Political Crossfire Forums

[Xenophen]

Hey guys, I am working on a researh paper for my College freshman english class. I was originally going to do it over General Patton, but due to a change in mind set I have decided to do it over whether or not FDR knew about Pearl Harbor before it happened. My paper will be trying to prove he did.

What I need help with is sources, if you guys know of any books that would be good to check in I would appreciate you letting me know. If you have any books in your own library and would be willing to send me (I assure you will get them back) the book or a photo copy of the pages helpful to me also with the bibliographical information, that would be awesome. I would be willing to re-pay you for postage and such.

If you can help that would be awesome, i would deeply appreciate it.

Thanks
Xenophen

[Nnamath]

try these

http://www.thenewamerican.com/tna/2001/06-04-2001/vo17no12_facts.htm

http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/pearl.html

http://www.btinternet.com/~nlpwessex/Documents/pearlharbor.htm

try a book called The Annals. can't find the link. i'll research some more.

for the record i am not into conspiracy theories but i believe their were elements of the government at the time who thought american isolationism was wrong. is this crap possible, sure.

[Simon De Montfort]

Xenophen wrote: Hey guys, I am working on a researh paper for my College freshman english class. I was originally going to do it over General Patton, but due to a change in mind set I have decided to do it over whether or not FDR knew about Pearl Harbor before it happened. My paper will be trying to prove he did.

What I need help with is sources, if you guys know of any books that would be good to check in I would appreciate you letting me know. If you have any books in your own library and would be willing to send me (I assure you will get them back) the book or a photo copy of the pages helpful to me also with the bibliographical information, that would be awesome. I would be willing to re-pay you for postage and such.

If you can help that would be awesome, i would deeply appreciate it.

Thanks
Xenophen

I will help you by telling you to change your argument. The idea that FDR allowed Pearl Harbor to happen to get us into WW2 is simply ludicrous. FDR wanted to fight Germany much more than Japan. If he was going to create or allow an event that would draw us into a war he would have done it with Germany. For example, he would have gotten Germany to sink an American civilian ship. That's what got us into WW1. Also what sense would it make for FDR to allow a large part of our navy to be destroyed just prior to going to war. The American army was small and weak the only thing going for the US was our navy. He wouldn't have had that vital asset for the prosecution of a war gutted just to begin a war.

Japan launched a sneak attack on us all by themselves. No help from FDR was required. It was believed that Japan might attack the Philippines but not PH. Japan attacked us because they decided that the Southern Resource Zone (SE Asia and Dutch East Indies) was an easier target than the Northern Resource Zone (Soviet Far East and Siberia). The Philippines sits across Japan's lines of communication with the Southern Resource Zone and had to be taken. To ensure that the US couldn't reinforce the Philippines the US Pacific Fleet at PH had to be destroyed. So FDR didn't need to get Japan to attack us. They planned to do it by themselves.

[Laonin]

Simon = Idiot

No one said he coaxed Japan into attacking Pearl Harbor. The argument is that he ALLOWED it to happen. ie, he knew they were planning to attack, but he didn't launch a preemptive strike to stop them. As far as why would he let the bulk of the Navy be destroyed, he didn't. He actually sent several of the more valuable battle groups in the Pacific Fleet out on bs missions just prior to the attack. He wanted to fight Germany, but to fight Germany would mean to fight Japan. If Japan attacks us, that means Germany would too. If we launch a counter-attack on Japan, it would mean war with Germany. It's called the allies system. You should read about it.

As far as the Lucitania, America had nothing to do with provoking the U-Boat attack. The Lucitania wasn't even an American ship, it just had Americans on it. America didn't even enter WWI because of the Lucitania incident. We demanded that Germany stop their unrestricted submarine warfare, which they did. We didn't get into the War until Germany returned to unrestricted submarine warfare and sent the Zimmerman Telegraph much later.

Try to know what you're talking about when you type, bud.

I think it's quite possible that your thesis is correct. Good luck in finding your sources and writing your paper.

[Simon De Montfort]

Laonin wrote: Simon = Idiot

No one said he coaxed Japan into attacking Pearl Harbor. The argument is that he ALLOWED it to happen. ie, he knew they were planning to attack, but he didn't launch a preemptive strike to stop them. As far as why would he let the bulk of the Navy be destroyed, he didn't. He actually sent several of the more valuable battle groups in the Pacific Fleet out on bs missions just prior to the attack. He wanted to fight Germany, but to fight Germany would mean to fight Japan. If Japan attacks us, that means Germany would too. If we launch a counter-attack on Japan, it would mean war with Germany. It's called the allies system. You should read about it.

As far as the Lucitania, America had nothing to do with provoking the U-Boat attack. The Lucitania wasn't even an American ship, it just had Americans on it. America didn't even enter WWI because of the Lucitania incident. We demanded that Germany stop their unrestricted submarine warfare, which they did. We didn't get into the War until Germany returned to unrestricted submarine warfare and sent the Zimmerman Telegraph much later.

Try to know what you're talking about when you type, bud.

I think it's quite possible that your thesis is correct. Good luck in finding your sources and writing your paper.
:rotf: Captain cant spell is calling me an idiot. :rotf: It's spelled Lusitania with an S! :rotf:

It's obvious that you are a child. You begin your post with a baseless personal attack over simple disagreement and you have a problem with spelling. I addressed both sides of his implied argument by debunking the idea that FDR "create[d] or allow[ed] an event that would draw us into a war." If you weren't so quick to be an @sshole you would have noticed that. You probably don't know in1941 that the US had only recently moved the Pacific Fleet's base from San Diego to PH. Many conspiracy wackos (like yourself) have argued that FDR did this to provoke or create and incident. Also by saying that FDR knew about the PH attack one is in part implying that FDR created the incident by not doing something to stop it. But I'm not surprised this kind of thinking passed you by.

The idea that FDR would allow or create a war with Japan to get into a war with Germany using the alliance system (not allies system :roll: ) is the creation of simple minds. War with Germany wasn't guaranteed! Germany didn't have to declare war on us. Japan never went to war with Russia despite Hitler's many requests that Japan do so. So your precious "allies system" :lol: isn't a sure way to get a war to spread. So allowing or creating the PH attack could have ensured that the US NEVER got involved in the war against Hitler.

I have read books and seen interviews with respected historians on PH and I have yet to come across a reliable source that supports the idea that FDR either created the PH attack or allowed it to happen.

[eynon]

more over, if Germany had not declared war then I'd bet congress would've stopped lend-lease as a waste of valuble military resources that should be going to our war against Japan.

Interesting alternate history, no American involvement in the ETO, and far more American resources going to the PTO.....

[Xenophen]

Simon De Montfort wrote: :rotf: Captain cant spell is calling me an idiot. :rotf: It's spelled Lusitania with an S! :rotf:

It's obvious that you are a child. You begin your post with a baseless personal attack over simple disagreement and you have a problem with spelling.

Simon De Montfort wrote: If you weren't so quick to be an @sshole you would have noticed that.

Yep, you just showed him how to handle things in mature adult manner, not. There is no need kinduva stuff from either of you guys.

[Marcfj]

Xenophen wrote:

What I need help with is sources, if you guys know of any books that would be good to check in I would appreciate you letting me know.

"Infamy:Pearl Harbor and its aftermath" by John Toland

"Day Of Deceit" by Robert Stinnett

"At Dawn We Slept" by Donald M. Goldstein

[Marcfj]

Simon De Montfort wrote: Also what sense would it make for FDR to allow a large part of our navy to be destroyed just prior to going to war
Please note that the carriers, the most valuable ships, were conveniently absent from Pearl Harbor.
Simon De Montfort wrote:
War with Germany wasn't guaranteed!
In lieu of the fact that FDR publicly declared on September 11, 1941 that he had ordered the United States Navy to attack on sight any German war vessel, it was, in fact, guaranteed.
Simon De Montfort wrote:
Germany didn't have to declare war on us.
Their declaration was just a formality being that we had already initiated hostilities with them by attacking their ships.

[Deus]

Xenophen wrote: Hey guys, I am working on a researh paper for my College freshman english class. I was originally going to do it over General Patton, but due to a change in mind set I have decided to do it over whether or not FDR knew about Pearl Harbor before it happened. My paper will be trying to prove he did.


You cant begin research with the conclusion already in mind.

You dont want to be considered a creationist do you :)

[Simon De Montfort]

Marcfj wrote: Simon De Montfort wrote: Also what sense would it make for FDR to allow a large part of our navy to be destroyed just prior to going to war
Please note that the carriers, the most valuable ships, were conveniently absent from Pearl Harbor.
Simon De Montfort wrote:
War with Germany wasn't guaranteed!
In lieu of the fact that FDR publicly declared on September 11, 1941 that he had ordered the United States Navy to attack on sight any German war vessel, it was, in fact, guaranteed.
Simon De Montfort wrote:
Germany didn't have to declare war on us.
Their declaration was just a formality being that we had already initiated hostilities with them by attacking their ships.

Good points, there was a sort of de-facto war between the US and Germany in the Atlantic. But there was a huge difference between the kind of hostilities between Germany and the US before and after Dec 11, 1941. Just look at the number of US ships sunk in US waters by U-boats shortly after Germany's declaration of war. Had Germany not declared war there is no guarantee that the hostilities between the US Germany would have escalated to total war.

[Simon De Montfort]

Deus wrote: Xenophen wrote: Hey guys, I am working on a researh paper for my College freshman english class. I was originally going to do it over General Patton, but due to a change in mind set I have decided to do it over whether or not FDR knew about Pearl Harbor before it happened. My paper will be trying to prove he did.


You cant begin research with the conclusion already in mind.

You dont want to be considered a creationist do you :)

So if you were going to write a paper on Neanderthals you wouldn't assume that evolution is true?

Of course you have to begin a research paper with a conclusion in mind. It's called a hypothesis. The problem comes if you hold to hypothesis if your research doesn't support it.

[Angela]

Simon De Montfort wrote: Xenophen wrote: Hey guys, I am working on a researh paper for my College freshman english class. I was originally going to do it over General Patton, but due to a change in mind set I have decided to do it over whether or not FDR knew about Pearl Harbor before it happened. My paper will be trying to prove he did.

What I need help with is sources, if you guys know of any books that would be good to check in I would appreciate you letting me know. If you have any books in your own library and would be willing to send me (I assure you will get them back) the book or a photo copy of the pages helpful to me also with the bibliographical information, that would be awesome. I would be willing to re-pay you for postage and such.

If you can help that would be awesome, i would deeply appreciate it.

Thanks
Xenophen

I will help you by telling you to change your argument. The idea that FDR allowed Pearl Harbor to happen to get us into WW2 is simply ludicrous. FDR wanted to fight Germany much more than Japan. If he was going to create or allow an event that would draw us into a war he would have done it with Germany. For example, he would have gotten Germany to sink an American civilian ship. That's what got us into WW1. Also what sense would it make for FDR to allow a large part of our navy to be destroyed just prior to going to war. The American army was small and weak the only thing going for the US was our navy. He wouldn't have had that vital asset for the prosecution of a war gutted just to begin a war.

Japan launched a sneak attack on us all by themselves. No help from FDR was required. It was believed that Japan might attack the Philippines but not PH. Japan attacked us because they decided that the Southern Resource Zone (SE Asia and Dutch East Indies) was an easier target than the Northern Resource Zone (Soviet Far East and Siberia). The Philippines sits across Japan's lines of communication with the Southern Resource Zone and had to be taken. To ensure that the US couldn't reinforce the Philippines the US Pacific Fleet at PH had to be destroyed. So FDR didn't need to get Japan to attack us. They planned to do it by themselves.

Exactly Moreover even if FDR had known about the attack do you really think he would have left all the Pacific battleships fleet like a sitting duck in PH? What for? Any Japanese attack would have caused a war no need to let them sunk the fleet. War with Japan was more than a possibility after imposing the Oil embargo on Japan, and the US knew it simply they didn’t think Japan could strike as far as PH, the military was much more worried about sabotage hence the planes parked wing against wing instead of being dispersed and so on. The US and the UK simply unevaluated Japan, perhaps a race induced wishful thinking.
BTW from a military standpoint even if the PH attack hadn’t happened nothing would have changed, Japan would have stormed the whole Pacific for six months, the Battleships (moreover WWI vintage battleships) were useless if not escorted by carriers as the tragic end of the Repulse and the Prince of Wales in Singapore would have demonstrated. During the whole war there was only one big gun encounter (Suriago straits during the Leyte gulf battle) all the other decisive battles (Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz Islands, and Marianas) were carrier battles.

[Angela]

Simon De Montfort wrote: Marcfj wrote: Simon De Montfort wrote: Also what sense would it make for FDR to allow a large part of our navy to be destroyed just prior to going to war
Please note that the carriers, the most valuable ships, were conveniently absent from Pearl Harbor.
Simon De Montfort wrote:
War with Germany wasn't guaranteed!
In lieu of the fact that FDR publicly declared on September 11, 1941 that he had ordered the United States Navy to attack on sight any German war vessel, it was, in fact, guaranteed.
Simon De Montfort wrote:
Germany didn't have to declare war on us.
Their declaration was just a formality being that we had already initiated hostilities with them by attacking their ships.

Good points, there was a sort of de-facto war between the US and Germany in the Atlantic. But there was a huge difference between the kind of hostilities between Germany and the US before and after Dec 11, 1941. Just look at the number of US ships sunk in US waters by U-boats shortly after Germany's declaration of war. Had Germany not declared war there is no guarantee that the hostilities between the US Germany would have escalated to total war.

I'm pretty sure the US would have declared war on Germany, if I'm not mistaken a formal declaration of war was in preparation in the Congress after PH, but Germany was faster

[FCTE]

[Norrin Radd]

XENOPHEN,

There is little doubt left that FDR had foreknowledge of a Japanese attack.

It can be debated if FDR knew Pearl was the target, but this is of little consequence, as the McCollum memo, the intercepted messages and all the other evidence proves that FDR intentionally provoked a Japanese attack and the evidence also indicates that the reason the Pacific Fleet was moved to Pearl was to bait the Japanese into attacking us there. After all, look at what WWII required of the American people. There were not many families that didn't have a loved one serving either in the armed forces, or at home in the war effort. There was gas rationing, food rationing, sugar rationing, this was not Viet Nam, or Iraq, this war required the comittment of almost all Americans and for this kind of resolve a brutal attack on US soil was needed to guarantee support for a long, expensive war in which many sacrifices would need to be made by the American people. The attack was allowed to happen so that FDR could gain this support and also so that the Japanese wold not suspect we had broken their codes.

It is o.k. to listen to other's opinions, but you must do your own research if you want to get to the truth. You should be skeptical of all opinions, even mine.

The first link presented to you in this thread is the best short piece on the subject. It is from the New American and it includes most of the vital information.

Do not be afraid to copy and paste any pieces from that article into a search engine which you would like more information on, or that you find difficult to believe. All of it can be verified.

I will add some more info, but please remember, this is not by any means all of the evidence.


Here we go...........

/////////

January 27, 1941 Joseph C. Grew, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, wired Washington that he had learned information that Japan, in the event of trouble with the U.S., was planning a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

April: U.S. intelligence officers continue to monitor Japanese secret messages. In a program code-named Magic, U.S. intelligence uses a machine to decode Japan's diplomatic dispatches. Washington does not communicate all the available information to all commands, including Short and Kimmel in Hawaii.

May: Japanese Adm. Nomura informs his superiors that he has learned Americans were reading his message traffic. No one in Tokyo believes the code could have been broken. The code is not changed.

July: Throughout the summer, Adm. Yamamoto trains his forces and finalizes the planning of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Sept. 24: The "bomb plot" message from Japanese naval intelligence to Japan's consul general in Honolulu requesting a grid of exact locations of ships in Pearl Harbor is deciphered. The information is not shared with the Hawaii's Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short.

http://history.acusd.edu/gen/WW2Timeline/RD-PEARL.html

////////

After 24 November 1941, events in U.S.-Japanese diplomatic negotiations moved very swiftly to their climax on 7 December. A number of important diplomatic messages passed between Tokyo and Washington between July and November; these are summarized below. These early messages and those exchanged after 24 November which have been selected for inclusion in this appendix are so revealing that it is easy to lose sight of the fact that U.S. officials were often reading these messages at about the same time as the Japanese diplomats. The "War Warning" messages sent by OPNAV beginning on 24 November have also been included in this appendix to insure that the reader fully appreciates their correlation with events occurring in diplomatic circles.

N 25 Nov A circular message from Tokyo to Washington on 15 November with detailed instructions on how to destroy code machines.
N 28 Nov A circular message from Tokyo to Washington on 19 November with detailed instructions to listen for "Winds Execute" messages to be added to Japanese news broadcasts in case of diplomatic emergencies involving the U.S., England, or Russia. When heard, embassies were to destroy all codes, papers, etc.
N 26 Nov A circular message from Tokyo to Washington on 19 November, sent after above message but translated earlier, contained instructions to listen for an abbreviated "Winds" message in general intelligence broadcasts repeated five times at beginning and end, i.e., only the word East, West, or North would be spoken five times.
A 28 Nov Circular message from Tokyo on 20 November said U.S.-Japanese situation would not "permit any further conciliation by us" and rejected all feelings of optimism.
A 22 Nov Tokyo informed Washington on 22 November that, by 29 November if agreement had not been reached, "things are automatically going to happen."
24 Nov OPNAV message warned of possible Japanese "aggressive movement" toward Philippines, Guam, or any direction.
A 26 Nov Tokyo message to Washington on 26 November contained telephone brevity code to be used because "telegrams take too long." The code covered topics under negotiation, situations, and personalities.
27 Nov OPNAV WAR WARNING message.
A 29 Nov Message on 26 November from Nomura to Tokyo recommended that Japan break diplomatic relations with the U.S. in a formal manner rather than "enter on scheduled operations" without prior announcement particularly since "our intention is a strict military secret." A formal break would avoid responsibility for the "rupture."
N 2 Dec A circular message from Tokyo on 27 November contained another brevity code in which codewords were assigned specific meanings, e.g., "Japan's and USA's military forces have clashed" equals, "HIZIKATA MINAMI."

-68-

page 69

N 28 Nov A telephone conversation on 27 November between Washington (Kurusu) and a foreign office official in Tokyo named Yamamoto. Tokyo used telephone code to convey a message referring to an attack on the U.S.
29 Nov OPNAV WAR WARNING message. Text indicated Army had also been notified.
A 1 Dec Message from Tokyo to Berlin on 30 November directed the Japanese ambassador to inform Germany that U.S. relations had ruptured and that "war may break out quicker than anyone dreams." Regarding Russia, Tokyo stated that if Russia reacted to her move southward and joined hands with England and the U.S., Japan was "ready to turn on her with all our might." Tokyo requested the Germans and Italians to maintain "absolute secrecy."
N 1 Dec Message from Tokyo to Washington discussed means of allaying U.S. suspicions regarding Japanese reactions to the U.S. proposal of 26 November. News media were to be advised that "negotiations are continuing." A plan was discussed to make a formal presentation in Washington vice Tokyo. The message queried president's reaction to Tojo's bellicose speech.
N 1 Dec A circular message from Tokyo on 1 December advised Washington that London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila had been instructed to destroy code machines.
2 Dec OPNAV instructed CINCAF to establish defensive patrols.
A 4 Dec Message from Rome to Washington on 2 December said that Tokyo believed the Hull note of 26 November "absolutely unacceptable," and "a conflict(?) in the near future is considered very probable." Rome also said Tokyo believed American Navy in Pacific was "not strong enough for decisive action."
N 3 Dec Message from Tokyo to Washington on 2 December instructed Washington to burn all codes except one copy of the codes being used in conjunction with the machine (i.e., PURPLE, the O Code, and the abbreviation code. Washington was also to burn messages, other secret papers, and telegraphic codes, and possibly to destroy one machine.
3 Dec An OPNAV message regarding Japanese instructions to burn codes.
N 6 Dec Messages from Berlin and Rome to Tokyo on 3 December described Japanese attempts to obtain German and Italian assurances that they would follow the Japanese declaration of war on the U.S. with their own. Hitler was not available, but Mussolini agreed.

-69-

page 70

4 Dec OPNAV ordered U.S. codes destroyed.
N 6 Dec Washington confirmed destruction of codes on 5 December.
N 6 Dec Tokyo message on 5 December ordered four individuals in Washington to leave immediately. The translation contained a note which identified one as head of Japanese espionage in the Western Hemisphere and the others as his assistants.
A 6 Dec Tokyo message to Washington on 6 December alerted Nomura that a formal reply to the 26 November note had been prepared, was very long, and would be in 14 parts.

The messages quoted in this appendix are taken from Radio Intelligence Publication Number 87Z, "The Role of Radio Intelligence in the American-Japanese Naval War," Vol. I, Section A, by Ensign John V. Connorton, USNR. SRH-012, RG 457.

http://www.history.navy.mil/books/comint/ComInt-B.html

These are from What Really Happened.

I have not verified these, but I can't think of any "fake" government documents I have ever found on the net.


Dec. 3 N 6991 25644 Tokyo 111 Make your "ships in harbor"

report irregular but twice a

week. (Nov. 15, 1941-J19).

**Dec. 4 N 7001 JD #7001 or #6975 is believed to

be the (missing) translation of

the Winds Message.

*Dec. 3 A 7017 25640 Tokyo 867 Washington burn all codes except

one copy of "Oite" (Pa-K2) and

"L" (LA). Stop using the code

machine and destroy it com-

pletely when you have finished

this, wire back "HARUNA."

Destroy all messages files and

other secret documents. (Dec. 2,

1941.)

#Dec. 4 A 7029 25694 Tokyo 114 Investigate fleet air bases in

or 111 Hawaii (Nov. 20, 1941-J19.)

#Dec. 5 A 7063 25773 Tokyo 113 Report ships in Pearl Harbor,

Manila Bay, etc. (Nov. 18, 1941 -

J19.)

#Dec. 5 A 7064 25772 Honolulu 224 Spy report. (Nov. 18, 1941)

*Dec. 5 N 7086 25823 Tokyo 122 In the future report even when

there are no (ship) movements

(Nov 29, 1941-J19.)

#Dec. 5 N 7091 25787 Tokyo 2443 London discontinue use of code

machine and dispose of it immed-

iately. (Dec. 1)

http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/pearl/www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/magic.html

////////////

More From the NAVY Site..............

"This appendix contains seventy-two selected Japanese naval messages intercepted between September and 4 December 1941 by Navy intercept sites at Hawaii, Guam, and Corregidor; these messages were not decoded and translated until September 1945-May 1946."

[not pasting any of these since they were allegedly translated after the attack-norrin]

http://www.history.navy.mil/books/comint/ComInt-A.html

///

Even if you only look at the diplomatic messages, ruling out all the other evidence, it doesn't take a rocket scientist to see what's going on.

Here is an interesting piece I just found while looking for the messages.........

"America's very success, in September 1940, in breaking the Japanese diplomatic cipher, code named "Purple," had the ironic effect of distracting attention from where it could have been more profitably focused in the fateful months leading up to Pearl Harbor. The Purple cipher carried the highest-level diplomatic messages of the Japanese Empire; this was intelligence of such remarkable value that it was given the code name magic. The Purple cipher was generated by a complex machine. It used a cascade of rotating switches to encipher every letter of a message in a different key from the last or the next. In one position of the switches the letter A would become G; in the next it would become P. The U.S. Army's code breakers had, in eighteen months of intense effort, deduced the wiring and setup of the machine without ever seeing one, a feat of pure analysis the likes of which had scarcely before been seen. After hastily soldering together telephone switches and relays to produce a replica of the machine, they proceeded to decode the Japanese messages almost as quickly as they arrived."

"On the morning of December 3, 1941, a Purple message came through ordering Japan's embassy in Washington to destroy its code books, and even one of its two vital Purple machines. Frank Rowlett, a senior cryptanalyst of the Army's Signal Intelligence Service, arrived at his office at noon that day from a meeting, plucked this latest magic decrypt from his in-box, and proceeded to read its contents with mounting incredulity. With only a single machine it would obviously be impossible for the embassy to continue its normal flow of business. Colonel Otis Sadtler, who was in charge of distributing the magic decrypts, showed up in Rowlett's office at that moment and began to pepper him with questions. Had the Japanese ever sent anything like this before? Could they be getting ready to change their codes? Perhaps they suspected their current codes had been broken? Then the only possible meaning of this extraordinary message sank in. Sadtler pulled himself to attention. "Rowlett, do you know what this means? It means Japan is about to go to war with the United States!" And, decrypt in hand, Sadtler took off literally running down the corridor of the Munitions Building to alert the head of Army intelligence."


http://www.worldwar2history.info/Midway/war.html

The next piece comes from a person who doesn't believe in foreknowledge of the attack on Pearl.

How can that be?

The author continues...........

"But diplomatic communications are not the place where military orders are delivered. America knew that Japan was going to strike; it did not know where she would strike. To know that would require breaking into the Japanese naval codes, and there was only one catch: Since mid-1939, America had not read a single message in the main Japanese naval code on the same day it had been sent. For most of the period from June 1, 1939, to December 7, 1941, the Navy was working on naval messages that were months, or even over a year, old."

Hmmmm. They knew Japan was going to strike, but they did not know where.

Hmmm, where could it be?????

Hey, maybe we could ask the US ambassador to Japan. Of the major US military bases in the Eastern Pacific, Pearl Harbor was closest to Japan, the most vulnerable to air attack and it had the prize of three aircraft carriers in her harbor when the Japanese strike force left port.

U.S. intelligence services had direct access to Japanese coded transmissions, so U.S. officials were well aware that the Japanese were planning something against them—they just did not know precisely what. One man in particular, Admiral Richmond K. Turner, strongly urged that U.S. forces be placed on a higher state of alert, as he was particularly concerned about the U.S. Navy base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. During previous U.S. war games and exercises, Pearl Harbor had proven highly vulnerable to surprise attacks. Although Turner’s advice was considered, only some of his recommendations were implemented.

http://www.sparknotes.com/history/european/ww2/section6.rhtml

O.K, so some Admiral guy, pfft, what the hell does he know, was particuarly concerned about Pearl Harbor, the US Ambassador to Japan had warned months earlier of an attack at Pearl, Admiral Richardson destroyed his career because he fought FDR on leaving the fleet vulnerable at Pearl, it was our closest MAJOR base to Japan, the most vulnerable, had the most targets, including a prize of three aircraft carriers is her harbor when the Japanese strike force left Japan, so hmmmmmmmmmm, where could the attack be?

# 1932 - In the Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercises, 152 aircraft carrier planes caught the defenders of Pearl Harbor completely by surprise. It was a Sunday.
# 1938 - Admiral Ernst King led a carrier-born airstrike from the USS Saratoga successfully against Pearl Harbor in another exercise.
# 1940 - FDR ordered the fleet transferred from the West Coast to its exposed position in Hawaii and ordered the fleet remain stationed at Pearl Harbor over complaints by its commander Admiral Richardson that there was inadequate protection from air attack and no protection from torpedo attack. Richardson felt so strongly that he twice disobeyed orders to berth his fleet there and he raised the issue personally with FDR in October and he was soon after replaced. His successor, Admiral Kimmel, also brought up the same issues with FDR in June 1941.

http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/pearl.html

Hmmmmmmm, where could the attack be?

/////////////

Actual scans of the McCollum memo

http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/McCollum/

////////

Advance Warning?
The Red Cross Connection

By Daryl S. Borgquist

Naval History, June 1999

http://www.usni.org/NavalHistory/Articles99/NHborgquist6.htm

/////

In 1973, former Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Adm. J.O. Richardson, Kimmel's predecessor, said that, "the Report of the Roberts Commission was the most unfair, unjust, and deceptively dishonest document ever printed by the Government Printing Office." Adm. Richardson was only able to say that because on February 21, 1944, 806 days after the attack, Capt. Laurance Safford blew the whistle to Adm. Kimmel about America's success decrypting Japanese codes prior to the Pearl Harbor attack.

The decrypted codes gave indications of the place of the Pearl Harbor attack, the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, the reason for the Pearl Harbor attack, and the deceit plan to cover the Pearl Harbor attack. Kimmel and Short received none of this information even though it was available in Washington, Manila and London. After learning about this, Adm. Kimmel initiated the next eight Pearl Harbor inquiries, and not surprisingly, the only one that accorded him the opportunity to defend himself -- the Naval Court of Inquiry -- exonerated him.

Congress passed a law in 2000 recommending that this administration advance Kimmel and Short on the retired list. To date, the administration has not done so, and refuses to release requested information explaining why.

http://usa.mediamonitors.net/headlines/on_the_politics_of_national_com mission

////////

The Navy Court of Inquiry, met between 20 July 1944 and 20 October 1944. The net result of the Courts inquiry is the complete exoneration of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel while serving as Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet on 7 December 1941. We single out for special mention this portion of the Opinion.

Based on Findings XVIII and XIX, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Harold R. Stark, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had regarding the Japanese situation and, especially, in that, on the morning of 7 December, he did not transmit immediately information which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon. [10]

http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v08/v08p205_Merson.html

/////////

Admiral Richardson lost his job because he dared to argue against FDR's wish to station the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii. Why would he risk his career like that?

For a great piece on Admiral Richardson, see..................

http://www.usna.com/classes/1942/UDT4.htm

Besides being a non-deterrent, he reasoned, the Fleet was geographically vulnerable, 2,000 miles closer to the potential enemy. Throughout 1940, he sent numerous letters and dispatches to Washington pointing out the flaws in Fleet combat readiness and requesting the resources to rectify them. He emphasized them all to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox during the latter's visit to Hawaii....all to no avail.



Then he made two trips to Washington to apprise President Roosevelt of the situation and seek his intercession to bring the fleet up to fighting trim or, failing that, return it to its West Coast, less vulnerable bases. Roosevelt did neither.



Political considerations dominated Roosevelt’s thinking. He clung to the illusion that keeping the Fleet in Hawaii would discourage Japanese aggression. Moreover, it was election year and he was more interested in his political image as a peace guarantor than in preparing the nation for self defense.



When his second eye-to-eye appeal to Roosevelt was rebuffed, Oct. 7, 1940, Richardson tried to shock the president by telling him bluntly that the senior officers of the Navy did not have the trust and confidence in their civilian leadership for the successful prosecution of a war in the Pacific. Roosevelt was shocked all right, but he did not change his policies. Instead, he changed the command of the Fleet to a new incumbent, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and history recorded the results.



In its reporting of the incident, L1FE magazine referred to the relieved commander as "Burly Admiral Richardson." A dictionary defines "burly" as "rough, bulky and bluff." That was not the Richardson I knew. Big he was, but courtly and courteous....a true Texas gentleman of the old school. He was a God-fearing man of high moral principles. He lived by a motto given him by his Stepmother when he left Texas for the Naval Academy: '`The wise man seeks to outshine himself. The fool seeks to outshine others."



Despite the humiliating ignominy of his firing, and the belated vindication of his assessment of the pre-Pearl Harbor situation, he maintained a stoic silence in public on the issues swirling around the turbulent years of World War II and beyond, never criticizing Roosevelt or any of the other key players in the drama. He burned his diary because he feared he had recorded some observations that, if published, might hurt others. Only when he was terminally ill did he authorize the publication of his memoirs.

////////

In the first part of 1941, joint military staff conferences took place between the Americans, British, Canadians, and the Dutch to develop plans for global war against the Axis, although the U.S. was not yet a belligerent. Of greatest importance for the Pacific theater was a meeting in Singapore in April 1941 between the Americans, British, and Dutch. Out of this meeting came the ADB (sometimes called ABCD because of the Canadian involvement in the other meetings) agreement, which committed the conferees to joint action to fight Japan if Japanese forces crossed a geographic line that approximated the northerly extremity of the Dutch East Indies. War would result if Japan invaded British or Dutch territories in Southern Asia or moved into neutral Thailand. In essence, Roosevelt had committed the U.S. to war even if American territory were not attacked. And he had committed the U.S. to war even if the Japanese did not fire the first shot. Prange, Goldstein, and Dillon try to argue that the ADB agreement did not actually commit the U.S. to make war but only "outlined the military strategy to be followed if the U.S. joined the conflict."12 This interpretation, however, ignores the fact that central to the ADB agreement was the criterion for joining the conflict--the Japanese crossing of a particular geographical line. Even one of the early defenders of the Roosevelt administration, Herbert Feis, acknowledged this significance in his history: "Had not the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, this line would have become the boundary between war and peace."13

A secret memo General MacArthur received in September 1941 underscored the offensive purposes that American forces would undertake. It read

commence operation as soon as possible, concentrating on propaganda, terrorism, and sabotage of Japanese communications and military installations . . . Assassination of individual Japanese should also be considered. Prepare to defeat Japan without suffering grievous loss ourselves. . . We must base mobile forces as near to Japan as is practicable. . . To the west there is China where air bases are already being prepared and stocked. . . . to the south there is Luzon in the Philippine Islands, within easy air range of Hainan, Formosa, and Canton, and extreme range of southern Japan. . . Development of further air bases is proceeding.17

http://www.charlesmartelsociety.org/toq/vol1no2/ss-pearlharbor.html

/////////

On 23 June 1941 - one day after Hitler's attack on Russia - Secretary of the Interior and FDR's Advisor Harold Ickes wrote a memo for the President in which he pointed out that "there might develop from the embargoing of oil to Japan such a situation as would make it not only possible but easy to get into this war in an effective way. And if we should thus indirectly be brought in, we would avoid the criticism that we had gone in as an ally of communistic Russia."

On 18 October Ickes noted in his diary: "For a long time I have believed that our best entrance into the war would be by way of Japan."

The U.S. had cracked key Japanese codes before the attack. FDR received "raw" translations of all key messages. On 24 September 1941 Washington deciphered a message from the Naval Intelligence HQ in Tokyo to Japan's consul general in Honolulu, requesting grid of exact locations of U.S. Navy ships in the harbor. Commanders in Hawaii were not warned.

Sixty years later the U.S. Government still refuses to identify or declassify many pre-attack decrypts on the grounds of "national security."

On November 25 Secretary of War Stimson wrote in his diary that FDR said an attack was likely within days, and asked "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without too much danger to ourselves. In spite of the risk involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors." On November 25 FDR received a "positive war warning" from Churchill that the Japanese would strike against America at the end of the first week in December. This warning caused the President to do an abrupt about-face on plans for a time-buying modus vivendi with Japan and it resulted in Secretary of State Hull's deliberately provocative ultimatum of 26 November 1941 that guaranteed war.

On November 26 Washington ordered both US aircraft carriers, the Enterprise and the Lexington, out of Pearl Harbor "as soon as possible". This order included stripping Pearl of 50 planes or 40 percent of its already inadequate fighter protection. On the same day Cordell Hull issued his ultimatum demanding full Japanese withdrawal from Indochina and all China. U.S. Ambassador to Japan called this "The document that touched the button that started the war."

http://truedemocracy.net/td4/54s-who.html

////////

I leave you with one last piece for your consideration........

Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy
Charles Lutton

http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v11/v11p431_Lutton.html

[Marcfj]

Angela wrote:

Exactly Moreover even if FDR had known about the attack do you really think he would have left all the Pacific battleships fleet like a sitting duck in PH?.

No, I think he would have removed the carriers which were the most valuable ships.

Angela wrote: Battleships (moreover WWI vintage battleships) were useless if not escorted by carriers as the tragic end of the Repulse and the Prince of Wales in Singapore would have demonstrated.

Precisely!

[Angela]

Marcfj wrote: Angela wrote:

Exactly Moreover even if FDR had known about the attack do you really think he would have left all the Pacific battleships fleet like a sitting duck in PH?.

No, I think he would have removed the carriers which were the most valuable ships.

Angela wrote: Battleships (moreover WWI vintage battleships) were useless if not escorted by carriers as the tragic end of the Repulse and the Prince of Wales in Singapore would have demonstrated.

Precisely!

Little proble that in 1941 everybody but the Japanese navy considered the battleship as the capital ship and the carriers only had a supporting role ;)

[Katsumoto]

Norrin Radd wrote: XENOPHEN,

There is little doubt left that FDR had foreknowledge of a Japanese attack.

It can be debated if FDR knew Pearl was the target, but this is of little consequence, as the McCollum memo, the intercepted messages and all the other evidence proves that FDR intentionally provoked a Japanese attack and the evidence also indicates that the reason the Pacific Fleet was moved to Pearl was to bait the Japanese into attacking us there. After all, look at what WWII required of the American people. There were not many families that didn't have a loved one serving either in the armed forces, or at home in the war effort. There was gas rationing, food rationing, sugar rationing, this was not Viet Nam, or Iraq, this war required the comittment of almost all Americans and for this kind of resolve a brutal attack on US soil was needed to guarantee support for a long, expensive war in which many sacrifices would need to be made by the American people. The attack was allowed to happen so that FDR could gain this support and also so that the Japanese wold not suspect we had broken their codes.

It is o.k. to listen to other's opinions, but you must do your own research if you want to get to the truth. You should be skeptical of all opinions, even mine.

The first link presented to you in this thread is the best short piece on the subject. It is from the New American and it includes most of the vital information.

Do not be afraid to copy and paste any pieces from that article into a search engine which you would like more information on, or that you find difficult to believe. All of it can be verified.

I will add some more info, but please remember, this is not by any means all of the evidence.


Here we go...........

/////////

January 27, 1941 Joseph C. Grew, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, wired Washington that he had learned information that Japan, in the event of trouble with the U.S., was planning a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

April: U.S. intelligence officers continue to monitor Japanese secret messages. In a program code-named Magic, U.S. intelligence uses a machine to decode Japan's diplomatic dispatches. Washington does not communicate all the available information to all commands, including Short and Kimmel in Hawaii.

May: Japanese Adm. Nomura informs his superiors that he has learned Americans were reading his message traffic. No one in Tokyo believes the code could have been broken. The code is not changed.

July: Throughout the summer, Adm. Yamamoto trains his forces and finalizes the planning of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Sept. 24: The "bomb plot" message from Japanese naval intelligence to Japan's consul general in Honolulu requesting a grid of exact locations of ships in Pearl Harbor is deciphered. The information is not shared with the Hawaii's Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short.

http://history.acusd.edu/gen/WW2Timeline/RD-PEARL.html

////////

After 24 November 1941, events in U.S.-Japanese diplomatic negotiations moved very swiftly to their climax on 7 December. A number of important diplomatic messages passed between Tokyo and Washington between July and November; these are summarized below. These early messages and those exchanged after 24 November which have been selected for inclusion in this appendix are so revealing that it is easy to lose sight of the fact that U.S. officials were often reading these messages at about the same time as the Japanese diplomats. The "War Warning" messages sent by OPNAV beginning on 24 November have also been included in this appendix to insure that the reader fully appreciates their correlation with events occurring in diplomatic circles.

N 25 Nov A circular message from Tokyo to Washington on 15 November with detailed instructions on how to destroy code machines.
N 28 Nov A circular message from Tokyo to Washington on 19 November with detailed instructions to listen for "Winds Execute" messages to be added to Japanese news broadcasts in case of diplomatic emergencies involving the U.S., England, or Russia. When heard, embassies were to destroy all codes, papers, etc.
N 26 Nov A circular message from Tokyo to Washington on 19 November, sent after above message but translated earlier, contained instructions to listen for an abbreviated "Winds" message in general intelligence broadcasts repeated five times at beginning and end, i.e., only the word East, West, or North would be spoken five times.
A 28 Nov Circular message from Tokyo on 20 November said U.S.-Japanese situation would not "permit any further conciliation by us" and rejected all feelings of optimism.
A 22 Nov Tokyo informed Washington on 22 November that, by 29 November if agreement had not been reached, "things are automatically going to happen."
24 Nov OPNAV message warned of possible Japanese "aggressive movement" toward Philippines, Guam, or any direction.
A 26 Nov Tokyo message to Washington on 26 November contained telephone brevity code to be used because "telegrams take too long." The code covered topics under negotiation, situations, and personalities.
27 Nov OPNAV WAR WARNING message.
A 29 Nov Message on 26 November from Nomura to Tokyo recommended that Japan break diplomatic relations with the U.S. in a formal manner rather than "enter on scheduled operations" without prior announcement particularly since "our intention is a strict military secret." A formal break would avoid responsibility for the "rupture."
N 2 Dec A circular message from Tokyo on 27 November contained another brevity code in which codewords were assigned specific meanings, e.g., "Japan's and USA's military forces have clashed" equals, "HIZIKATA MINAMI."

-68-

page 69

N 28 Nov A telephone conversation on 27 November between Washington (Kurusu) and a foreign office official in Tokyo named Yamamoto. Tokyo used telephone code to convey a message referring to an attack on the U.S.
29 Nov OPNAV WAR WARNING message. Text indicated Army had also been notified.
A 1 Dec Message from Tokyo to Berlin on 30 November directed the Japanese ambassador to inform Germany that U.S. relations had ruptured and that "war may break out quicker than anyone dreams." Regarding Russia, Tokyo stated that if Russia reacted to her move southward and joined hands with England and the U.S., Japan was "ready to turn on her with all our might." Tokyo requested the Germans and Italians to maintain "absolute secrecy."
N 1 Dec Message from Tokyo to Washington discussed means of allaying U.S. suspicions regarding Japanese reactions to the U.S. proposal of 26 November. News media were to be advised that "negotiations are continuing." A plan was discussed to make a formal presentation in Washington vice Tokyo. The message queried president's reaction to Tojo's bellicose speech.
N 1 Dec A circular message from Tokyo on 1 December advised Washington that London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila had been instructed to destroy code machines.
2 Dec OPNAV instructed CINCAF to establish defensive patrols.
A 4 Dec Message from Rome to Washington on 2 December said that Tokyo believed the Hull note of 26 November "absolutely unacceptable," and "a conflict(?) in the near future is considered very probable." Rome also said Tokyo believed American Navy in Pacific was "not strong enough for decisive action."
N 3 Dec Message from Tokyo to Washington on 2 December instructed Washington to burn all codes except one copy of the codes being used in conjunction with the machine (i.e., PURPLE, the O Code, and the abbreviation code. Washington was also to burn messages, other secret papers, and telegraphic codes, and possibly to destroy one machine.
3 Dec An OPNAV message regarding Japanese instructions to burn codes.
N 6 Dec Messages from Berlin and Rome to Tokyo on 3 December described Japanese attempts to obtain German and Italian assurances that they would follow the Japanese declaration of war on the U.S. with their own. Hitler was not available, but Mussolini agreed.

-69-

page 70

4 Dec OPNAV ordered U.S. codes destroyed.
N 6 Dec Washington confirmed destruction of codes on 5 December.
N 6 Dec Tokyo message on 5 December ordered four individuals in Washington to leave immediately. The translation contained a note which identified one as head of Japanese espionage in the Western Hemisphere and the others as his assistants.
A 6 Dec Tokyo message to Washington on 6 December alerted Nomura that a formal reply to the 26 November note had been prepared, was very long, and would be in 14 parts.

The messages quoted in this appendix are taken from Radio Intelligence Publication Number 87Z, "The Role of Radio Intelligence in the American-Japanese Naval War," Vol. I, Section A, by Ensign John V. Connorton, USNR. SRH-012, RG 457.

http://www.history.navy.mil/books/comint/ComInt-B.html

These are from What Really Happened.

I have not verified these, but I can't think of any "fake" government documents I have ever found on the net.


Dec. 3 N 6991 25644 Tokyo 111 Make your "ships in harbor"

report irregular but twice a

week. (Nov. 15, 1941-J19).

**Dec. 4 N 7001 JD #7001 or #6975 is believed to

be the (missing) translation of

the Winds Message.

*Dec. 3 A 7017 25640 Tokyo 867 Washington burn all codes except

one copy of "Oite" (Pa-K2) and

"L" (LA). Stop using the code

machine and destroy it com-

pletely when you have finished

this, wire back "HARUNA."

Destroy all messages files and

other secret documents. (Dec. 2,

1941.)

#Dec. 4 A 7029 25694 Tokyo 114 Investigate fleet air bases in

or 111 Hawaii (Nov. 20, 1941-J19.)

#Dec. 5 A 7063 25773 Tokyo 113 Report ships in Pearl Harbor,

Manila Bay, etc. (Nov. 18, 1941 -

J19.)

#Dec. 5 A 7064 25772 Honolulu 224 Spy report. (Nov. 18, 1941)

*Dec. 5 N 7086 25823 Tokyo 122 In the future report even when

there are no (ship) movements

(Nov 29, 1941-J19.)

#Dec. 5 N 7091 25787 Tokyo 2443 London discontinue use of code

machine and dispose of it immed-

iately. (Dec. 1)

http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/pearl/www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/magic.html

////////////

More From the NAVY Site..............

"This appendix contains seventy-two selected Japanese naval messages intercepted between September and 4 December 1941 by Navy intercept sites at Hawaii, Guam, and Corregidor; these messages were not decoded and translated until September 1945-May 1946."

[not pasting any of these since they were allegedly translated after the attack-norrin]

http://www.history.navy.mil/books/comint/ComInt-A.html

///

Even if you only look at the diplomatic messages, ruling out all the other evidence, it doesn't take a rocket scientist to see what's going on.

Here is an interesting piece I just found while looking for the messages.........

"America's very success, in September 1940, in breaking the Japanese diplomatic cipher, code named "Purple," had the ironic effect of distracting attention from where it could have been more profitably focused in the fateful months leading up to Pearl Harbor. The Purple cipher carried the highest-level diplomatic messages of the Japanese Empire; this was intelligence of such remarkable value that it was given the code name magic. The Purple cipher was generated by a complex machine. It used a cascade of rotating switches to encipher every letter of a message in a different key from the last or the next. In one position of the switches the letter A would become G; in the next it would become P. The U.S. Army's code breakers had, in eighteen months of intense effort, deduced the wiring and setup of the machine without ever seeing one, a feat of pure analysis the likes of which had scarcely before been seen. After hastily soldering together telephone switches and relays to produce a replica of the machine, they proceeded to decode the Japanese messages almost as quickly as they arrived."

"On the morning of December 3, 1941, a Purple message came through ordering Japan's embassy in Washington to destroy its code books, and even one of its two vital Purple machines. Frank Rowlett, a senior cryptanalyst of the Army's Signal Intelligence Service, arrived at his office at noon that day from a meeting, plucked this latest magic decrypt from his in-box, and proceeded to read its contents with mounting incredulity. With only a single machine it would obviously be impossible for the embassy to continue its normal flow of business. Colonel Otis Sadtler, who was in charge of distributing the magic decrypts, showed up in Rowlett's office at that moment and began to pepper him with questions. Had the Japanese ever sent anything like this before? Could they be getting ready to change their codes? Perhaps they suspected their current codes had been broken? Then the only possible meaning of this extraordinary message sank in. Sadtler pulled himself to attention. "Rowlett, do you know what this means? It means Japan is about to go to war with the United States!" And, decrypt in hand, Sadtler took off literally running down the corridor of the Munitions Building to alert the head of Army intelligence."


http://www.worldwar2history.info/Midway/war.html

The next piece comes from a person who doesn't believe in foreknowledge of the attack on Pearl.

How can that be?

The author continues...........

"But diplomatic communications are not the place where military orders are delivered. America knew that Japan was going to strike; it did not know where she would strike. To know that would require breaking into the Japanese naval codes, and there was only one catch: Since mid-1939, America had not read a single message in the main Japanese naval code on the same day it had been sent. For most of the period from June 1, 1939, to December 7, 1941, the Navy was working on naval messages that were months, or even over a year, old."

Hmmmm. They knew Japan was going to strike, but they did not know where.

Hmmm, where could it be?????

Hey, maybe we could ask the US ambassador to Japan. Of the major US military bases in the Eastern Pacific, Pearl Harbor was closest to Japan, the most vulnerable to air attack and it had the prize of three aircraft carriers in her harbor when the Japanese strike force left port.

U.S. intelligence services had direct access to Japanese coded transmissions, so U.S. officials were well aware that the Japanese were planning something against them—they just did not know precisely what. One man in particular, Admiral Richmond K. Turner, strongly urged that U.S. forces be placed on a higher state of alert, as he was particularly concerned about the U.S. Navy base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. During previous U.S. war games and exercises, Pearl Harbor had proven highly vulnerable to surprise attacks. Although Turner’s advice was considered, only some of his recommendations were implemented.

http://www.sparknotes.com/history/european/ww2/section6.rhtml

O.K, so some Admiral guy, pfft, what the hell does he know, was particuarly concerned about Pearl Harbor, the US Ambassador to Japan had warned months earlier of an attack at Pearl, Admiral Richardson destroyed his career because he fought FDR on leaving the fleet vulnerable at Pearl, it was our closest MAJOR base to Japan, the most vulnerable, had the most targets, including a prize of three aircraft carriers is her harbor when the Japanese strike force left Japan, so hmmmmmmmmmm, where could the attack be?

# 1932 - In the Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercises, 152 aircraft carrier planes caught the defenders of Pearl Harbor completely by surprise. It was a Sunday.
# 1938 - Admiral Ernst King led a carrier-born airstrike from the USS Saratoga successfully against Pearl Harbor in another exercise.
# 1940 - FDR ordered the fleet transferred from the West Coast to its exposed position in Hawaii and ordered the fleet remain stationed at Pearl Harbor over complaints by its commander Admiral Richardson that there was inadequate protection from air attack and no protection from torpedo attack. Richardson felt so strongly that he twice disobeyed orders to berth his fleet there and he raised the issue personally with FDR in October and he was soon after replaced. His successor, Admiral Kimmel, also brought up the same issues with FDR in June 1941.

http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/pearl.html

Hmmmmmmm, where could the attack be?

/////////////

Actual scans of the McCollum memo

http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/McCollum/

////////

Advance Warning?
The Red Cross Connection

By Daryl S. Borgquist

Naval History, June 1999

http://www.usni.org/NavalHistory/Articles99/NHborgquist6.htm

/////

In 1973, former Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Adm. J.O. Richardson, Kimmel's predecessor, said that, "the Report of the Roberts Commission was the most unfair, unjust, and deceptively dishonest document ever printed by the Government Printing Office." Adm. Richardson was only able to say that because on February 21, 1944, 806 days after the attack, Capt. Laurance Safford blew the whistle to Adm. Kimmel about America's success decrypting Japanese codes prior to the Pearl Harbor attack.

The decrypted codes gave indications of the place of the Pearl Harbor attack, the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, the reason for the Pearl Harbor attack, and the deceit plan to cover the Pearl Harbor attack. Kimmel and Short received none of this information even though it was available in Washington, Manila and London. After learning about this, Adm. Kimmel initiated the next eight Pearl Harbor inquiries, and not surprisingly, the only one that accorded him the opportunity to defend himself -- the Naval Court of Inquiry -- exonerated him.

Congress passed a law in 2000 recommending that this administration advance Kimmel and Short on the retired list. To date, the administration has not done so, and refuses to release requested information explaining why.

http://usa.mediamonitors.net/headlines/on_the_politics_of_national_com mission

////////

The Navy Court of Inquiry, met between 20 July 1944 and 20 October 1944. The net result of the Courts inquiry is the complete exoneration of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel while serving as Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet on 7 December 1941. We single out for special mention this portion of the Opinion.

Based on Findings XVIII and XIX, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Harold R. Stark, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had regarding the Japanese situation and, especially, in that, on the morning of 7 December, he did not transmit immediately information which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon. [10]

http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v08/v08p205_Merson.html

/////////

Admiral Richardson lost his job because he dared to argue against FDR's wish to station the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii. Why would he risk his career like that?

For a great piece on Admiral Richardson, see..................

http://www.usna.com/classes/1942/UDT4.htm

Besides being a non-deterrent, he reasoned, the Fleet was geographically vulnerable, 2,000 miles closer to the potential enemy. Throughout 1940, he sent numerous letters and dispatches to Washington pointing out the flaws in Fleet combat readiness and requesting the resources to rectify them. He emphasized them all to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox during the latter's visit to Hawaii....all to no avail.



Then he made two trips to Washington to apprise President Roosevelt of the situation and seek his intercession to bring the fleet up to fighting trim or, failing that, return it to its West Coast, less vulnerable bases. Roosevelt did neither.



Political considerations dominated Roosevelt’s thinking. He clung to the illusion that keeping the Fleet in Hawaii would discourage Japanese aggression. Moreover, it was election year and he was more interested in his political image as a peace guarantor than in preparing the nation for self defense.



When his second eye-to-eye appeal to Roosevelt was rebuffed, Oct. 7, 1940, Richardson tried to shock the president by telling him bluntly that the senior officers of the Navy did not have the trust and confidence in their civilian leadership for the successful prosecution of a war in the Pacific. Roosevelt was shocked all right, but he did not change his policies. Instead, he changed the command of the Fleet to a new incumbent, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and history recorded the results.



In its reporting of the incident, L1FE magazine referred to the relieved commander as "Burly Admiral Richardson." A dictionary defines "burly" as "rough, bulky and bluff." That was not the Richardson I knew. Big he was, but courtly and courteous....a true Texas gentleman of the old school. He was a God-fearing man of high moral principles. He lived by a motto given him by his Stepmother when he left Texas for the Naval Academy: '`The wise man seeks to outshine himself. The fool seeks to outshine others."



Despite the humiliating ignominy of his firing, and the belated vindication of his assessment of the pre-Pearl Harbor situation, he maintained a stoic silence in public on the issues swirling around the turbulent years of World War II and beyond, never criticizing Roosevelt or any of the other key players in the drama. He burned his diary because he feared he had recorded some observations that, if published, might hurt others. Only when he was terminally ill did he authorize the publication of his memoirs.

////////

In the first part of 1941, joint military staff conferences took place between the Americans, British, Canadians, and the Dutch to develop plans for global war against the Axis, although the U.S. was not yet a belligerent. Of greatest importance for the Pacific theater was a meeting in Singapore in April 1941 between the Americans, British, and Dutch. Out of this meeting came the ADB (sometimes called ABCD because of the Canadian involvement in the other meetings) agreement, which committed the conferees to joint action to fight Japan if Japanese forces crossed a geographic line that approximated the northerly extremity of the Dutch East Indies. War would result if Japan invaded British or Dutch territories in Southern Asia or moved into neutral Thailand. In essence, Roosevelt had committed the U.S. to war even if American territory were not attacked. And he had committed the U.S. to war even if the Japanese did not fire the first shot. Prange, Goldstein, and Dillon try to argue that the ADB agreement did not actually commit the U.S. to make war but only "outlined the military strategy to be followed if the U.S. joined the conflict."12 This interpretation, however, ignores the fact that central to the ADB agreement was the criterion for joining the conflict--the Japanese crossing of a particular geographical line. Even one of the early defenders of the Roosevelt administration, Herbert Feis, acknowledged this significance in his history: "Had not the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, this line would have become the boundary between war and peace."13

A secret memo General MacArthur received in September 1941 underscored the offensive purposes that American forces would undertake. It read

commence operation as soon as possible, concentrating on propaganda, terrorism, and sabotage of Japanese communications and military installations . . . Assassination of individual Japanese should also be considered. Prepare to defeat Japan without suffering grievous loss ourselves. . . We must base mobile forces as near to Japan as is practicable. . . To the west there is China where air bases are already being prepared and stocked. . . . to the south there is Luzon in the Philippine Islands, within easy air range of Hainan, Formosa, and Canton, and extreme range of southern Japan. . . Development of further air bases is proceeding.17

http://www.charlesmartelsociety.org/toq/vol1no2/ss-pearlharbor.html

/////////

On 23 June 1941 - one day after Hitler's attack on Russia - Secretary of the Interior and FDR's Advisor Harold Ickes wrote a memo for the President in which he pointed out that "there might develop from the embargoing of oil to Japan such a situation as would make it not only possible but easy to get into this war in an effective way. And if we should thus indirectly be brought in, we would avoid the criticism that we had gone in as an ally of communistic Russia."

On 18 October Ickes noted in his diary: "For a long time I have believed that our best entrance into the war would be by way of Japan."

The U.S. had cracked key Japanese codes before the attack. FDR received "raw" translations of all key messages. On 24 September 1941 Washington deciphered a message from the Naval Intelligence HQ in Tokyo to Japan's consul general in Honolulu, requesting grid of exact locations of U.S. Navy ships in the harbor. Commanders in Hawaii were not warned.

Sixty years later the U.S. Government still refuses to identify or declassify many pre-attack decrypts on the grounds of "national security."

On November 25 Secretary of War Stimson wrote in his diary that FDR said an attack was likely within days, and asked "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without too much danger to ourselves. In spite of the risk involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors." On November 25 FDR received a "positive war warning" from Churchill that the Japanese would strike against America at the end of the first week in December. This warning caused the President to do an abrupt about-face on plans for a time-buying modus vivendi with Japan and it resulted in Secretary of State Hull's deliberately provocative ultimatum of 26 November 1941 that guaranteed war.

On November 26 Washington ordered both US aircraft carriers, the Enterprise and the Lexington, out of Pearl Harbor "as soon as possible". This order included stripping Pearl of 50 planes or 40 percent of its already inadequate fighter protection. On the same day Cordell Hull issued his ultimatum demanding full Japanese withdrawal from Indochina and all China. U.S. Ambassador to Japan called this "The document that touched the button that started the war."

http://truedemocracy.net/td4/54s-who.html

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I leave you with one last piece for your consideration........

Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy
Charles Lutton

http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v11/v11p431_Lutton.html

:owned: Norrin Radd OWNS this entire thread.

[superskippy]

Quote: Their declaration was just a formality being that we had already initiated hostilities with them by attacking their ships.

I just wanted to say that their is a huge difference between scant or random encounters at sea and throwing a million men across the English Channel and marching on Paris and pushing to the Elbe.