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In philosophy of mind some people maintain that 'qualia' (the qualities of sensations) are not to be identified with brain states, an idea which lead to the 'zombie world' scenario, a world indistinguishable from ours, except that where brain states are present qualia are not. As a theoretical physicist i've serious concerns with proposals of this kind. For, as i understand it, the qualia would eventually be states of mind which constitute a state space independent from the physical brain states, at the same time not exhibiting any dynamics of their own. In fact, the quality of 'blue' color sensation will come along with the corresponding neural state which we shall name 'blue', in which case the dynamics of qualia is essentially the dynamics of physical states of the brain. The qualia-state-space is essentially non dynamic. It lacks a basic property commonly associated with a non-trivial state space.