Political Crossfire Forums

[Gryff1nd0r]

and God assigns the microscopic piece of tissue with a human soul at the moment of conception...

then what happens in the case of twins, where the split occurs a few days after conception?

[The Grandmaster]

A good question Gryffinador. In fact, this was one of the main issued under debate for almost three weeks earlier this year, with most people arguing over this very thing. Anarchist and myself brought this point up a couple months ago. The fact is, it provides a difficulty for the pro-life crowd, because it makes it seem impossible to say that “a life begins at conception” if something has not even determined if it’s going to be 1, o2 two “lives.” The problem for them is, something cannot be both “a life” and “not a life.” The Anarchist explained this the most eloquently back in January I think.

[Gilbert1908]

Gryff1nd0r wrote: and God assigns the microscopic piece of tissue with a human soul at the moment of conception...

then what happens in the case of twins, where the split occurs a few days after conception?

The Morality of Unenabled Embryo Use—Arguments That Work and Arguments That Don’t
LOUIS M. GUENIN

From the Department of Microbiology and Molecular Genetics, Harvard Medical School, Boston, Mass.

Based on a presentation at Internal Medicine Grand Rounds, Mayo Clinic College of Medicine, Rochester, Minn, on June 4, 2003.



Nonindividuation Objection to Zygotic Personhood


The nonindividuation objection to zygotic personhood runs as follows. Prior to formation of an embryo’s primitive streak at day 14 of development, it can happen that the embryo splits into monozygotic twins. And if twinning occurs, the twins can fuse. Hence it has been suggested that in respect of any embryo, one cannot say until day 14 whether there exists one individual or more. If one cannot say how many persons exist, it is untenable to say that any person exists. Another version of the nonindividuation objection begins from the premise that in twinning, an embryo vanishes and leaves no earthly remains. How could an individual person die leaving no earthly remains? If no corpse ever exists, there could not earlier have existed a person.

Thus does the nonindividuation objection characterize zygotic personhood as metaphysically impossible. The objection’s biological sophistication has led many scientists to regard it as a clinching argument for embryo use. Despite that sophistication, the nonindividuation objection is susceptible to the following refutation owed to David Oderberg.1 Suppose at time t0 a somatic cell x. By t1, x has divided, and there exist x’s daughter cells d1 and d2. The process by which this has occurred, namely, mitosis, is routine. Notice that as we look back at the history of x up to t1, we do not have any doubt that x was an individual cell. Plainly x had the capability of dividing, and in fact, x did divide, but it is not incoherent to say, and we unhesitatingly do say, that for so long as x existed, x was an individual. As for the apparent puzzle of dying without leaving earthly remains, again a reflection on mitosis sheds light. Necrosis is not the only means by which a life form may cease to exist. Dividing is another means. And it happens that after division, there is no corpse. So it is not metaphysically incoherent to say that an embryo capable of dividing is an individual. Or that an embryo that does divide was an individual before it divided.


We may reply to the proponent of the nonindividuation objection with two thoughts. First, what is feasible for an adult ought not constrain our thinking, because we know of the remarkable ability of an early embryo to split into surviving individuals. Second, the individuality of a being does not depend on its being the same individual, if it happens to split, as any of its successors. When an embryo has split, we may simply say that it was one individual until it split, that the individual ceased to exist when it split, and that two individuals have succeeded it. Thus may we render not only the possibility but the actuality of twinning consistent with individuality of the original embryo and with individuality of its twin successors. Given that the case of an embryo that does split resolves in this way, no impediment arises to individuality of an embryo that has not split.

According to this analysis, the nonindividuation objection fails to establish that an embryo cannot be a person. When monozygotic twinning occurs, it may be said that two persons succeed one person that ceases. But even if we defeat the contention that an embryo cannot be a person, there remains the question whether, for purposes of the duty not to kill, we should treat every embryo as a person. That a being “is a person” is not an empirical observation or an a priori truth. Calling a being a person is a shorthand reply to the moral question, “How should we treat it for this purpose?” The shorthand signifies our conclusion that we should classify the being among those to whom we think all of us should accord a particular treatment. Whereupon we may fairly be asked what argument supports that conclusion. Failure of the nonindividuation objection leaves the door open to introduce, or oppose, arguments that we are obliged to treat all embryos as persons for purposes of the duty not to kill.

[galba]

Gryff1nd0r wrote: and God assigns the microscopic piece of tissue with a human soul at the moment of conception...

then what happens in the case of twins, where the split occurs a few days after conception?

Another soul for the new embryo?

[Æ]

Gryff1nd0r wrote: and God assigns the microscopic piece of tissue with a human soul at the moment of conception...

then what happens in the case of twins, where the split occurs a few days after conception?
What does God have to do with this debate?

[Plodder]

wThis is a byzantine argument. It does not matter ever and at all in any way

[joe christian]

Gryff1nd0r wrote: and God assigns the microscopic piece of tissue with a human soul at the moment of conception...

then what happens in the case of twins, where the split occurs a few days after conception?
Obviously, the twin's individual souls existed prior to conception. Otherwise, they couldn't be conceived in the first place.

[Gryff1nd0r]

joe christian wrote: Gryff1nd0r wrote: and God assigns the microscopic piece of tissue with a human soul at the moment of conception...

then what happens in the case of twins, where the split occurs a few days after conception?
Obviously, the twin's individual souls existed prior to conception. Otherwise, they couldn't be conceived in the first place.

Ah. Of course.

[steen]

Gilbert1908 wrote: ...Based on a presentation at Internal Medicine Grand Rounds, Mayo Clinic College of Medicine, Rochester, Minn, on June 4, 2003.... That makes it a personal opinion and nothing else.

[joe christian]

Gryff1nd0r wrote: joe christian wrote: Gryff1nd0r wrote: and God assigns the microscopic piece of tissue with a human soul at the moment of conception...

then what happens in the case of twins, where the split occurs a few days after conception?
Obviously, the twin's individual souls existed prior to conception. Otherwise, they couldn't be conceived in the first place.

Ah. Of course.
I knew there would be at least one other poster on the thread who would appreciate this reasonable and logical solution to the problem of soul migration and human attachment in procreation.

[Gryff1nd0r]

joe christian wrote: Gryff1nd0r wrote: joe christian wrote: Gryff1nd0r wrote: and God assigns the microscopic piece of tissue with a human soul at the moment of conception...

then what happens in the case of twins, where the split occurs a few days after conception?
Obviously, the twin's individual souls existed prior to conception. Otherwise, they couldn't be conceived in the first place.

Ah. Of course.
I knew there would be at least one other poster on the thread who would appreciate this reasonable and logical solution to the problem of soul migration and human attachment in procreation.

And I suppose that spontaneously aborted fetuses never had a soul in the first place.

Sorry, but I'm not exactly sure if you are being sarcastic. I assume you are serious based on your handel and past threads I have seen you in.

[Plodder]

they had a soul but they died. end of story.

[spearsy23]

Plodder wrote: they had a soul but they died. end of story.

So according to you christians, twins have no souls? interesting.

[Gilbert1908]

steen wrote: Gilbert1908 wrote: ...Based on a presentation at Internal Medicine Grand Rounds, Mayo Clinic College of Medicine, Rochester, Minn, on June 4, 2003.... That makes it a personal opinion and nothing else.

I was unaware informed argument was not acceptable on this forum, in the future I will limit myself to ill informed, shallow, pointless, taunts.

[War Approving Democrat]

That question is good and therefore life starts at birth because if it started at conception then the soul of identical twins would be split in half because the split is not conception so a soul could not be given at conception.

[Plodder]

god knows that twins were to be, so I guess the embryo that is going to split in 2 when it does, one soul goes to each embryo