Political Crossfire Forums

[Jimmy Madison]

Quote: Again, if he knows that the law may be inapplicable and unconstitutional under certain conditions he should send the bill back to congress with a veto and a note that says "We need a stipulation that this does not apply to the executive branch in wartime when in conflict with national security".


Medius:

He is not aware of the "conditions". President Bush is completely blind to "what" conditions in an armed conflict involving U.S. troops are going to render the law unconstitutional. The language of the U.S. Constitution did not place a requirement upon the President rendering him to list all those objections which are properly characterized as "may" be an objection.

It is a fair statement to say there are undoubtedly some innumerable situations where the law may be unconstitutional but such a claim by the President would not require him to veto the bill because this is not the type of objection the constitution is talking about. Yet, this is very close if not identical to the statement President Bush was making in his signing statement which read, " situations may arise, especially in wartime, in which the President must act promptly under his constitutional grants of executive power and authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces while protecting certain extraordinarily sensitive national security information. The executive branch shall construe these sections in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President.


Well absolutely. There are undoubtedly innumerable situations which one could imagine or conjure where U.S. soldiers are engaged in combat and the law impedes, impairs, interferes, or restricts the President's power as Commander in Chief. Yet, this abstract, general, and ambiguous statement is not the type of objection the U.S. Constitution was talking about.

[Richard Owl Mirror]

Regarding the first portion of the above post.

Funds appropriated by this Act may not be used ...
None of the funds appropriated in this or any other Act may be used ...
None of the funds in this Act may be used to ...

Quote: The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

To borrow money on the credit of the United States;

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;

To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;

To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;

To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;

To establish Post Offices and Post Roads;

To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;

To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;

To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations;

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings; And

To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

Section 9 - Limits on Congress
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.

VS

Quote: Section 2 - Civilian Power over Military, Cabinet, Pardon Power, Appointments

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.


:think:

No where in Section 2 - Civilian Power over Military, Cabinet, Pardon Power, Appointments of the Executive does it stipulate the President has Constitutional Authority of the Treasury and how Funds may be spent.

[Medius]

Jimmy Madison wrote: Quote: The Presidential Signing Statement
RAY SUAREZ: Bruce Fein, you were on the task force that looked at this for the American Bar Association. In your view, does a presidential signing statement have the same force as the law that it accompanies?

BRUCE FEIN, Former Associate Deputy Attorney General: Well, he intends it to be that way. And I disagree with the professor that the statutes that the president claims he will not enforce under his constitutional interpretation are ambiguous.

The detainee treatment act, which you mentioned, was categorical: There shall be no torture, period, by any branch of the administration in interrogating or otherwise treating illegal combatants or those detainees held in the war.

There is another statute that we addressed concerning the use of military in Colombia in combat situations with narco-terrorists, and the language of the statute was very clear: It shall not be done. And the president issued a staining statement saying, "I will interpret this as being advisory only."
So these are not questions of interpreting ambiguous statutes; it's a question of the president unilaterally declaring that provision he has just signed into law is unconstitutional and that he won't enforce it.

The Constitution envisioned the president use his veto power if he thought the Congress was overstepping its bounds, and then Congress could override the veto or Congress could delete the offending provision, but that was what the Constitution envisioned.


This is great Richard but for the 901st time...not ALL of the signing statements are of this nature and if I concede those signing statements which are of this type are problematic, as I have been doing so all along, how long will it take you to address THOSE signing statements which FALL outside of those mentioned in this article and are outside the ergergious violations you talk about?

Let's talk about the signing statements where the President is simply presenting a conditional/hypothetical as opposed to the clearly problematic ones you keep referring to in post, after post, after post, after post, where I make every effort by resorting to plain english to talk about those signing statements which of a different nature and character.

If the constitutional objection is truly unforseen there will be no signing statement on the law. In instances that are truly unforseen the President may then choose to disregard the law for the sake of preserving the constitution. Congress may at that point decide whether the President has a true constitutional objection or whether he or she is unjustly disregarding law. If they find that the President is breaking the law without constitutional objection they may then begin impeachment as a recourse.

When you exempt yourself from the law, it isn't a method of enforcement, it is a method of disobedience. There are times where disobedience is just and lawful. There are also times where they are not. President Bush is placing statements that clearly indicate his intention to disregard law. Whether for very specific or vague reasons, his signing statements state that the laws may not apply. He does not clarify enforcement. He completely nullifies the law for certain applications (well attempts to at least).

What I am saying very simply, is that if the objections are truly unforseen then there is no way he could foresee them and write a signing statement. How rediculous would it be for presidents to tack on a statement to every law they pass that says "This law may, in the future, for unforseeable reasons become unconstitutional and may be disregarded at such a time."

Every citizen of the United States of America has the right to disobey a law that they find unconstitutional. They may be arrested, however, they have the right to take their case to the courts and if necessary the supreme court itself to fight the enforcement of a law they believe to be unconstitutional. The President has these same rights as well as the right to not enforce a law he finds unconstitutional as well as pardon when a law is enforced.

The President may, however, be called to defend those actions by Congress.

[Jimmy Madison]

Quote: OK, now we have some substance with which to debate the merits and legal ramifications.

Yes we can and I suggest we begin with the specific language I have been focusing upon for the last several posts. As I said before, not ALL language of the signing statement supports what you have been saying. I admit some of it does but not all of it. What is the significance of this fact? Well if those parts of the signing statement are not objectionable, then the President can use them in future signing statements.

[Richard Owl Mirror]

Jimmy Madison wrote: Quote: The Presidential Signing Statement
RAY SUAREZ: Bruce Fein, you were on the task force that looked at this for the American Bar Association. In your view, does a presidential signing statement have the same force as the law that it accompanies?

BRUCE FEIN, Former Associate Deputy Attorney General: Well, he intends it to be that way. And I disagree with the professor that the statutes that the president claims he will not enforce under his constitutional interpretation are ambiguous.

The detainee treatment act, which you mentioned, was categorical: There shall be no torture, period, by any branch of the administration in interrogating or otherwise treating illegal combatants or those detainees held in the war.

There is another statute that we addressed concerning the use of military in Colombia in combat situations with narco-terrorists, and the language of the statute was very clear: It shall not be done. And the president issued a staining statement saying, "I will interpret this as being advisory only."
So these are not questions of interpreting ambiguous statutes; it's a question of the president unilaterally declaring that provision he has just signed into law is unconstitutional and that he won't enforce it.

The Constitution envisioned the president use his veto power if he thought the Congress was overstepping its bounds, and then Congress could override the veto or Congress could delete the offending provision, but that was what the Constitution envisioned.


This is great Richard but for the 901st time...not ALL of the signing statements are of this nature and if I concede those signing statements which are of this type are problematic, as I have been doing so all along, how long will it take you to address THOSE signing statements which FALL outside of those mentioned in this article and are outside the ergergious violations you talk about?

Let's talk about the signing statements where the President is simply presenting a conditional/hypothetical as opposed to the clearly problematic ones you keep referring to in post, after post, after post, after post, where I make every effort by resorting to plain english to talk about those signing statements which of a different nature and character.
Quote: if I concede those signing statements which are of this type are problematic, as I have been doing so all along
How many instances of a violation are needed to call into question the use of such?
I believe the Constitution dictates ONE instance is enough to pursue Impeachment.

Quote: There is another statute that we addressed concerning the use of military in Colombia in combat situations with narco-terrorists, and the language of the statute was very clear: It shall not be done. And the president issued a staining statement saying, "I will interpret this as being advisory only."
So these are not questions of interpreting ambiguous statutes; it's a question of the president unilaterally declaring that provision he has just signed into law is unconstitutional and that he won't enforce it.

[Jimmy Madison]

Quote: If the constitutional objection is truly unforseen there will be no signing statement on the law.

Medius

This is quite simply an untrue statement. Once again you assume there are no other reasons to use a signing statement which is nothing short of a fallacy. The President can use a signing statement to reflect the fact IF the legislation impairs, impedes, or obstructs his constitutional authority in some fashion, then he will not enforce it or abide by it.

Quote: In instances that are truly unforseen the President may then choose to disregard the law for the sake of preserving the constitution.

Yes and the President can use a signing statement to express this point. Hence, a signing statement CAN be used when no constitutional objection is truly foreseen. In some instances, President Bush has used language demonstrating he is making the above remark in some part of a signing statement. Hence, President Bush has used a signing statement when the constitutional objection is truly unknown, rendering your assumption they are ONLY used when a constitutional objection is known as patently false.

Quote: is that if the objections are truly unforseen then there is no way he could foresee them and write a signing statement. How rediculous would it be for presidents to tack on a statement to every law they pass that says "This law may, in the future, for unforseeable reasons become unconstitutional and may be disregarded at such a time."


Yeah I agree with you, it is rather redundant, which is John Galt's point! The President ALREADY possesses the power he is expressing in the signing statement, thereby making the signing statement practically POINTLESS. Yet this is precisely what President Bush is doing in SOME areas of the signing statement. Such as the following, " situations may arise, especially in wartime, in which the President must act promptly under his constitutional grants of executive power and authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces while protecting certain extraordinarily sensitive national security information. The executive branch shall construe these sections in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President.

[Jimmy Madison]

Quote: How many instances of a violation are needed to call into question the use of such?
I believe the Constitution dictates ONE instance is enough to pursue Impeachment.

Well for someone representing themselves as cherishing the text of the U.S. Constitution you are quick to forget what it says. One violation of the text is not sufficient to pursue impeachment. In fact, the U.S. Constitution makes no mention of the "number" of offenses sufficient to impeachment.

The requirement for impeachment is the offense constitute as a "high crime or misdemeanor" and the House vote to approve articles of impeachment.

Second of all, you have once again decided not to answer the question but instead rely upon a tangent. Why am I not surprised?

[Richard Owl Mirror]

Can you answer my query above ?

Quote: Regarding the first portion of the above post.

Funds appropriated by this Act may not be used ...
None of the funds appropriated in this or any other Act may be used ...
None of the funds in this Act may be used to ...

[Medius]

Jimmy Madison wrote: Quote: If the constitutional objection is truly unforseen there will be no signing statement on the law.

Medius

This is quite simply an untrue statement. Once again you assume there are no other reasons to use a signing statement which is nothing short of a fallacy. The President can use a signing statement to reflect the fact IF the legislation impairs, impedes, or obstructs his constitutional authority in some fashion, then he will not enforce it or abide by it.

Quote: In instances that are truly unforseen the President may then choose to disregard the law for the sake of preserving the constitution.

Yes and the President can use a signing statement to express this point. Hence, a signing statement CAN be used when no constitutional objection is truly foreseen. In some instances, President Bush has used language demonstrating he is making the above remark in some part of a signing statement. Hence, President Bush has used a signing statement when the constitutional objection is truly unknown, rendering your assumption they are ONLY used when a constitutional objection is known as patently false.

Quote: is that if the objections are truly unforseen then there is no way he could foresee them and write a signing statement. How rediculous would it be for presidents to tack on a statement to every law they pass that says "This law may, in the future, for unforseeable reasons become unconstitutional and may be disregarded at such a time."


Yeah I agree with you, it is rather redundant, which is John Galt's point! The President ALREADY possesses the power he is expressing in the signing statement, thereby making the signing statement practically POINTLESS. Yet this is precisely what President Bush is doing in SOME areas of the signing statement. Such as the following, " situations may arise, especially in wartime, in which the President must act promptly under his constitutional grants of executive power and authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces while protecting certain extraordinarily sensitive national security information. The executive branch shall construe these sections in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President.


I think I better understand the fundamental misunderstanding here. I am limiting my scope to the argument that I see as the one being discussed in this thread, which are: signing statements by Bush that either question constitutionality or seek to immunize the executive branch from being subject to enforcement. What I have failed to do is to limit the scope of my language (the intent was for berevity) which is fueling the misunderstandings we are having.

I fully agree that signing statements used for explanation purposes only, which detail enforcement and do not change or nullify the law in any way, are fine. They are not listed in the constitution, however, they also do not suppose any power other than the freedom of speech. The signing statements that I find disagreement with and the scope of my argument are those that are attempting to imbue the president with legislative powers, or at the very least, subvert the legislative powers vested in congress. The instances of these are not rare, they are very plentiful in the 800 or so signing statements issues by this administration.

[GTTofAK]

Richard Owl Mirror wrote: Can you answer my query above ?

Quote: Regarding the first portion of the above post.

Funds appropriated by this Act may not be used ...
None of the funds appropriated in this or any other Act may be used ...
None of the funds in this Act may be used to ...

In my opinion since Vietnam Congress has taken the power of the purse way too far. I do not believe that congress should have nor did our founding forefathers intend for congress to use the power of the purse to literally dictate war strategy.

[John Galt]

Richard Owl Mirror wrote: Regarding the first portion of the above post.

Funds appropriated by this Act may not be used ...
None of the funds appropriated in this or any other Act may be used ...
None of the funds in this Act may be used to ...

Quote: The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

To borrow money on the credit of the United States;

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;

To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;

To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;

To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;

To establish Post Offices and Post Roads;

To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;

To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;

To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations;

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings; And

To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

Section 9 - Limits on Congress
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.

VS

Quote: Section 2 - Civilian Power over Military, Cabinet, Pardon Power, Appointments

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.


:think:

No where in Section 2 - Civilian Power over Military, Cabinet, Pardon Power, Appointments of the Executive does it stipulate the President has Constitutional Authority of the Treasury and how Funds may be spent.

Congress creates laws, the President executes them. But my contention is, in the spirit of Jackson and Jeffersonian departmentalism is that the President can refuse to enforce the law if it violates a higher authority, such as the Constitution. The Supreme Court has long held that this is true. While you say the President cannot say HOW the funds may be spent, he does have a say whether or not they may be spent, even if he signed the law authorizing their appropriation. He does not have to spend it.

As for an earlier question you asked of me, yes, I did read the signing statements. Now, back to page one I believe regarding a question I asked regarding my last paragraph. Can you refute that the President cannot refuse to spend appropriations that he signed into law?

[Richard Owl Mirror]

John Galt wrote: Richard Owl Mirror wrote: Regarding the first portion of the above post.

Funds appropriated by this Act may not be used ...
None of the funds appropriated in this or any other Act may be used ...
None of the funds in this Act may be used to ...

Quote: The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

To borrow money on the credit of the United States;

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;

To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;

To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;

To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;

To establish Post Offices and Post Roads;

To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;

To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;

To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations;

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings; And

To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

Section 9 - Limits on Congress
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.

VS

Quote: Section 2 - Civilian Power over Military, Cabinet, Pardon Power, Appointments

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.


:think:

No where in Section 2 - Civilian Power over Military, Cabinet, Pardon Power, Appointments of the Executive does it stipulate the President has Constitutional Authority of the Treasury and how Funds may be spent.

Congress creates laws, the President executes them. But my contention is, in the spirit of Jackson and Jeffersonian departmentalism is that the President can refuse to enforce the law if it violates a higher authority, such as the Constitution. The Supreme Court has long held that this is true. While you say the President cannot say HOW the funds may be spent, he does have a say whether or not they may be spent, even if he signed the law authorizing their appropriation. He does not have to spend it.

As for an earlier question you asked of me, yes, I did read the signing statements. Now, back to page one I believe regarding a question I asked regarding my last paragraph. Can you refute that the President cannot refuse to spend appropriations that he signed into law?

First, the stipulations cited above say NO FUNDS MAY BE SPENT, so you're contention that the president has the Constitutional right to NOT Spend money runs contrary to this arguement since HE is saying HE HAS the Authority to spend funds which the Congress hasn't given authority to spend.

As for your question, I'm not certain the President can stipulate that a Law signing by him designating a program with accompaning funds could be defunded by the President.
I believe that puts into play an Unfunded mandate.
Quote: An Unfunded Mandate is a requirement imposed by Congress on state or local governments with no funding to pay for it.
House rules permit a point of order to be made against a provision creating a new unfunded mandate.

Unlike regular points of order, the Chair does not rule on the merits of an unfunded mandate's point of order.

If the Chair decides the point is appropriately made, 20 minutes of debate on its merits may be held.

The House then votes on the question of consideration. The vote decides if the provision may be considered.

Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995
104th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 5

AN ACT
To curb the practice of imposing unfunded Federal mandates on States and local governments, to ensure that the Federal Government pays the costs incurred by those governments in complying with certain requirements under Federal statutes and regulations, and to provide information on the cost of Federal mandates on the private sector, and for other purposes.

~@~

If you believe the President has this Authority, please show me where in the Constitution this is stipulated.

[John Galt]

The Founders made three branches and their powers can not mix. Legislative writes thelaw, executive executes the law. Congress can never spend the money. Only the President can ("he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed"). But he is bound by something higher, "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." Since he is, he can refuse to spend.

I will now quote Scalia:

The Presentment Clause requires, in relevant part, that "[e]very Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it," U. S. Const., Art. I, §7, cl. 2. There is no question that enactment of the Balanced Budget Act complied with these requirements: the House and Senate passed the bill, and the President signed it into law. It was only after the requirements of the Presentment Clause had been satisfied that the President exercised his authority under the Line Item Veto Act to cancel the spending item. Thus, the Court's problem with the Act is not that it authorizes the President to veto parts of a bill and sign others into law, but rather that it authorizes him to "cancel"-prevent from "having legal force or effect"-certain parts of duly enacted statutes.

Article I, §7 of the Constitution obviously prevents the President from cancelling a law that Congress has not authorized him to cancel. . . It was certainly arguable, as an original matter, that Art. I, §7 also prevents the President from cancelling a law which itself authorizes the President to cancel it. But as the Court acknowledges, that argument has long since been made and rejected. In 1809, Congress passed a law authorizing the President to cancel trade restrictions against Great Britain and France if either revoked edicts directed at the United States. Act of Mar. 1, 1809, §11, 2 Stat. 528. Joseph Story regarded the conferral of that authority as entirely unremarkable in The Orono , 18 F. Cas. 830 (No. 10,585) (CCD Mass. 1812). The Tariff Act of 1890 authorized the President to "suspend, by proclamation to that effect" certain of its provisions if he determined that other countries were imposing "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable" duties. Act of Oct. 1, 1890, §3, 26 Stat. 612. This Court upheld the constitutionality of that Act in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892), reciting the history since 1798 of statutes conferring upon the President the power to, inter alia , "discontinue the prohibitions and restraints hereby enacted and declared," id., at 684, "suspend the operation of the aforesaid act," id., at 685, and "declare the provisions of this act to be inoperative," id., at 688. . .

I turn, then, to the crux of the matter: whether Congress's authorizing the President to cancel an item of spending gives him a power that our history and traditions show must reside exclusively in the Legislative Branch. I may note, to begin with, that the Line Item Veto Act is not the first statute to authorize the President to "cancel" spending items. . .

Insofar as the degree of political, "law-making" power conferred upon the Executive is concerned, there is not a dime's worth of difference between Congress's authorizing the President to cancel a spending item, and Congress's authorizing money to be spent on a particular item at the President's discretion. And the latter has been done since the Founding of the Nation. . .

Certain Presidents have claimed Executive authority to withhold appropriated funds even absent an express conferral of discretion to do so. In 1876, for example, President Grant reported to Congress that he would not spend money appropriated for certain harbor and river improvements, see Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 267, 19 Stat. 132, because "[u]nder no circumstances [would he] allow expenditures upon works not clearly national," and in his view, the appropriations were for "works of purely private or local interest, in no sense national," 4 Cong. Rec. 5628. President Franklin D. Roosevelt impounded funds appropriated for a flood control reservoir and levee in Oklahoma. See Act of Aug. 18, 1941, ch. 377, 55 Stat. 638, 645; Hearings on S. 373 before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Impoundment of Funds of the Committee on Government Operations and the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 848-849 (1973). President Truman ordered the impoundment of hundreds of millions of dollars that had been appropriated for military aircraft. See Act of Oct. 29, 1949, ch. 787, 63 Stat. 987, 1013; Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman, 1949, pp. 538-539 (W. Reid ed. 1964). . .

The short of the matter is this: Had the Line Item Veto Act authorized the President to "decline to spend" any item of spending contained in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, there is not the slightest doubt that authorization would have been constitutional. What the Line Item Veto Act does instead-authorizing the President to "cancel" an item of spending-is technically different. But the technical difference does not relate to the technicalities of the Presentment Clause, which have been fully complied with; and the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation, which is at issue here, is preeminently not a doctrine of technicalities. The title of the Line Item Veto Act, which was perhaps designed to simplify for public comprehension, or perhaps merely to comply with the terms of a campaign pledge, has succeeded in faking out the Supreme Court. The President's action it authorizes in fact is not a lineitem veto and thus does not offend Art. I, §7; and insofar as the substance of that action is concerned, it is no different from what Congress has permitted the President to do since the formation of the Union.

Clinton v. City of New York

And so there you have it. SInce the begining of our nation Presidents have refused to spend and the court hasn't said much about it. They did tell Nixon to stop it in regards to a certian statutue that explicitly said X must be spent although X+Y was allocated and only X(.5) was spent and it was statutorilly incorrect. But not against the Constitution. The President does not violate the Presentment clause since everything has been met. In regards to things other than the budget, that is to say, in regards to the Presidents power to not enforce unconstitutional laws, I turn to Jackson's Bank Veto message.

It is maintained by the advocates of the bank that its constitutionality in all its features ought to be considered as settled by precedent and by the decision of the Supreme Court. To this conclusion I can not assent. Mere precedent is a dangerous source of authority, and should not be regarded as deciding questions of constitutional power except where the acquiescence of the people and the States can be considered as well settled. . .

If the opinion of the Supreme Court covered the whole ground of this act, it ought not to control the coordinate authorities of this Government. The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others. It is as much the duty of the House of Representatives, of the Senate, and of the President to decide upon the constitutionality of any bill or resolution which may be presented to them for passage or approval as it is of the supreme judges when it may be brought before them for judicial decision. The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that point the President is independent of both. The authority of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive when acting in their legislative capacities, but to have only such influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve.

THere's more but that's enopugh reading for now. To recap, I bagan by saying where in the Constitution the power of teh executive to enforce the law reesides, then mentioned how he takes an oath to the Constitution of the United States. I then showed where historically declining to spend is within the President's descretion. I then quoted Jackson to explain how the Supreme Court does not have a monopoly on interpresting the Constitution.

[Richard Owl Mirror]

John Galt wrote: The Founders made three branches and their powers can not mix. Legislative writes thelaw, executive executes the law. Congress can never spend the money. Only the President can ("he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed"). But he is bound by something higher, "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." Since he is, he can refuse to spend.

I will now quote Scalia:

The Presentment Clause requires, in relevant part, that "[e]very Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it," U. S. Const., Art. I, §7, cl. 2. There is no question that enactment of the Balanced Budget Act complied with these requirements: the House and Senate passed the bill, and the President signed it into law. It was only after the requirements of the Presentment Clause had been satisfied that the President exercised his authority under the Line Item Veto Act to cancel the spending item. Thus, the Court's problem with the Act is not that it authorizes the President to veto parts of a bill and sign others into law, but rather that it authorizes him to "cancel"-prevent from "having legal force or effect"-certain parts of duly enacted statutes.

Article I, §7 of the Constitution obviously prevents the President from cancelling a law that Congress has not authorized him to cancel. . . It was certainly arguable, as an original matter, that Art. I, §7 also prevents the President from cancelling a law which itself authorizes the President to cancel it. But as the Court acknowledges, that argument has long since been made and rejected. In 1809, Congress passed a law authorizing the President to cancel trade restrictions against Great Britain and France if either revoked edicts directed at the United States. Act of Mar. 1, 1809, §11, 2 Stat. 528. Joseph Story regarded the conferral of that authority as entirely unremarkable in The Orono , 18 F. Cas. 830 (No. 10,585) (CCD Mass. 1812). The Tariff Act of 1890 authorized the President to "suspend, by proclamation to that effect" certain of its provisions if he determined that other countries were imposing "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable" duties. Act of Oct. 1, 1890, §3, 26 Stat. 612. This Court upheld the constitutionality of that Act in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892), reciting the history since 1798 of statutes conferring upon the President the power to, inter alia , "discontinue the prohibitions and restraints hereby enacted and declared," id., at 684, "suspend the operation of the aforesaid act," id., at 685, and "declare the provisions of this act to be inoperative," id., at 688. . .

I turn, then, to the crux of the matter: whether Congress's authorizing the President to cancel an item of spending gives him a power that our history and traditions show must reside exclusively in the Legislative Branch. I may note, to begin with, that the Line Item Veto Act is not the first statute to authorize the President to "cancel" spending items. . .

Insofar as the degree of political, "law-making" power conferred upon the Executive is concerned, there is not a dime's worth of difference between Congress's authorizing the President to cancel a spending item, and Congress's authorizing money to be spent on a particular item at the President's discretion. And the latter has been done since the Founding of the Nation. . .

Certain Presidents have claimed Executive authority to withhold appropriated funds even absent an express conferral of discretion to do so. In 1876, for example, President Grant reported to Congress that he would not spend money appropriated for certain harbor and river improvements, see Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 267, 19 Stat. 132, because "[u]nder no circumstances [would he] allow expenditures upon works not clearly national," and in his view, the appropriations were for "works of purely private or local interest, in no sense national," 4 Cong. Rec. 5628. President Franklin D. Roosevelt impounded funds appropriated for a flood control reservoir and levee in Oklahoma. See Act of Aug. 18, 1941, ch. 377, 55 Stat. 638, 645; Hearings on S. 373 before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Impoundment of Funds of the Committee on Government Operations and the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 848-849 (1973). President Truman ordered the impoundment of hundreds of millions of dollars that had been appropriated for military aircraft. See Act of Oct. 29, 1949, ch. 787, 63 Stat. 987, 1013; Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman, 1949, pp. 538-539 (W. Reid ed. 1964). . .

The short of the matter is this: Had the Line Item Veto Act authorized the President to "decline to spend" any item of spending contained in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, there is not the slightest doubt that authorization would have been constitutional. What the Line Item Veto Act does instead-authorizing the President to "cancel" an item of spending-is technically different. But the technical difference does not relate to the technicalities of the Presentment Clause, which have been fully complied with; and the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation, which is at issue here, is preeminently not a doctrine of technicalities. The title of the Line Item Veto Act, which was perhaps designed to simplify for public comprehension, or perhaps merely to comply with the terms of a campaign pledge, has succeeded in faking out the Supreme Court. The President's action it authorizes in fact is not a lineitem veto and thus does not offend Art. I, §7; and insofar as the substance of that action is concerned, it is no different from what Congress has permitted the President to do since the formation of the Union.

Clinton v. City of New York

And so there you have it. SInce the begining of our nation Presidents have refused to spend and the court hasn't said much about it. They did tell Nixon to stop it in regards to a certian statutue that explicitly said X must be spent although X+Y was allocated and only X(.5) was spent and it was statutorilly incorrect. But not against the Constitution. The President does not violate the Presentment clause since everything has been met. In regards to things other than the budget, that is to say, in regards to the Presidents power to not enforce unconstitutional laws, I turn to Jackson's Bank Veto message.

It is maintained by the advocates of the bank that its constitutionality in all its features ought to be considered as settled by precedent and by the decision of the Supreme Court. To this conclusion I can not assent. Mere precedent is a dangerous source of authority, and should not be regarded as deciding questions of constitutional power except where the acquiescence of the people and the States can be considered as well settled. . .

If the opinion of the Supreme Court covered the whole ground of this act, it ought not to control the coordinate authorities of this Government. The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others. It is as much the duty of the House of Representatives, of the Senate, and of the President to decide upon the constitutionality of any bill or resolution which may be presented to them for passage or approval as it is of the supreme judges when it may be brought before them for judicial decision. The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that point the President is independent of both. The authority of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive when acting in their legislative capacities, but to have only such influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve.

THere's more but that's enopugh reading for now. To recap, I bagan by saying where in the Constitution the power of teh executive to enforce the law reesides, then mentioned how he takes an oath to the Constitution of the United States. I then showed where historically declining to spend is within the President's descretion. I then quoted Jackson to explain how the Supreme Court does not have a monopoly on interpresting the Constitution.

I'm still unsure how that has anything to do with:
Quote: Regarding the first portion of the above post.

Funds appropriated by this Act may not be used ...
None of the funds appropriated in this or any other Act may be used ...
None of the funds in this Act may be used to ...

The above is quoted from the Legislation provided by Congress, mandating that
"None of the funds appropriated ~ may be used".
In the Presidential Signing Statement, the President stipulates that he has authority to SPEND funds not granted by Congress.
As for your usage of the LINE ITEM VETO, I'm unsure how you could use that to bolster your claim since it has been ruled unconstitutional.

Line Item Veto Act of 1996
Quote: The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 enacted a line-item veto for the Federal Government of the United States, but its effect was brief due to judicial review.

The bill was signed into law by President Bill Clinton on April 9, 1996 and was immediately challenged in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia by a group of six senators, first among whom was Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV), where it was declared unconstitutional by District Judge Harry Jackson, a Reagan appointee, on April 10, 1997. The case was subsequently remanded by the Supreme Court of the United States with instructions to dismiss on the grounds that the senators had not suffered sufficient injury to press charges under Article III of the United States Constitution. The case, Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997), was handed down on June 26, 1997, and did not include a judgement on the constitutional grounds of the law.

It was used against one provision of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and two provisions of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 before being challenged again in two separate cases; one by the City of New York, two hospital associations, one hospital, and two health care unions; the other by a farmers' cooperative from Idaho and an individual member of the cooperative. Senators Byrd, Moynihan, Levin, and Hatfield again opposed the law, this time through Amicus curiæ briefs. United States District Court Judge Thomas Hogan combined the cases and declared the law unconstitutional on February 12, 1998. This ruling was subsequently affirmed on June 25, 1998 by a 6-3 decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case Clinton v. City of New York.
Justices Breyer, Scalia, and O'Connor dissented.

:gdgf:

Are you intimating that the President HAS Authority to SPEND funds not granted by the Congress?

[John Galt]

Did you actually read what I said? Yes, it was a dissent. But that does not mean it was incorrect. Scalia rightly saw that the Supreme Court was taken in by the term "veto" in "line item veto" but what Scalia was saying is it wasn't really a veto at all (since, well, it wasn't) and actually facilitated Congress in overturning the President in refusing to spend appropriations. In fact, since it was made "unconstitutional" now no one can overturn the President if he refuses to spend. Congress and the President were agreeing on a way to overturn the President and the Supreme Court held it was giving the President power. But the fact of the matter is it wasn't... but I digress.



Please post information on what funds the President HAS spent that are outside the mandate. THen we can argue about it. Whil;e you mention that the legistaltion says what it can't be used for, does it mention that it MUST in ALL circumstances be used for X? Or is there some discretion?

Again from Scalia:

From 1789-1791, the First Congress made lump-sum appropriations for the entire Government-"sum[s] not exceeding" specified amounts for broad purposes. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 23, §1, 1 Stat. 95; Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 4, §1, 1 Stat. 104; Act of Feb. 11, 1791, ch. 6, 1 Stat. 190. From a very early date Congress also made permissive individual appropriations, leaving the decision whether to spend the money to the President's unfettered discretion. In 1803, it appropriated $50,000 for the President to build "not exceeding fifteen gun boats, to be armed, manned and fitted out, and employed for such purposes as in his opinion the public service may require," Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 11, §3, 2 Stat. 206. President Jefferson reported that "[t]he sum of fifty thousand dollars appropriated by Congress for providing gun boats remains unexpended. The favorable and peaceable turn of affairs on the Mississippi rendered an immediate execution of that law unnecessary," 13 Annals of Cong. 14 (1803). Examples of appropriations committed to the discretion of the President abound in our history. During the Civil War, an Act appropriated over $76 million to be divided among various items "as the exigencies of the service may require," Act of Feb. 25, 1862, ch. 32, 12 Stat. 344-345. During the Great Depression, Congress appropriated $950 million "for such projects and/or purposes and under such rules and regulations as the President in his discretion may prescribe," Act of Feb. 15, 1934, ch. 13, 48 Stat. 351, and $4 billion for general classes of projects, the money to be spent "in the discretion and under the direction of the President," Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 115. The constitutionality of such appropriations has never seriously been questioned. Rather, "[t]hat Congress has wide discretion in the matter of prescribing details of expenditures for which it appropriates must, of course, be plain. Appropriations and other acts of Congress are replete with instances of general appropriations of large amounts, to be allotted and expended as directed by designated government agencies." Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 -322 (1937).

[Gitana]

I think the broader perspective on this issue is that this administration seems determined to circumnvent constitutional law when it impedes their desires. I believe, during the entire history of all US presidents, a total of 600-something signing statements were used. That's every president since George Washington until 2000. Bush has already exceeded 800. I think signing statements, as used by Bush, have several purposes: as a defense tool in potential future prosecution, to further increase the powers of the Executive Branch, and to further marginalize Congress - and therefore, the People.

To add to the picture: following the Hamden ruling, Bush has proposed a new bill. The 32-page draft measure is intended to authorize the Pentagon's tribunal system, established shortly after the 2001 terrorist attacks to detain and prosecute detainees captured in the war on terror. (The tribunal system was thrown out last month by the Supreme Court.) What's new? This bill proposes that US citizens can be subjected to a domestic 'Gitmo'-like status, and be held indefinitely, with no civil rights, and in secret.

Want more? The Bush/Gonzalez team is now quietly circulating legislation to change the statutory interpretation of the War Crimes Act of 1996; because the Hamden decision opened the door to possible prosecution under the War Crimes Act. The Bush team proposal wants to mandate that US enforcement of Geneva Conventions be subject to domestic interpretation, not international standards. This change is needed by Bush because the US Supreme Court believes that foreign interpretations of international treaties, like the Geneva Conventions, should at least be considered by US courts:
Quote: Publicly released memos show that as far back as Jan. 25, 2002, Gonzales, then the White House counsel, worried that the president's policies could trigger prosecution under the act. That led the White House to declare, over the objection of the State Department, that al-Qaida was not protected by the conventions. In the memo, Gonzales argued that the president could create "a solid defense against any future prosecution" by declaring that the Geneva Conventions did not apply.


This is also why they changed the definition of 'terrorist' - so they could broadly expand the classes of people that they could hold, subject to 'extraordinary rendition,' and reclassify during military operations. The last Patriot Act version gave the Feds the ability to classify (should they so desire) US citizens as 'domestic terrorists' - and the language was so broad that it could include peaceful protesters at a political rally, for example. (See Josh Wolf: http://news.com.com/Blogger+jailed+after+defying+court+orders/2100-1028_3-6101187.html)


More? Bush is now also trying to obtain retroactive immunity for his legal liability in implementing his illegal NSA spying programs.

Quote: "They want retroactive immunity," said Mary Ellen O'Connell, a professor of international law at Notre Dame. "Have you known of any other time in our history when we have tried to immunize public officials against crimes after they have committed the crimes?"

Taken altogether, the above activities are a grim testament to an administration that apparently has no respect for our Constitution at all.

[John Galt]

Gitana wrote: I think the broader perspective on this issue is that this administration seems determined to circumnvent constitutional law when it impedes their desires. I believe, during the entire history of all US presidents, a total of 600-something signing statements were used. That's every president since George Washington until 2000. Bush has already exceeded 800. I think signing statements, as used by Bush, have several purposes: as a defense tool in potential future prosecution, to further increase the powers of the Executive Branch, and to further marginalize Congress - and therefore, the People.

To add to the picture: following the Hamden ruling, Bush has proposed a new bill. The 32-page draft measure is intended to authorize the Pentagon's tribunal system, established shortly after the 2001 terrorist attacks to detain and prosecute detainees captured in the war on terror. (The tribunal system was thrown out last month by the Supreme Court.) What's new? This bill proposes that US citizens can be subjected to a domestic 'Gitmo'-like status, and be held indefinitely, with no civil rights, and in secret.

The proposed legislation targets terrorists.

I don't see what this has to do with the topic at hand: whether or not the President should uphold the Constitution or must he enforce an unconstitutional law which, at the time he signed it, he viewed as wholly constitutional.

Quote: Want more? The Bush/Gonzalez team is now quietly circulating legislation to change the statutory interpretation of the War Crimes Act of 1996; because the Hamden decision opened the door to possible prosecution under the War Crimes Act. The Bush team proposal wants to mandate that US enforcement of Geneva Conventions be subject to domestic interpretation, not international standards. This change is needed by Bush because the US Supreme Court believes that foreign interpretations of international treaties, like the Geneva Conventions, should at least be considered by US courts:
Quote: Publicly released memos show that as far back as Jan. 25, 2002, Gonzales, then the White House counsel, worried that the president's policies could trigger prosecution under the act. That led the White House to declare, over the objection of the State Department, that al-Qaida was not protected by the conventions. In the memo, Gonzales argued that the president could create "a solid defense against any future prosecution" by declaring that the Geneva Conventions did not apply.


The Geneva Convention only applies to enemy soldiers, not enemy combatants who are of no state actor, who wear no uniform and who do not do battle on battlefields but in people's homes. Ex parte Quiren controls.

I don't see what this has to do with the topic at hand: whether or not the President should uphold the Constitution or must he enforce an unconstitutional law which, at the time he signed it, he viewed as wholly constitutional.


Quote: This is also why they changed the definition of 'terrorist' - so they could broadly expand the classes of people that they could hold, subject to 'extraordinary rendition,' and reclassify during military operations. The last Patriot Act version gave the Feds the ability to classify (should they so desire) US citizens as 'domestic terrorists' - and the language was so broad that it could include peaceful protesters at a political rally, for example. (See Josh Wolf: http://news.com.com/Blogger+jailed+after+defying+court+orders/2100-1028_3-6101187.html)


More? Bush is now also trying to obtain retroactive immunity for his legal liability in implementing his illegal NSA spying programs.

Quote: "They want retroactive immunity," said Mary Ellen O'Connell, a professor of international law at Notre Dame. "Have you known of any other time in our history when we have tried to immunize public officials against crimes after they have committed the crimes?"

Taken altogether, the above activities are a grim testament to an administration that apparently has no respect for our Constitution at all.

I don't see what this has to do with the topic at hand: whether or not the President should uphold the Constitution or must he enforce an unconstitutional law which, at the time he signed it, he viewed as wholly constitutional.

Frankly most of the Constitution has to do with what government can specifically do, and frankly the leftists in this country have rendered the Constitution meaningless. But that is neither here nor there as to the topic at hand.

[Gitana]

Quote: not enemy combatants who are of no state actor, who wear no uniform and who do not do battle on battlefields but in people's homes.

'Wars' are no longer fought traditionally. I think it's a misuse of the Conventions interpretations, given the state of the MiddleEast and other nations who's combatants are the people, not a State army. Clarity and updating are needed.

Quote: The proposed legislation targets terrorists.

No. Like the Patriot Act wording, the proposed legislations wording is so broad that it leaves plenty of room for abuse. We must take this (and all actions by this admin) in context, and in view of past performance and goals by this admin. To not do so would be to foolishly ignore machinations. (Hence, the seemingly unrelated paragraphs in my post.)

Quote: I don't see what this has to do with the topic at hand: whether or not the President should uphold the Constitution or must he enforce an unconstitutional law which, at the time he signed it, he viewed as wholly constitutional.

Frankly most of the Constitution has to do with what government can specifically do, and frankly the leftists in this country have rendered the Constitution meaningless.

I hate to break it to you, but it is not the leftists (whoever they are) who have developed all the techniques over the last six years to circumnvent the Constitution, and erode the functionality of the three branches of government, which were supposed to be balanced.

But to get to your repeated phrase: I think the president has the duty to uphold the Constitution in situ, until such time as an amendment is clarified, modified, added, or changed. I saw no clause stating that the president's duty depended upon his personal view of any particular element of the Constitution - although Bush is sure working on that one. :wink:

[John Galt]

Gitana wrote: Quote: not enemy combatants who are of no state actor, who wear no uniform and who do not do battle on battlefields but in people's homes.

'Wars' are no longer fought traditionally. I think it's a misuse of the Conventions interpretations, given the state of the MiddleEast and other nations who's combatants are the people, not a State army. Clarity and updating are needed.

We never signed this imaginary updated version and are not bound by made up treaties.

Quote: Quote: The proposed legislation targets terrorists.

No. Like the Patriot Act wording, the proposed legislations wording is so broad that it leaves plenty of room for abuse. We must take this (and all actions by this admin) in context, and in view of past performance and goals by this admin. To not do so would be to foolishly ignore machinations. (Hence, the seemingly unrelated paragraphs in my post.)

Please quote, from the PATRIOT Act, the broad words that do just that.

Quote: Quote: I don't see what this has to do with the topic at hand: whether or not the President should uphold the Constitution or must he enforce an unconstitutional law which, at the time he signed it, he viewed as wholly constitutional.

Frankly most of the Constitution has to do with what government can specifically do, and frankly the leftists in this country have rendered the Constitution meaningless.

I hate to break it to you, but it is not the leftists (whoever they are) who have developed all the techniques over the last six years to circumnvent the Constitution, and erode the functionality of the three branches of government, which were supposed to be balanced.

But to get to your repeated phrase: I think the president has the duty to uphold the Constitution in situ, until such time as an amendment is clarified, modified, added, or changed. I saw no clause stating that the president's duty depended upon his personal view of any particular element of the Constitution - although Bush is sure working on that one. :wink:

Bush is a leftist. He is President Wilson's heir. But I was speaking more of people like FDR. Of course, like I said, this is all neither here nor there. What the question is is whether or not teh President should enforce the law even if it is unconstitutional. Richard Owl Mirror seems to think yes, since he signed it he is bound by it until the almighty and infallible Solomons on the Supreme Court decide its constitutionality. I tend to take Jefferson's departmentalism approach to the matter, and know that the President is bound by oath to protect above all the Constitution of the United States.

[Gitana]

Quote: We never signed this imaginary updated version and are not bound by made up treaties.

According to Bush, we aren't even bound by the one we did sign.

Quote:
The proposed legislation targets terrorists.

No. Like the Patriot Act wording, the proposed legislations wording is so broad that it leaves plenty of room for abuse. We must take this (and all actions by this admin) in context, and in view of past performance and goals by this admin. To not do so would be to foolishly ignore machinations. (Hence, the seemingly unrelated paragraphs in my post.)

Please quote, from the PATRIOT Act, the broad words that do just that.


You missed the entire point. But should you really want to know, that info is all over the internet; google your preferred source. Patriot I or II + civil rights, Domestic Security Enhancement Act + civil rights, etc.

Quote: What the question is is whether or not teh President should enforce the law even if it is unconstitutional.

I answered that. Now, if a president doesn't fulfill that oath, or works to circumnvent the Constitution, what are the possible consequences?