Political Crossfire Forums

[VogonFord]

The last defeat for the Allies during the Second World War was Montgomery's MARKET GARDEN. I'm not going to explain the operation but I do have questions for people.

1. Why was an operation so humongous in scale prepared in such a short time?

2. How did Allied intelligence completely not notice the presence of Waffen SS Panzer divisions?

3. Why was the majority of the operation planned for airborne? I will explain this. Every airborne operation up to MARKET GARDEN had shown the clear disadvantages of it. Fallschirmjäger in the Netherlands were almost annhialated by a small group of armored cars. OVERLORD and the German invasion of the Netherlands showed also that airborne drops are not in small areas, and cannot be relied upon to reach their objectives within a short amount of time. Also, Crete showed how easily paratroopers could be hurt. So why was it mostly airborne?

4. How did intelligence miss the easy targets the Shermans would be on the only transportation they could take? The roads were high, and they couldn't go off them or they would get stuck in the mud. So how did they miss it?

and finally

5. Why was the operation cleared in the first place?

[NAB]

Funny timing on your post (at least for me). I just finished re-reading Band of Brothers just a couple of days ago. I remember a quote from Eisenhower on the failure of Market Garden which seemed to address a least a couple of your questions. I don't have the book handy, but I'll go take a look and see if I'm remembering it correctly.

[DSwain]

Very interesting questions; try to take a look at Cornelius Ryan's "Bridge Too Far" - an excellent account of the campaign

Here's my thoughts

1) It wasn't prepared in SUCH a short time; there'd been a plan similar to Market-Garden - Operation Comet - which would have been much smaller. However, it was pretty swift. There was a feeling among the western Allies that, come September 1944 we really could finish off the Germans in the west by Christmas 1944. At the end of August and the beginning of September, as the Allies sped east, the Germans were falling back everywhere. At the crucial moment - as the Allies were approaching Germany - the supplies ran dry. Here there was a crucial decision - hunker down, wait for substantial resupply and go for Antwerp - or try to go for a quick knock out blow. SHAEF went for the knockout blow but it had to be swift.

2) Intel did flag up concerns about German troop concentrations around Arnhem. Montgomery's 21st Army Group found itself in the realms of self-delusion; Monty wanted M-G to go ahead, he wanted to beat Patton and he was willing to twist and to misinterpret the intel to do it. I'm not suggesting that he would have allowed Market to go ahead as it did (ie, without significant revision) had he known that IISS Pz Corps was at Arnhem, he just didn't want to believe what he was being told.

3) 1st Allied Airborne Army was kicking its heels in England. Airborne still hadn't proved their strategic worth by 1944 - arguably, it never did during WW2. This is not to impugn in the slightest the bravery of the individuals and the tactical brilliance of the units, but the return was insufficient for the substantial investments used in building these formations. There was pressure to get these formations to do something more before the war ended. An additional airborne element was intended for Market - and that was the airlifting of UK 52nd Lowland Division into Deelen Airfield nr Arnhem - this never happened.

4) Again, as with #2, intel was being overlooked or downgraded in importance. Though the dispersement of polder is indisputable and I really can't see why the 'tankies' in the Guards Armoured Division didn't ask questions.

5) Much as in #1, really.


I'd like to add a point here if I may. British and US formations were, by 1944 in NW Europe, behaving somewhat differently. There are some generalisations coming but they do hold up. The British Army had been fighting around the world for 5 years; the loss of manpower from a country the size of Britain was becoming intolerable. Divisions were broken up to provide replacements, battalions merged. This had an effect on doctrine in the British Army. Everything was subordinate to keeping casualties down. The Canadians were suffering similarly. Meanwhile the US still had substantial pools of manpower to call upon. The differences were shown at Falaise - with UK/Canadian forces moving steadily but cautiously while US forces were faster and rather more reckless. Garden needed US forces and a Patton. I'm not a fan of Patton but I think for such an audacious plan based on speed and guile, you couldn't have picked a worse formation than British 2nd Army and a worse general than Monty.

[pikers]

The ego of competing generals on the Allied side of the fence. The rush to glory contributed heavily to this.