT of AK, cannot read the plain language of the U.S. Constitution.

However, your jokes are entertaining and all of us here needed the laugh. Where do I leave you a tip? [/b]

Your QUESTION has NO bearing on the TOPIC.
But since you keep on insisting, why not show us all one of these LAWS which the president finds unconstitutional?
Give me an example of what you are basing your question upon.

[John Galt]

How does it not have any bearing on the topic at hand? IT IS THE TOPIC. How could it NOT be? I am sorely confused as to how it could not be the topic.

The topic is whether or not the President should either uphold his oath to the Constitution or enforce unconstitutional laws. You so far have said the later, but only if that President in particular had signed the law before hand. We are merely asking if some unconstitutional aspect of it comes up, would you say that the President is forced to violate his oath of office and enforce the law, simply because he signed it? Or should the President uphold the Constitution above all other laws? And what of other Presidents; what if Clinton signed into law a law that the President now sees as unconstituional? Is Bush forced into violating his oath of office?

[Richard Owl Mirror]

John Galt wrote: How does it not have any bearing on the topic at hand? IT IS THE TOPIC. How could it NOT be? I am sorely confused as to how it could not be the topic.

The topic is whether or not the President should either uphold his oath to the Constitution or enforce unconstitutional laws. You so far have said the later, but only if that President in particular had signed the law before hand. We are merely asking if some unconstitutional aspect of it comes up, would you say that the President is forced to violate his oath of office and enforce the law, simply because he signed it? Or should the President uphold the Constitution above all other laws? And what of other Presidents; what if Clinton signed into law a law that the President now sees as unconstituional? Is Bush forced into violating his oath of office?

Hello John, the question being put forth is a hypothetical based upon some unknown.
The very existance of the Signing statements shows that the President believes a KNOWN unconstitutional quality exists and is therefore signing into law something to which he personally objects.
The Constitution states clearly that if the Preisdent has an objection, the Bill in question should be remanded back to Congress.

I asked that if such an unconstitutional measure is evident in the Presidents mind, he should be able to provide in evidence the facts as he sees them.
I believe the burden of proof is squarely upon the shoulders of the Executive to prove the unconstitutionality exists.
What happens if the bill in question is NOT unconstitutional yet, in the Presidents mind he believes it is?
Should we defer to his rationale simply because he is President?

The question put forth by Jimmy Madison is saying that the President reserves the right to refuse to enforce and follow ANY law he believes is unconstitutional in some context without ever having to prove such unconstitutionality exists.
If the President has an OBJECTION, even if he is undecided about future events overtaking said law, he is required to return the legislation to Congress with his objections and they should determine if such unconstitutionality does indeed exists, now or in the future.

Quote: We are merely asking if some unconstitutional aspect of it comes up, would you say that the President is forced to violate his oath of office and enforce the law, simply because he signed it?

The President is sworn to uphold the Constitution, same as every Congressperson & Senator.
Naturally, an unconstitutional law should NOT be followed yet, it must be proven to be unconstitutional.
Something this President has refused to do.

[bigstick61]

Another thing the President has done with signing statements is to say he'll ignore the law or parts of it for national sevurity reasons, which is something he definitely does not have the Constitutional authority to do. He goes beyond just saying that he won't follow a part of it if it is unconstitutional.

[John Galt]

Richard Owl Mirror wrote: John Galt wrote: How does it not have any bearing on the topic at hand? IT IS THE TOPIC. How could it NOT be? I am sorely confused as to how it could not be the topic.

The topic is whether or not the President should either uphold his oath to the Constitution or enforce unconstitutional laws. You so far have said the later, but only if that President in particular had signed the law before hand. We are merely asking if some unconstitutional aspect of it comes up, would you say that the President is forced to violate his oath of office and enforce the law, simply because he signed it? Or should the President uphold the Constitution above all other laws? And what of other Presidents; what if Clinton signed into law a law that the President now sees as unconstituional? Is Bush forced into violating his oath of office?

Hello John, the question being put forth is a hypothetical based upon some unknown.
The very existance of the Signing statements shows that the President believes a KNOWN unconstitutional quality exists and is therefore signing into law something to which he personally objects.
The Constitution states clearly that if the Preisdent has an objection, the Bill in question should be remanded back to Congress/

No.

The President in his signing statements said IF there is something unconstitutional about it he would uphold the Constitution. He never said that there was some known Constitutional objection. He has never raised a Constitutional objection. One may never exist.

This is why the statements are meaningless, it is already within a President's power to uphold the Constitution.

[Richard Owl Mirror]

John Galt wrote: Richard Owl Mirror wrote: John Galt wrote: How does it not have any bearing on the topic at hand? IT IS THE TOPIC. How could it NOT be? I am sorely confused as to how it could not be the topic.

The topic is whether or not the President should either uphold his oath to the Constitution or enforce unconstitutional laws. You so far have said the later, but only if that President in particular had signed the law before hand. We are merely asking if some unconstitutional aspect of it comes up, would you say that the President is forced to violate his oath of office and enforce the law, simply because he signed it? Or should the President uphold the Constitution above all other laws? And what of other Presidents; what if Clinton signed into law a law that the President now sees as unconstituional? Is Bush forced into violating his oath of office?

Hello John, the question being put forth is a hypothetical based upon some unknown.
The very existance of the Signing statements shows that the President believes a KNOWN unconstitutional quality exists and is therefore signing into law something to which he personally objects.
The Constitution states clearly that if the Preisdent has an objection, the Bill in question should be remanded back to Congress/

No.

The President in his signing statements said IF there is something unconstitutional about it he would uphold the Constitution. He never said that there was some known Constitutional objection. He has never raised a Constitutional objection. One may never exist.

This is why the statements are meaningless, it is already within a President's power to uphold the Constitution.

John, have you read ANY of the Statements of Signing ?
I've presented many of them.

[Jimmy Madison]

Quote: Perhaps it is people like him that the President finds comfort in because they too think the Constitution is just a G#d D@mn piece of paper?


What a joke....I know more about the document then you could ever hope to in your lifetime. The Constitution means more to me than it does you which is WHY I have chosen as my profession to practice constitutional law.

[Richard Owl Mirror]

Jimmy Madison wrote: Quote: Perhaps it is people like him that the President finds comfort in because they too think the Constitution is just a G#d D@mn piece of paper?


What a joke....I know more about the document then you could ever hope to in your lifetime. The Constitution means more to me than it does you which is WHY I have chosen as my profession to practice constitutional law.

Then why not present evidence of an unconstitutional law which the President has the authority to dismiss?

[Jimmy Madison]

Quote: Your QUESTION has NO bearing on the TOPIC.
But since you keep on insisting, why not show us all one of these LAWS which the president finds unconstitutional?


What on earth are you talking about? It does have bearing on the topic. The signing statement is the President's assertion he will not enforce the law if to do so would violate the U.S. Constitution.

[Jimmy Madison]

Quote: The very existance of the Signing statements shows that the President believes a KNOWN unconstitutional quality exists and is therefore signing into law something to which he personally objects.


ALL of the signing statements are of this character?

[Publius2006]

Jimmy Madison wrote: Quote: Perhaps it is people like him that the President finds comfort in because they too think the Constitution is just a G#d D@mn piece of paper?


What a joke....I know more about the document then you could ever hope to in your lifetime. The Constitution means more to me than it does you which is WHY I have chosen as my profession to practice constitutional law.

Regardless of your opinion on this matter, a personal attack such as this is completely unwarranted. You are in no position to say that the constitution means more to you than it does to anyone else. Such a statement does nothing to help you prove your point and is counter productive when it comes discussing an issue.

[Richard Owl Mirror]

Show me ONE Law which fits the description of not being Constitutional and that the President should not follow.

These Signing Statements are much more than
"Well, if sometime down the line it's proven this law is unconstitutional, I refuse to follow it"

Amended to include:

Quote: The Presidential Signing Statement
RAY SUAREZ: Bruce Fein, you were on the task force that looked at this for the American Bar Association. In your view, does a presidential signing statement have the same force as the law that it accompanies?

BRUCE FEIN, Former Associate Deputy Attorney General: Well, he intends it to be that way. And I disagree with the professor that the statutes that the president claims he will not enforce under his constitutional interpretation are ambiguous.

The detainee treatment act, which you mentioned, was categorical: There shall be no torture, period, by any branch of the administration in interrogating or otherwise treating illegal combatants or those detainees held in the war.

There is another statute that we addressed concerning the use of military in Colombia in combat situations with narco-terrorists, and the language of the statute was very clear: It shall not be done. And the president issued a staining statement saying, "I will interpret this as being advisory only."
So these are not questions of interpreting ambiguous statutes; it's a question of the president unilaterally declaring that provision he has just signed into law is unconstitutional and that he won't enforce it.

The Constitution envisioned the president use his veto power if he thought the Congress was overstepping its bounds, and then Congress could override the veto or Congress could delete the offending provision, but that was what the Constitution envisioned.

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white_house/july-dec06/signing_07-24.html

But surely the president, in the constitutional scheme, must veto a bill if he thinks it's unconstitutional, not sign it and then say, "I won't enforce provisions," and end up then having a law that Congress did not enact.

~@~

Many of these signing statements include the phrase: "I will interpret this as being advisory only."
Which IS NOT the intent of the legislation.

[Jimmy Madison]

Quote: Regardless of your opinion on this matter, a personal attack such as this is completely unwarranted. You are in no position to say that the constitution means more to you than it does to anyone else. Such a statement does nothing to help you prove your point and is counter productive when it comes discussing an issue.

Quite right Saint Publius.

[Publius2006]

Richard Owl Mirror wrote: Show me ONE Law which fits the description of not being Constitutional and that the President should not follow.

These Signing Statements are much more than
"Well, if sometime down the line it's proven this law is unconstitutional, I refuse to follow it"

Amended to include:

Quote: The Presidential Signing Statement
RAY SUAREZ: Bruce Fein, you were on the task force that looked at this for the American Bar Association. In your view, does a presidential signing statement have the same force as the law that it accompanies?

BRUCE FEIN, Former Associate Deputy Attorney General: Well, he intends it to be that way. And I disagree with the professor that the statutes that the president claims he will not enforce under his constitutional interpretation are ambiguous.

The detainee treatment act, which you mentioned, was categorical: There shall be no torture, period, by any branch of the administration in interrogating or otherwise treating illegal combatants or those detainees held in the war.

There is another statute that we addressed concerning the use of military in Colombia in combat situations with narco-terrorists, and the language of the statute was very clear: It shall not be done. And the president issued a staining statement saying, "I will interpret this as being advisory only."
So these are not questions of interpreting ambiguous statutes; it's a question of the president unilaterally declaring that provision he has just signed into law is unconstitutional and that he won't enforce it.

The Constitution envisioned the president use his veto power if he thought the Congress was overstepping its bounds, and then Congress could override the veto or Congress could delete the offending provision, but that was what the Constitution envisioned.

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white_house/july-dec06/signing_07-24.html

But surely the president, in the constitutional scheme, must veto a bill if he thinks it's unconstitutional, not sign it and then say, "I won't enforce provisions," and end up then having a law that Congress did not enact.

~@~

Many of these signing statements include the phrase: "I will interpret this as being advisory only."
Which IS NOT the intent of the legislation.

That is exactly the kind of statement which troubled me when I first heard of this issue. The President cannot simply say that a piece of legislation passed by Congress and signed into law, by him, is simply advisory.

[Jimmy Madison]

Quote: Show me ONE Law which fits the description of not being Constitutional and that the President should not follow.

These Signing Statements are much more than
"Well, if sometime down the line it's proven this law is unconstitutional, I refuse to follow it"

How about language from the signing statements themselves?

situations may arise, especially in wartime, in which the President must act promptly under his constitutional grants of executive power and authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces while protecting certain extraordinarily sensitive national security information.www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html Second paragraph.

Focus on the words "MAY arise". This is a conditional statement. The situation must first present itself before the president acts in some manner. Bush is not even expressing a belief the situation will arise at all.

This is my point. In some areas the President is expressing a conditional, a If X happens, then I will do Y.

[Medius]

GTTofAK wrote: Medius wrote: Jimmy Madison wrote: Quote: If it were unknown then there would not be a signing statement. By putting the signing statement on the law, it is exhibiting advanced knowledge of one or more applications of such law being unconstitutional.

False dilemma Medius. The signing statements can and are used for much more than you assume here. Your conditional of If X, then Y, NOT Y therefore, NOT X, is translated as follows. There is a signing statement, therefore, it is known to the President. You erroneously assume a signing is used solely for the purpose of expressing known constitutional objections. If, however, it is true a signing statement is used to merely assert a Presiden'ts power to not follow or enforce a law which MAY or MAY not be unconstitutional in some UNSPECIFIED context in the future, then your argument falls apart and in fact has done so. Some of President Bush's signing statements do not admit of IMMEDIATE or KNOWN constitutional objections at the time of signing but rather are nothing more than CONTINGENCY/HYPOTHETICAL/CONDITIONAL CLAUSES, stipulating, If X, then Y.

If they were unspecified then they wouldn't be signed onto the bill. I think most of his signing statements are very clear in saying that "This law doesn't apply to the Executive Branch". If he knows it does not apply then the law is bunk and should be vetoed and sent back.

If the reasoning were to truly be unknown, then the president wouldn't need to put a signing statement on the law. He knows full well as to what applications of these laws are in question and makes this clear by attempting to nullify the law under these applications with these signing statements.

And if the congress overrides the Presidents veto, is the law now suddenly constitutional? Is the power of congress absolute? Is the President required to violate his oath of office?

Yes and no, they are the embodiment of the people and thus have full legislative control when they can exert such a majority. Once it is a law, however, the people have the courts as an option to determine final constitutionality. If the supreme court finds the law unconstitutional then in the argued instance the law will not be applied.

[Jimmy Madison]

Quote: These Signing Statements are much more than
"Well, if sometime down the line it's proven this law is unconstitutional, I refuse to follow it"

No, not ALL of them are of this nature and not ALL of a signing statement can be characterized as such. The following language is a segment of a signing statement where the President is asserting, "If X transpires, rendering the application of this law unconstitutional in some way, then I will do Y." situations may arise, especially in wartime, in which the President must act promptly under his constitutional grants of executive power and authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces while protecting certain extraordinarily sensitive national security information. The executive branch shall construe these sections in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President.


Quote: The question put forth by Jimmy Madison is saying that the President reserves the right to refuse to enforce and follow ANY law he believes is unconstitutional in some context without ever having to prove such unconstitutionality exists.
If the President has an OBJECTION, even if he is undecided about future events overtaking said law, he is required to return the legislation to Congress with his objections and they should determine if such unconstitutionality does indeed exists, now or in the future.


Have you even for a moment stopped and scrutinized what you just said here?

Quote: If the President has an OBJECTION, even if he is undecided about future events overtaking said law

How on earth is a President to submit an objection when the events which would create the objection are UNKNOWN and known only by God?

Quote: The question put forth by Jimmy Madison is saying that the President reserves the right to refuse to enforce and follow ANY law he believes is unconstitutional in some context without ever having to prove such unconstitutionality exists.


How on earth can the president prove unconstitutionality exists when at the time the FACTS which would create the unconstitutionality are known ONLY to God?

Quote: he is required to return the legislation to Congress with his objections and they should determine if such unconstitutionality does indeed exists, now or in the future.


Well there are a lot of Congressman following in the footsteps of Nostradamus, Edgar Caycie, and prophets in the bible, or they all possess crystal balls which reveals to them known future events, or bring along their Quijia boards and acquire insight into future events which will surely come to pass as to enable them to determine the constitutionality of the law in the future, even 100 years from now!

Wow we have some great prognosticators in the White House and in Congress. They are better than weather men. When Lincoln signed a bill into law in 1863 he should have foreseen the circumstances in the 1960's which would lead him to believe the operation of the law in some area would be unconstitutional. Then our all knowing and future seeing members of Congress could definitively tell the President what events, facts, and occurrences would transpire in the next 97 years and appease the President's concerns about the unconstitutionality of the proposed legislation.

Yet, this is of course the delusional position you are proposing Richard.

Quote: he is required to return the legislation to Congress with his objections

For the 900th time, the Constitution assumes, as do you, the President has an objection at the time of signing. The President merely asserting, "If X happens, then Y," does not constitute the type of objection the U.S. Constitution is talking about. An objection does not constitute as, "Sometime in the undetermined, unfixed future, should a war arise in which U.S. military forces are involved, and this bill impedes my powers as Commander in Chief, then I will not follow it or construe its provisions in a manner consistent with my powers as Commander in Chief." This is not an objection as mentioned by the U.S. Constitution.

Yet the President makes an identical assertion by stating, " situations may arise, especially in wartime, in which the President must act promptly under his constitutional grants of executive power and authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces while protecting certain extraordinarily sensitive national security information. The executive branch shall construe these sections in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President.

[Medius]

Jimmy Madison wrote: Quote: Show me ONE Law which fits the description of not being Constitutional and that the President should not follow.

These Signing Statements are much more than
"Well, if sometime down the line it's proven this law is unconstitutional, I refuse to follow it"

How about language from the signing statements themselves?

situations may arise, especially in wartime, in which the President must act promptly under his constitutional grants of executive power and authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces while protecting certain extraordinarily sensitive national security information.www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html Second paragraph.

Focus on the words "MAY arise". This is a conditional statement. The situation must first present itself before the president acts in some manner. Bush is not even expressing a belief the situation will arise at all.

This is my point. In some areas the President is expressing a conditional, a If X happens, then I will do Y.

Again, if he knows that the law may be inapplicable and unconstitutional under certain conditions he should send the bill back to congress with a veto and a note that says "We need a stipulation that this does not apply to the executive branch in wartime when in conflict with national security".

He won't do that because the president gains no extra constitutionally backed powers in war time nor on issues of national security beyond his station as commander in chief.

[Jimmy Madison]

Quote: The Presidential Signing Statement
RAY SUAREZ: Bruce Fein, you were on the task force that looked at this for the American Bar Association. In your view, does a presidential signing statement have the same force as the law that it accompanies?

BRUCE FEIN, Former Associate Deputy Attorney General: Well, he intends it to be that way. And I disagree with the professor that the statutes that the president claims he will not enforce under his constitutional interpretation are ambiguous.

The detainee treatment act, which you mentioned, was categorical: There shall be no torture, period, by any branch of the administration in interrogating or otherwise treating illegal combatants or those detainees held in the war.

There is another statute that we addressed concerning the use of military in Colombia in combat situations with narco-terrorists, and the language of the statute was very clear: It shall not be done. And the president issued a staining statement saying, "I will interpret this as being advisory only."
So these are not questions of interpreting ambiguous statutes; it's a question of the president unilaterally declaring that provision he has just signed into law is unconstitutional and that he won't enforce it.

The Constitution envisioned the president use his veto power if he thought the Congress was overstepping its bounds, and then Congress could override the veto or Congress could delete the offending provision, but that was what the Constitution envisioned.


This is great Richard but for the 901st time...not ALL of the signing statements are of this nature and if I concede those signing statements which are of this type are problematic, as I have been doing so all along, how long will it take you to address THOSE signing statements which FALL outside of those mentioned in this article and are outside the ergergious violations you talk about?

Let's talk about the signing statements where the President is simply presenting a conditional/hypothetical as opposed to the clearly problematic ones you keep referring to in post, after post, after post, after post, where I make every effort by resorting to plain english to talk about those signing statements which of a different nature and character.

[Richard Owl Mirror]

Jimmy Madison wrote: Quote: Show me ONE Law which fits the description of not being Constitutional and that the President should not follow.

These Signing Statements are much more than
"Well, if sometime down the line it's proven this law is unconstitutional, I refuse to follow it"

How about language from the signing statements themselves?

situations may arise, especially in wartime, in which the President must act promptly under his constitutional grants of executive power and authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces while protecting certain extraordinarily sensitive national security information.www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html Second paragraph.

Focus on the words "MAY arise". This is a conditional statement. The situation must first present itself before the president acts in some manner. Bush is not even expressing a belief the situation will arise at all.

This is my point. In some areas the President is expressing a conditional, a If X happens, then I will do Y.

TITLE VIII
GENERAL PROVISIONS
(TRANSFER OF FUNDS)
SEC. 8007. Funds appropriated by this Act may not be used to initiate a special access program without prior notification 30 calendar days in session in advance to the congressional defense committees.
SEC. 8011. None of the funds appropriated in this or any other Act may be used to initiate a new installation overseas without 30-day advance notification to the Committees on Appropriations.
SEC. 8093. None of the funds in this Act may be used to initiate a new start program without prior written notification to the Office of Secretary of Defense and the congressional defense committees.
Quote: Sections 8007, 8011, and 8093 of the Act prohibit the use of funds to initiate a special access program, a new overseas installation, or a new start program, unless the congressional defense committees receive advance notice. The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that the President's authority to classify and control access to information bearing on the national security flows from the Constitution and does not depend upon a legislative grant of authority. Although the advance notice contemplated by sections 8007, 8011, and 8093 can be provided in most situations as a matter of comity, situations may arise, especially in wartime, in which the President must act promptly under his constitutional grants of executive power and authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces while protecting certain extraordinarily sensitive national security information. The executive branch shall construe these sections in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President.

SEC. 8059. (a) LIMITATION ON TRANSFER OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds available to the Department of Defense for the current fiscal year may be obligated or expended to transfer to another nation or an international organization any defense articles or services (other than intelligence services) for use in the activities described in subsection (b) unless the congressional defense committees, the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate are notified 15 days in advance of such transfer.

(b) COVERED ACTIVITIES- This section applies to--

(1) any international peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operation under the authority of chapter VI or chapter VII of the United Nations Charter under the authority of a United Nations Security Council resolution; and

(2) any other international peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, or humanitarian assistance operation.

(c) REQUIRED NOTICE- A notice under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) A description of the equipment, supplies, or services to be transferred.

(2) A statement of the value of the equipment, supplies, or services to be transferred.

(3) In the case of a proposed transfer of equipment or supplies--

(A) a statement of whether the inventory requirements of all elements of the Armed Forces (including the reserve components) for the type of equipment or supplies to be transferred have been met; and

(B) a statement of whether the items proposed to be transferred will have to be replaced and, if so, how the President proposes to provide funds for such replacement.
Quote: Section 8059 of the Act provides that, notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds available to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2006 may be used to transfer defense articles or services, other than intelligence services, to another nation or an international organization for international peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or humanitarian assistance operations, until 15 days after the executive branch notifies six committees of the Congress of the planned transfer. To the extent that protection of the U.S. Armed Forces deployed for international peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or humanitarian assistance operations might require action of a kind covered by section 8059 sooner than 15 days after notification, the executive branch shall construe the section in a manner consistent with the President's constitutional authority as Commander in Chief.

SEC. 8010. (a) During fiscal year 2006, the civilian personnel of the Department of Defense may not be managed on the basis of any end-strength, and the management of such personnel during that fiscal year shall not be subject to any constraint or limitation (known as an end-strength) on the number of such personnel who may be employed on the last day of such fiscal year.

(b) The fiscal year 2007 budget request for the Department of Defense as well as all justification material and other documentation supporting the fiscal year 2007 Department of Defense budget request shall be prepared and submitted to the Congress as if subsections (a) and (b) of this provision were effective with regard to fiscal year 2007.

SEC. 8032. The President shall include with each budget for a fiscal year submitted to the Congress under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, and hereafter, materials that shall identify clearly and separately the amounts requested in the budget for appropriation for that fiscal year for salaries and expenses related to administrative activities of the Department of Defense, the military departments, and the defense agencies.

SEC. 8037. (a) During the current fiscal year, none of the appropriations or funds available to the Department of Defense Working Capital Funds shall be used for the purchase of an investment item for the purpose of acquiring a new inventory item for sale or anticipated sale during the current fiscal year or a subsequent fiscal year to customers of the Department of Defense Working Capital Funds if such an item would not have been chargeable to the Department of Defense Business Operations Fund during fiscal year 1994 and if the purchase of such an investment item would be chargeable during the current fiscal year to appropriations made to the Department of Defense for procurement.

(b) The fiscal year 2007 budget request for the Department of Defense as well as all justification material and other documentation supporting the fiscal year 2007 Department of Defense budget shall be prepared and submitted to the Congress on the basis that any equipment which was classified as an end item and funded in a procurement appropriation contained in this Act shall be budgeted for in a proposed fiscal year 2007 procurement appropriation and not in the supply management business area or any other area or category of the Department of Defense Working Capital Funds.

SEC. 8100. The budget of the President for fiscal year 2007 submitted to the Congress pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code shall include separate budget justification documents for costs of United States Armed Forces' participation in contingency operations for the Military Personnel accounts, the Operation and Maintenance accounts, and the Procurement accounts: Provided, That these documents shall include a description of the funding requested for each contingency operation, for each military service, to include all Active and Reserve components, and for each appropriations account: Provided further, That these documents shall include estimated costs for each element of expense or object class, a reconciliation of increases and decreases for each contingency operation, and programmatic data including, but not limited to, troop strength for each Active and Reserve component, and estimates of the major weapons systems deployed in support of each contingency: Provided further, That these documents shall include budget exhibits OP-5 and OP-32 (as defined in the Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation) for all contingency operations for the budget year and the two preceding fiscal years.
Quote: A proviso in the Act's appropriation for "Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide" purports to prohibit planning for consolidation of certain offices within the Department of Defense. Also, sections 8010(b), 8032, 8037(b), and 8100 purport to specify the content of portions of future budget requests to the Congress. The executive branch shall construe these provisions relating to planning and making of budget recommendations in a manner consistent with the President's constitutional authority to require the opinions of the heads of departments, to supervise the unitary executive branch, and to recommend for congressional consideration such measures as the President shall judge necessary and expedient.

SEC. 8005. Upon determination by the Secretary of Defense that such action is necessary in the national interest, he may, with the approval of the Office of Management and Budget, transfer not to exceed $3,750,000,000 of working capital funds of the Department of Defense or funds made available in this Act to the Department of Defense for military functions (except military construction) between such appropriations or funds or any subdivision thereof, to be merged with and to be available for the same purposes, and for the same time period, as the appropriation or fund to which transferred: Provided, That such authority to transfer may not be used unless for higher priority items, based on unforeseen military requirements, than those for which originally appropriated and in no case where the item for which funds are requested has been denied by the Congress: Provided further, That the Secretary of Defense shall notify the Congress promptly of all transfers made pursuant to this authority or any other authority in this Act: Provided further, That no part of the funds in this Act shall be available to prepare or present a request to the Committees on Appropriations for reprogramming of funds, unless for higher priority items, based on unforeseen military requirements, than those for which originally appropriated and in no case where the item for which reprogramming is requested has been denied by the Congress: Provided further, That a request for multiple reprogrammings of funds using authority provided in this section must be made prior to June 30, 2006: Provided further, That transfers among military personnel appropriations shall not be taken into account for purposes of the limitation on the amount of funds that may be transferred under this section.
Quote: Section 8005 of the Act, relating to requests to congressional committees for reprogramming of funds, shall be construed as calling solely for notification, as any other construction would be inconsistent with the constitutional principles enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in INS v. Chadha.

SEC. 8104. None of the funds provided in this Act shall be available for integration of foreign intelligence information unless the information has been lawfully collected and processed during the conduct of authorized foreign intelligence activities: Provided, That information pertaining to United States persons shall only be handled in accordance with protections provided in the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution as implemented through Executive Order No. 12333.

SEC. 8106. None of the funds available to the Department of Defense may be obligated to modify command and control relationships to give Fleet Forces Command administrative and operational control of U.S. Navy forces assigned to the Pacific fleet: Provided, That the command and control relationships which existed on October 1, 2004, shall remain in force unless changes are specifically authorized in a subsequent Act.

SEC. 8119. (a) None of the funds appropriated by this Act may be used to transfer research and development, acquisition, or other program authority relating to current tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAVs) from the Army.

(b) The Army shall retain responsibility for and operational control of the Extended Range Multi-Purpose (ERMP) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) in order to support the Secretary of Defense in matters relating to the employment of unmanned aerial vehicles.
Quote: The executive branch shall construe section 8104, relating to integration of foreign intelligence information, in a manner consistent with the President's constitutional authority as Commander in Chief, including for the conduct of intelligence operations, and to supervise the unitary executive branch. Also, the executive branch shall construe sections 8106 and 8119 of the Act, which purport to prohibit the President from altering command and control relationships within the Armed Forces, as advisory, as any other construction would be inconsistent with the constitutional grant to the President of the authority of Commander in Chief.


SEC. 8014. (a) LIMITATION ON CONVERSION TO CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE- None of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be available to convert to contractor performance an activity or function of the Department of Defense that, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, is performed by more than 10 Department of Defense civilian employees unless--

(1) the conversion is based on the result of a public-private competition that includes a most efficient and cost effective organization plan developed by such activity or function;

(2) the Competitive Sourcing Official determines that, over all performance periods stated in the solicitation of offers for performance of the activity or function, the cost of performance of the activity or function by a contractor would be less costly to the Department of Defense by an amount that equals or exceeds the lesser of--

(A) 10 percent of the most efficient organization's personnel-related costs for performance of that activity or function by Federal employees; or

(B) $10,000,000; and

(3) the contractor does not receive an advantage for a proposal that would reduce costs for the Department of Defense by--

(A) not making an employer-sponsored health insurance plan available to the workers who are to be employed in the performance of that activity or function under the contract; or

(B) offering to such workers an employer-sponsored health benefits plan that requires the employer to contribute less towards the premium or subscription share than the amount that is paid by the Department of Defense for health benefits for civilian employees under chapter 89 of title 5, United States Code.

(b) EXCEPTIONS-

(1) The Department of Defense, without regard to subsection (a) of this section or subsections (a), (b), or (c) of section 2461 of title 10, United States Code, and notwithstanding any administrative regulation, requirement, or policy to the contrary shall have full authority to enter into a contract for the performance of any commercial or industrial type function of the Department of Defense that--

(A) is included on the procurement list established pursuant to section 2 of the Javits-Wagner-O'Day Act (41 U.S.C. 47);

(B) is planned to be converted to performance by a qualified nonprofit agency for the blind or by a qualified nonprofit agency for other severely handicapped individuals in accordance with that Act; or

(C) is planned to be converted to performance by a qualified firm under at least 51 percent ownership by an Indian tribe, as defined in section 4(e) of the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 450b(e)), or a Native Hawaiian Organization, as defined in section 8(a)(15) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 637(a)(15)).

(2) This section shall not apply to depot contracts or contracts for depot maintenance as provided in sections 2469 and 2474 of title 10, United States Code.

(c) TREATMENT OF CONVERSION- The conversion of any activity or function of the Department of Defense under the authority provided by this section shall be credited toward any competitive or outsourcing goal, target, or measurement that may be established by statute, regulation, or policy and is deemed to be awarded under the authority of, and in compliance with, subsection (h) of section 2304 of title 10, United States Code, for the competition or outsourcing of commercial activities.

SEC. 8020. In addition to the funds provided elsewhere in this Act, $8,000,000 is appropriated only for incentive payments authorized by section 504 of the Indian Financing Act of 1974 (25 U.S.C. 1544): Provided, That a prime contractor or a subcontractor at any tier that makes a subcontract award to any subcontractor or supplier as defined in section 1544 of title 25, United States Code or a small business owned and controlled by an individual or individuals defined under section 4221(9) of title 25, United States Code shall be considered a contractor for the purposes of being allowed additional compensation under section 504 of the Indian Financing Act of 1974 (25 U.S.C. 1544) whenever the prime contract or subcontract amount is over $500,000 and involves the expenditure of funds appropriated by an Act making Appropriations for the Department of Defense with respect to any fiscal year: Provided further, That notwithstanding section 430 of title 41, United States Code, this section shall be applicable to any Department of Defense acquisition of supplies or services, including any contract and any subcontract at any tier for acquisition of commercial items produced or manufactured, in whole or in part by any subcontractor or supplier defined in section 1544 of title 25, United States Code or a small business owned and controlled by an individual or individuals defined under section 4221(9) of title 25, United States Code: Provided further, That, during the current fiscal year and hereafter, businesses certified as 8(a) by the Small Business Administration pursuant to section 8(a)(15) of Public Law 85-536, as amended, shall have the same status as other program participants under section 602 of Public Law 100-656, 102 Stat. 3825 (Business Opportunity Development Reform Act of 1988) for purposes of contracting with agencies of the Department of Defense.

SEC. 8057. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, each contract awarded by the Department of Defense during the current fiscal year for construction or service performed in whole or in part in a State (as defined in section 381(d) of title 10, United States Code) which is not contiguous with another State and has an unemployment rate in excess of the national average rate of unemployment as determined by the Secretary of Labor, shall include a provision requiring the contractor to employ, for the purpose of performing that portion of the contract in such State that is not contiguous with another State, individuals who are residents of such State and who, in the case of any craft or trade, possess or would be able to acquire promptly the necessary skills: Provided, That the Secretary of Defense may waive the requirements of this section, on a case-by-case basis, in the interest of national security.
Quote: The executive branch shall construe provisions of the Act relating to race, ethnicity, gender, and State residency, such as sections 8014, 8020 and 8057, in a manner consistent with the requirement to afford equal protection of the laws under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution's Fifth Amendment.

SEC. 1005. PROCEDURES FOR STATUS REVIEW OF DETAINEES OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
(e) Judicial Review of Detention of Enemy Combatants-

(1) IN GENERAL- Section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

`(e) Except as provided in section 1005 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider--

`(1) an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; or

`(2) any other action against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention by the Department of Defense of an alien at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who--

`(A) is currently in military custody; or

`(B) has been determined by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in accordance with the procedures set forth in section 1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant.'.

(2) REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNALS OF PROPRIETY OF DETENTION-

(A) IN GENERAL- Subject to subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any final decision of a Combatant Status Review Tribunal that an alien is properly detained as an enemy combatant.

(B) LIMITATION ON CLAIMS- The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit under this paragraph shall be limited to claims brought by or on behalf of an alien--

(i) who is, at the time a request for review by such court is filed, detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and

(ii) for whom a Combatant Status Review Tribunal has been conducted, pursuant to applicable procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense.

(C) SCOPE OF REVIEW- The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on any claims with respect to an alien under this paragraph shall be limited to the consideration of--

(i) whether the status determination of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal with regard to such alien was consistent with the standards and procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense for Combatant Status Review Tribunals (including the requirement that the conclusion of the Tribunal be supported by a preponderance of the evidence and allowing a rebuttable presumption in favor of the Government's evidence); and

(ii) to the extent the Constitution and laws of the United States are applicable, whether the use of such standards and procedures to make the determination is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.

(D) TERMINATION ON RELEASE FROM CUSTODY- The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit with respect to the claims of an alien under this paragraph shall cease upon the release of such alien from the custody of the Department of Defense.

(3) REVIEW OF FINAL DECISIONS OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS-

(A) IN GENERAL- Subject to subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any final decision rendered pursuant to Military Commission Order No. 1, dated August 31, 2005 (or any successor military order).

(B) GRANT OF REVIEW- Review under this paragraph--

(i) with respect to a capital case or a case in which the alien was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 10 years or more, shall be as of right; or

(ii) with respect to any other case, shall be at the discretion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

(C) LIMITATION ON APPEALS- The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit under this paragraph shall be limited to an appeal brought by or on behalf of an alien--

(i) who was, at the time of the proceedings pursuant to the military order referred to in subparagraph (A), detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and

(ii) for whom a final decision has been rendered pursuant to such military order.

(D) SCOPE OF REVIEW- The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on an appeal of a final decision with respect to an alien under this paragraph shall be limited to the consideration of--

(i) whether the final decision was consistent with the standards and procedures specified in the military order referred to in subparagraph (A); and

(ii) to the extent the Constitution and laws of the United States are applicable, whether the use of such standards and procedures to reach the final decision is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.

(4) RESPONDENT- The Secretary of Defense shall be the named respondent in any appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit under this subsection.

(h) Effective Date-

(1) IN GENERAL- This section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) REVIEW OF COMBATANT STATUS TRIBUNAL AND MILITARY COMMISSION DECISIONS- Paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (e) shall apply with respect to any claim whose review is governed by one of such paragraphs and that is pending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Quote: The executive branch shall construe Title X in Division A of the Act, relating to detainees, in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power, which will assist in achieving the shared objective of the Congress and the President, evidenced in Title X, of protecting the American people from further terrorist attacks. Further, in light of the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in 2001 in Alexander v. Sandoval, and noting that the text and structure of Title X do not create a private right of action to enforce Title X, the executive branch shall construe Title X not to create a private right of action. Finally, given the decision of the Congress reflected in subsections 1005(e) and 1005(h) that the amendments made to section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, shall apply to past, present, and future actions, including applications for writs of habeas corpus, described in that section, and noting that section 1005 does not confer any constitutional right upon an alien detained abroad as an enemy combatant, the executive branch shall construe section 1005 to preclude the Federal courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over any existing or future action, including applications for writs of habeas corpus, described in section 1005.


DIVISION B
EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS TO ADDRESS HURRICANES IN THE GULF OF MEXICO AND PANDEMIC INFLUENZA, 2006
Office of Justice Programs

STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE

For an additional amount for `State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance', $125,000,000, for necessary expenses related to the direct or indirect consequences of hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico in calendar year 2005, to remain available until expended: Provided, That the amount provided under this heading is designated as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 402 of H. Con. Res. 95 (109th Congress), the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2006: Provided further, That the Attorney General shall consult with the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives on the allocation of funds prior to expenditure.
Quote: Language in Division B of the Act, under the heading "Office of Justice Programs, State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance," purports to require the Attorney General to consult congressional committees prior to allocating appropriations for expenditure to execute the law. Because the President's constitutional authority to supervise the unitary executive branch and take care that the laws be faithfully executed cannot be made by law subject to a requirement to consult with congressional committees or to involve them in executive decision-making, the executive branch shall construe the provision to require only notification. At the same time, the Attorney General shall, as a matter of comity between the executive and legislative branches, seek and consider the views of appropriate committees in this matter as the Attorney General deems appropriate.

SEC. 8044. The Secretary of Defense, acting through the Office of Economic Adjustment of the Department of Defense, may use funds made available in this Act under the heading `Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide' to make grants and supplement other Federal funds in accordance with the guidance provided in the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference to accompany the conference report on the bill H.R. 2863, and the projects specified in such guidance shall be considered to be authorized by law.

SEC. 5022. The referenced statement of the managers under the heading `Community development fund' in Public Law 108-447 is amended with respect to item number 145 by striking `Putnam County, Missouri' and inserting `Sullivan County, Missouri'.

SEC. 5023. The statement of the managers correction referenced under the second paragraph of the heading `Community development fund' in title III of Public Law 109-115 (as in effect pursuant to H. Con. Res. 308, 109th Congress) is deemed to be amended--

(1) with respect to item number 65 by striking `$125,000 to Esperanza Mercado Project, California for the Esperanza Community Maple-Mae Project;' and inserting `$125,000 to the Esperanza Community Housing Corporation, Los Angeles, California for the Mercado La Paloma project;';

(2) with respect to item number 840 by striking `$100,000 to Gwen's Girls, Inc. in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania for construction of a residential facility;' and inserting `$100,000 to the Bloomfield-Garfield Association in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania for acquisition and demolition;';

(3) with respect to item number 411 by striking `$200,000 to the City of Holyoke, Massachusetts for renovations of facility for Solutions Development Corporation;' and inserting `$200,000 to Solutions Development Inc. of Holyoke, Massachusetts for facility renovations;';

(4) with respect to item number 314 by striking `$225,000 to the City of Harvey, Illinois for demolition and redevelopment of property to aid the community;' and inserting `$225,000 to the Village of Riverdale, Illinois for planning, design, acquisition, and demolition;';

(5) with respect to item number 715 by striking `39th' and inserting `59th';

(6) with respect to item number 26 by striking `Center' and inserting `College';

(7) with respect to item number 372 by striking `Fairview, Kansas' and inserting `Fairway, Kansas';

(8) with respect to item number 584 by striking `City of Asheville, North Carolina for the renovation of the Asheville Veterans Memorial Stadium' and inserting `UNC Asheville Science and Multimedia Center, City of Asheville, North Carolina for the construction of a new science and multi-media building'; and

(9) with respect to item number 341 by striking `Village of Northfield, IL' and inserting `Northfield Park District of Illinois'.

SEC. 5024. The referenced statement of the managers under the heading `Community development fund' in title II of division I of Public Law 108-447 is deemed to be amended with respect to item 571 by striking `$575,000 to the Metropolitan Development Association in Syracuse, New York for the Essential New York Initiative' and inserting `$200,000 to the Monroe County Industrial Development Agency for streetscape and infrastructure improvements to the Medley Center in the Town of Irondequoit, New York; $90,000 to the City of Syracuse, New York for facilities and equipment improvements for the Syracuse Food Bank; $200,000 to the City of Syracuse, New York for renovations and infrastructure improvements to the Lofts on Willow Urban Village project; and, $85,000 to Cayuga County, New York for the CIVIC Heritage Historical Society for the construction of a history center;'.
Quote: Certain provisions in the Act purport to allocate funds for specified purposes as set forth in the joint explanatory statement of managers that accompanied the Act or other Acts; to make changes in statements of managers that accompanied various appropriations bills reported from conferences in the past; or to direct compliance with a committee report. Such provisions include section 8044 in Division A, and sections 5022, 5023, and 5024 and language under the heading "Natural Resources Conservation Service, Conservation Operations" in Division B, of the Act. Other provisions of the Act, such as sections 8073 and 8082 in Division A, purport to give binding effect to legislative documents not presented to the President. The executive branch shall construe all these provisions in a manner consistent with the bicameral passage and presentment requirements of the Constitution for the making of a law.

GEORGE W. BUSH

THE WHITE HOUSE,

December 30, 2005.


http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c109:7:./temp/~c109aG6fFu::

OK, now we have some substance with which to debate the merits and legal ramifications.